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Abstract
This dissertation concentrates on the case of organizations that engage with the future with
the intent to shape it. Engaging with the future implies identifying and pursuing opportunities
aligned with one’s vision for the future and that have the potential to enact the environment.
My specific focus is on the properties that can make the organization more effective at
pursuing its objectives, to understand why these properties are important and how they can
enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the future. The study builds on the extreme
case of Greenpeace International, an organization that dedicates its actions to the enactment
of a particular vision for the future. This vision implies the protection of the environment and
the prevention of the depletion of species. The case is based on historiography. It uses
historical documentation from Greenpeace International archives to reconstruct the intentions,
structures, processes, and practices of the organization as well as the rationale behind its
actions. The historical documentation is analyzed through periodization as well as through
analytic constructs aligned with the process of engaging with the future. My study highlights
the importance of the properties of flexibility (cognitive, operational, and financial), stability
(attentional, structural, and in processes), and diversity (institutional, structural, and in the
portfolio of action alternatives). What the research demonstrates is that flexibility, stability,
and diversity are important to identify, pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with one’s
vision for the future. Implications for organization theory, strategic management, and
international management are discussed.
Keywords: Engaging with the Future; Organizational Properties; Enactment; Case Study;
Historiography; Greenpeace International
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“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to
adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.”
- Quote from “Man and Superman” (1903), a play by George Bernard Shaw
“I am an unreasonable man! And Greenpeace's success to-date is based on the same
premise of trying to adapt the world to our long-term goals and objectives! We are a
most unreasonable gang of men and women - and, if we are to be worth our salt,
precisely this is expected of us, with dedication.”
- David McTaggart on the role of Greenpeace in society (1992)

Chapter 1
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of time, there have been organizations with the odd intention to adapt the
world to themselves. From the Catholic Church to Greenpeace and PETA, these
organizations have dedicated their actions to the enactment of their vision for the future, to
make this vision become reality. These organizations are not limited to extremes. In fact, we
can find them in all spheres of society. Alcoa, at different moments of its history, attempted
to introduce innovative materials to address challenges companies were expected to face in
decades ahead but were not necessarily aware of. Monsanto pushed for the introduction of
genetically modified organisms at a time when there was no market for it. Google, through its
activities, attempts to reinvent the way we use information. Apple aims to change our
interaction with technology, to make it more intuitive. Not all these initiatives can be
considered successes, and some led to unintended consequences, but in large part, innovation
and progress – economic, social, or environmental – depend on these organizations.
Organizations that attempt to adapt the world to themselves can be described as
engaging with the future: they go beyond the mere adaptation of their activities to a changing
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environment, and seek to fundamentally change that same environment.1 Changing the
environment can take different forms: it can be a change in legislation, a change in the
acceptable practices within an industry, a change in the preferences of individuals caused by
a change in values and beliefs, or the introduction of innovative products and services. This
process is called enactment (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Weick, 1988): by acting, individuals
and organizations create structures, constraints, and opportunities that did not exist or were
not necessarily noticeable before their actions. This is how we can evaluate whether or not an
organization is successful at engaging with the future. For organizations that base their
actions on the desire to enact a particular vision of the future, endurance in time is only a
condition to achieve higher aims: all successes depend on their ability to shape the landscape
through residuum of changes in their environment.
In the literature, engaging with the future is often looked at from the perspective of
entrepreneurs attempting to develop and implement novel ideas (e.g. Felin, Kauffman, Koppi,
& Longo, 2014) or from the perspective of institutional change at the level of the
environment (e.g. Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). These perspectives
are important and contributed to highlight the difficulties of enabling important changes in
the organization. Established organizations, however, face different sets of constraints and
challenges. Internally, it requires leaders to develop foresight and beliefs with regards to the
future, and to have this vision shared throughout the organization (Tsoukas & Shepherd,
2004). Because organizations are governed by political coalitions rather than by unitary
voices (March, 1962), this takes place through persuasion rather than hierarchy (Smircich &
Stubbart, 1985). Externally, it requires the organization to undertake actions that have the
1

The term “environment” is used interchangeably with “landscape”. King, Felin & Whetten (2010)
conceptualize the landscape based on the position of the organization, including within this landscape the
markets, the state, communities and individuals. I embrace the same definition of the organization’s landscape
and adopt the view that shaping the landscape corresponds to shaping the future, as shaping the future takes
place in the present, one step at a time.
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potential to alter other’s view of reality (Gavetti, 2012; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985), to favor
one future over alternative possibilities. In doing so, they are likely to go against the norm
and to elicit resistance, as altering other’s view of reality implies attempting to change what
they take for granted in terms of beliefs and behaviors. Because of this, engaging with the
future with the intent to shape it is expected to require persistence (March, 1995) as well as
opportunism (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).
In the recent years, a number of authors have attempted to explain why firms fail
(succeed) at engaging with the future (or the distant, more generally), either empirically (e.g.
Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010) or theoretically (e.g. Gavetti, 2012).
There is a consensus that engaging with the future involves cognition and actions, and the
feedback received from actions can inform representations of the landscape which, in -turn,
will influence future actions. Explanations for firms’ failures (successes), however, often lie
at the bottom of the organization level, focusing on the social practices that enable strategic
foresight (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010), or on strategic leaders'2
ability to overcome the challenges associated with engaging with opportunities that are
cognitively distant (Gavetti, 2012). These explanations are incomplete as they ignore the
unique properties of organizations as social actors capable of behaving in a purposeful and
intentional manner (King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010). As a social actor, the organization “can
exert influence on individuals, shape communities, and transform [its] environments” (King
et al., 2010, p. 292). It can also develop unique properties that have the potential to mediate
its ability to act on its environment (King et al., 2010). These properties are important
because engaging with the future is expected to be a serendipitous process. If leaders cannot

2

“Strategic leaders” refers to individuals in a position to impact the strategy of their organization. They include
senior management as well as other key individuals in the development of the strategy of an organization.

3

predict pathways to the future, they can nevertheless favor the adoption of specific features
that will enhance their firm’s ability to engage with the future. 3
In contrast with previous literature, which anchored their explanations around
strategic leaders (i.e. individuals who are in a position of influence on the organization’s
future) (e.g. Gavetti, 2012; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014) or on the social practices that enable
strategic foresight (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010), I center my
investigations on the organization itself and on the properties that can enhance the
organization’s ability to engage with the future. Properties correspond to specific features
that can be used to describe an organization. They are attributed to the organization as
opposed to individuals because they are enabled through the culture, the structures, the
processes, and the practices that have been adopted by organizational members over the years.
Focusing on these properties is important for both theory and practice. If strategic leaders are
expected to build the future and to ensure that their organization will last for years to come,
they cannot be involved in all spheres of the organization’s activities. Creating the right
context is considered the task that has the greatest impact on their firm’s longevity
(Burgelman & Grove, 2007). Hence, my research can provide insights on a phenomenon that
has received scant attention in the past. It can also lead to prescriptions that can inform
strategic leaders in organizations on the properties or qualities that can help their organization
succeed at engaging with the future.
To generate insights on the properties that can enhance an organization’s ability to
engage with the future, I conduct an in-depth case study of an unconventional organization
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010): Greenpeace International. Born as a social movement,
3

I use the term “ability” over “capability” to recognize the fact that an organization has little control over its
environment when it comes to engage with the future. Capability entails being capable of something, such as
adapting to a changing environment. It suggests a practical ability. Ability, on the other hand, implies
possibility. With regards to the future, an organization cannot claim to be capable of shaping it: it is a mere
possibility that it can influence it, hence the focus on ability over capability.
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Greenpeace International has an explicit aim of raising awareness about environmental issues
to change the way individuals behave. As described by scholars, Greenpeace challenges
prevailing structures, and re-imagines possible meanings attached to current practices
(Kilduff, Mehra, & Dunn, 2011). It achieves this by conducting long-term campaigns on
specific environmental and social issues. These campaigns employ a variety of tactics,
including lobbying, protests, and non-violent direct actions. Over the years, Greenpeace
experienced several successes in its attempts to shape the landscape, but also numerous
failures. Its senior leadership tried to learn from these successes and failures to develop
structures, practices, and processes designed to improve the organization’s effectiveness with
regards to its goals and objectives.
In the current study, I revisit Greenpeace's history from 1979 to 2002 to understand:
(1) what properties contributed to Greenpeace’s ability to shape the landscape over the years;
(2) why these properties mattered; and (3) how they can influence the ability of an
organization to engage with the future. I achieve this by comparing the different periods in
Greenpeace's history and by analyzing internal documentation from Greenpeace's archives
(approximately 200,000 pages of internal documentation coming from meeting minutes,
internal reports, and internal communications), to develop contextualized explanations on the
reasons why they adopted specific features over the years, and with what effect on their
ability to shape the landscape. To facilitate the analytical process put in place to identify the
properties that contributed to Greenpeace's success (failures) and why/how they mattered, I
built on analytical constructs (Ingram, Rao, & Silverman, 2012; Rowlinson, Hassard, &
Decker, 2014). These analytical constructs were used to focus my attention on specific
aspects of the data. These constructs are “Rationality” (i.e. ability to identify opportunities),
“Plasticity” (i.e. ability to pursue opportunities), and “Shaping ability” (i.e. ability to shape
5

the landscape). These analytical constructs were proposed by Gavetti (2012) to explain why
firms fail at engaging with the distant. I used these constructs to describe Greenpeace across
the different periods of its history, to develop insights as to what contributed to enhance its
ability to identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.
My research highlights the importance of flexibility (cognitive, operational, and
financial), stability (attentional, structural, and financial), and diversity (institutional,
structural, and in the portfolio of action alternatives). These three properties – along with
their associate dimensions – are important if an organization is to succeed at identifying and
pursuing opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape. Flexibility allows an
organization to approach problems in different ways and to move resources around quickly,
to seize opportunities that are time-sensitive. Stability allows an organization to focus on its
primary mission and to concentrate its attention on environmental issues as opposed to
organizational issues. In the case of complex issues, stability is also important to identify
opportunities that can enact the landscape and which can only be identified through a
sustained focus on the environment. Diversity within an organization, on the other hand,
enhances the ability of an organization to develop creative ways to approach issues and
design interventions that have the potential to change the way individuals and other actors in
the environment behave. Combined, these three properties allow for greater effectiveness in
identifying and pursuing opportunities to shape the landscape and, ultimately, enhance an
organization’s ability to engage with the future.
My study makes a contribution to three different streams of research. First, it
contributes to organizational theory by focusing on one type of organization that has received
scant attention in the past. Organizations that engage with the future live with the
understanding that the future can be altered based on a specific set of desires (van der
6

Heijden, 2004). Organizations that engage with the future with the intent to change it are the
ones that create the rules for others, placing them at the forefront of the changes within their
environment. Most research focuses on “fitness” with its environment (Gavetti, 2012;
Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow, 2001, 2002) or ability to adapt to a changing environment (Gaba
& Joseph, 2013; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Adapting to a changing environment is
certainly important, but it reflects a conceptualization of the future as an unalterable path
(van der Heijden, 2004). The future, from a temporal perspective, corresponds to what has
not happened yet. It is in the realm of imagination, meaning that there is not one future but
many possible futures (March, 1995). The future can be changed, and projections of the
future can inform actions (Lord, Dinh, & Hoffman, 2014). By focusing on an organization
that engages with the future, I focus on one type of organization that received scant attention
in the literature but nevertheless occupies an important role in enabling institutional change.
Second, my study contributes to strategic management, in particular to a burgeoning
literature concerned with understanding why firms might fail (succeed) at engaging with the
distant (e.g. Gavetti, 2012). This literature can be associated with “behavioral strategy”
(Gavetti, 2012; Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011) which is concerned with addressing questions,
such as how to improve the psychological architecture of firms, how particular forms of
behavior arise in and among organizations, and how individual cognition scales to collective
behavior. It aims to ground strategic management theories in realistic assumptions about
human cognition, emotion, and social interaction to enrich strategy theory. It also calls for a
plurality of approaches to the study of strategy. My study contributes to this emerging stream
of research by providing insights that are grounded in the case of an organization that
engages with the distant future as part of its mission. The future contains issues to be and
issues in the making: problems that will have to be solved, threats to be avoided or mitigated,
7

and opportunities to be seized. Some of the issues that are to be encountered in the future can
be predicted, but many of them are unknown and are to remain unforeseen until they occur
(Lord et al., 2014). My research highlights that although an organization cannot predict or
anticipate a course of actions that will allow it to engage with the distant, it can adopt specific
features that will enhance its ability to identify and pursue opportunities that align with its
objectives. My research provides guidelines as to what these features are, why they matter,
and how they influence the ability of an organization to engage with the future.
Third, my study contributes to international management theory and practice. More
specifically, it informs current research on cognition and attention in the multinational
enterprise, a stream of research that has gained interest in the recent years (e.g. Bouquet &
Birkinshaw, 2009; Maitland & Sammartino, 2014). Specifically, it informs the current
conversation on attention and cognition in the multinational enterprise by providing
additional insights on the mechanisms enabling attention and action across the organization.
While previous research suggests that the ability to identify changes in the environment can
be enhanced through attention-sustaining and focusing devices (Bouquet & Birkinshaw,
2011; Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009) and through the allocation of individuals
who have ties with the center of decision (Plourde, Parker, & Schaan, 2014), my study
provides precisions with regards to these findings, clarifying how activities associated with
“international attention” (i.e. activities that aim to improve an organization’s understanding
of its global environment) influence the ability of the organization to identify and seize
opportunities that are global in scope. My study provides contextualization to these findings,
providing elements of reflections as to how an organization that is global in scope can
enhance its ability to identify and seize opportunities aligned with its mission.

8

In the next chapters, I provide further background on the study. In Chapter 2, I
discuss the challenges of engaging with the future for an organization. In Chapter 3, I explain
the method behind my research. In Chapter 4, I provide a brief history of Greenpeace divided
by periods. In Chapter 5, I revisit these periods using the dimensions of rationality, plasticity,
and shaping ability, which have been used to explain why firms might fail at engaging with
the distant in the past and to understand what Greenpeace did during each period that has
contributed to its successes (failures). In Chapter 6, I elaborate on the properties that
contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability to engage with the future, and make a formal
proposition explaining why/how these properties can enhance an organization’s ability to
engage with the future. I also provide information as to what Greenpeace did to enable these
properties in practice. In Chapter 7, I discuss the theoretical contributions, limitations and
boundary conditions, as well as the transferability of the research to other settings, and
briefly propose future research directions.
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Chapter 2
2. The future and the organization
Engaging with the future corresponds to “seeing” what the future might offer and attempting
to “enact” it (Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010). The term enactment emphasizes “the central
point that when people act, they bring events and structures into existence and set them in
motion” (Weick, 1988: p. 306). Shaping the future corresponds to the act of enacting, as it
implies undertaking actions that have the potential to create new structures, constraints, and
opportunities that are associated with a particular vision of the future. It takes place in the
present and within a specific landscape, but is oriented towards the distant future.
The outcome of actions intended to shape the future corresponds to “residuum of
changes produced by enactment” (Weick, 1988: p. 306). Residuum of changes can take
different forms, from tangible objects (e.g. dominant design for a product or use of a product
that did not exist before) to new legislations (e.g. at the city-government level, country level,
or international level), mental representations (e.g. how we view the environment or how we
view the use of a technology), or acceptable norms (e.g. how resources should be exploited
or what is an acceptable way to promote products and services). These residuum of change
are obtained through interactions with the environment to create structures, constraints, and
opportunities that did not exist or were not necessarily noticeable before the actions were
undertaken (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985).
The actions intended to shape the landscape correspond to commitments (Weick,
1988: p. 310). A commitment occurs when actions are public, irrevocable, and volitional.
When actions are public, irrevocable, and volitional, they take on a new significance because
more is at stake. The word commitment is relevant for the current study because to impact
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the landscape, actions must be public; if they are not public, they cannot impact the external
environment. Actions must also have some degree of irrevocability; if they don’t, the
organization might lose credibility, which can undermine its legitimacy. Finally, actions
intended to shape the landscape are necessarily volitional; if they are not the result of
intended choices, their consequences are unintended and cannot be associated with the
desires of the organization.
Succeeding at enacting the environment through residuum of change brings a number
of challenges for organizations. First, it requires strategic leaders to create the right
organizational context, to encourage multiple realities, and to test and experiment with
different actions (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Second, it is expected to require persistence
(March, 1995), as creating residuum of changes can only occur over time. In this chapter, I
discuss the challenges for organizing, which are divided into three interrelated categories: the
challenge of determining what the future might and should entail; the challenge of sharing
visions of the future internally; and, the challenge of undertaking actions that have the
potential to enact a particular vision of the future. At the core of these challenges lays the
need for an organization to identify and seize opportunities that have the potential to create
residuum of change.

2.1 Determining which future
The first challenge for an organization that dedicates its actions to the enactment of a vision
for the future is the one of making sense of what the future might entail and determining
which future the organization wishes to see in times ahead. It includes dimensions of
foresight about what the future might offer and also includes beliefs about what the future
ought to be. Both foresight and beliefs are important and are tight with one another.
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Determining (or attempting to determine) what the future might entail can be
associated with foresight. Foresight “marks the ability to see through the apparent confusion,
to spot developments before they become trends, to see patterns before they emerge, and to
grasp the relevant features of social currents that are likely to shape the direction of future
events.” (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004, p. 2). Foresight has been defined as an activity, a
process, or an ability. Regardless of how it is defined, foresight refers primarily to
conceptualizing the future in order to inform present actions. It can be said to be strategic
when it is used to “penetrate and transgress established boundaries and seize the
opportunities otherwise overlooked by others” (Chia, 2008, p. 27).
Sensemaking is an important component of strategic foresight (Aaltonen, 2009;
Nathan, 2004; Sarpong & Maclean, 2014). Sensemaking corresponds to the social process of
identifying and interpreting subtle cues to form salient categories that can be used to inform
action and sustain meanings and identities (Weick, 1995). Sensemaking is, in essence,
retrospective as it builds on the past (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005); it can also be
prospective (Gioia, 1986) and future-oriented (Gephart, Topal, & Zhang, 2010) to inform
current actions (Lord et al., 2014). Prospective sensemaking typically occurs when
ambiguous situations require individuals to develop novel understandings and engage in
forward-looking thinking to “structure the future by imagining some desirable state” (Gioia
& Mehra, 1996: p. 229). For instance, it can be used to trigger innovation, to extrapolate
actions into the future, or to construct images of the yet to be realized innovation (Sarpong &
Maclean, 2014).
Within an organization, foresight becomes an activity carried out by several
individuals. Cues available at a given point in time are shared and discussed to speculate on
possible futures (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Stigliani & Ravasi,
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2012). The interpretation of these cues can be more or less controversial: individuals differ in
the way they perceive the saliency of cues, which can translate into diverging interpretations
about issues and concerns for the future. These interpretations might differ depending on
individuals’ backgrounds (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Gerstner, Konig, Enders, & Hambrick,
2013; Kaplan, 2008a), concerns and values (Bansal, 2003), personal biases (Reitzig &
Sorenson, 2013), cultural background (Barr & Glynn, 2004; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991),
how distant they are from an event (Barreto & Patient, 2013), as well as from the knowledge
base they can draw from (Dane, 2013). This diversity of perspectives can enhance or
undermine the ability of the organization to develop foresight about what the future might
entail.
In terms of activities used by strategic leaders to speculate on possible futures (or on
anticipating what the future might offer) and prepare their organization accordingly, we find
activities such as contingency planning, scenario-based learning, scenario planning,
forecasting techniques, and analogical reasoning (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). They vary in
their degree of sophistication and in terms of their duration in time. Forecasting approaches,
for instance, traditionally build on linear estimation of the future and tend to be formalized
within strategic planning processes (Cuhls, 2003). Scenario planning and scenario thinking is
a different type of intervention. It aims to identify possible trajectories and emerging trends
that can be evaluated to prepare the organization in the case one of the identified scenarios
occurs (Sarpong, 2011; van der Heijden, 1996). They usually are associated with a reactive
mode to prepare for situations that are expected to occur rather than a proactive mode where
the organization initiates specific actions to enact its environment (Tevis, 2010).
These activities represent tools that can be used by organizations to prepare for the
future, but they do not represent foresight by itself. Furthermore, because reality exists in the
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present (Mead, 1932), and the present is ongoing, actions conducted by actors in the
environment are expected to bring new cues to the attention of individuals. These cues can
inform possible paths for the future. They can also validate or disconfirm representations of
the direction the future is taking. This implies that foresight has to be flexible and in a state of
perpetual becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).
Determining which future should prevail refers to specific preferences or desires with
regards to what the future ought to be. Because the future is in the realm of possibilities,
actors can still influence the course of future events (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). For the
organization, these preferences can be associated with a set of beliefs about what ought to
become reality. These beliefs can be associated with a dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis,
1986), or a set of parameters that serve as a justification for why firms do what they do
(Balogun & Johnson, 2005). They can also be associated with the intentions of the
organization with regards to its actions (King et al., 2010), and/or, in extreme cases, an
ideology (Hond & Bakker, 2007). Beliefs are expected to form through shared experiences
(Kiesler & Sproull, 1982); they can also be influenced by values. Beliefs are expected to
inform actions that are aligned with the vision of the future that the organization wishes to
see in times ahead.
It is important at this point to emphasize that beliefs can also refer to the specific role
an organization might play in the future. For instance, strategic leaders might have foresight
about the future and see a particular role for their organization. In these instances, beliefs
become associated with a projection of what the future might look like for the organization
and be used as an anchor that guides organizational actions (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). These
representations can represent some form of future perfect thinking, whereas the future is
imagined as having already occurred (Weick, 1979). In the process of developing these
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beliefs, there might be multiple and conflicting interpretations about the organization’s
situation (Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Weick, 1979). The past will also remain important as the
organization attempts to determine its future, providing foundations for claims for future
identity (Schultz & Hernes, 2013). Depending on the organizational past and interpretations
of this past, the array of possible futures the organization can aim for can be broadened or
narrowed. Hence, beliefs about the future and beliefs about the organization’s role in that
future are distinct, but complementary, as they both have implications for the type of
opportunities organizational members will look for. Beliefs about the organization’s role will
be nested within beliefs about the future and the specific opportunities pursued by the
organization will be aligned with beliefs about the organization’s role in the enactment of
that future.
In this section, I have discussed the role of beliefs and foresight in engaging with the
future. Beliefs and foresight are important because they correspond to the underlying
foundations of engaging with the future. They also correspond to distinguishing elements
between an organization that seeks to adapt to a changing environment and one that aims to
change what the future will be. Beliefs correspond to a set of preferences or desires about
what the future ought to be. They can also refer to the organization’s role in that future.
Foresight, on the other hand, can inform beliefs about where the environment is going and
why it might be necessary to act to enact the future. It can also be used to identify
opportunities that have the potential to enact a particular vision for the future. Beliefs become
institutionalized within the organization’s long term goals and objectives; foresight
corresponds to something organizations have or do as opposed to something they value.
Keeping these definitions in mind, I review, in the next section, the challenges faced by an
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organization in sharing visions of the future internally and on taking actions to shape the
future.

2.2. Sharing visions of the future internally
In an organization, individuals “accept the joint commitment to uphold certain principles”
(King et al., 2010), even if personal preferences would suggest an alternative course of action.
These principles usually entail the mission of the organization, as well as its goals. With
regards to engaging with the future, these principles are also expected to entail values as well
as beliefs about the future and what it should entail. The acceptance of these beliefs is central
to the pursuit of commitments, as Smircich & Stubbart (1985, p. 732-733) suggest: “for
sizeable organizational enactments to succeed, a critical mass of beliefs and acceptance must
be reached.” Reaching this critical mass depends on persuasion rather than objective factors
and requires strategic leaders to justify their choices and actions to internal audiences with
regards to their vision for the future (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004).
The process of sharing visions for the future is akin to an institutionalization process
where representations of what the future should entail become ingrained into the
organization’s identity. Institutionalizing representations of what the future should entail,
however, is not without risk. While belief systems can be a source of competitive strength
(Collins & Porras, 1994; Porac & Rosa, 1996), they can also lead to wrongful assumptions
about the future or be detrimental to an organization when its environment is changing
(Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Furthermore, the institutionalization of beliefs about the future
and the organization’s role can go against the identification of opportunities that might serve
the organization’s objectives, but do not fit necessarily with shared representations (Tsoukas
& Chia, 2002; Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). Given that the future is in a state of perpetual
becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), it is thus expected that beliefs will evolve over time.
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Renewing beliefs might imply giving new meanings to the organization’s purpose
and actions, and thus renew the organization’s commitments. In these situations, it might
violate some aspects of the organization’s identity (Tripsas, 2009; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).
The violation of different aspects of the organization’s identity will imply important change
efforts requiring an “unlearning” of what individuals within the organization have come to
believe over the years. As Smircich and Stubbart emphasize, “organized people often
struggle within the confines of their own prior enactments […]. Changing these patterns
requires people to intentionally forget some of what they know and to disbelieve some of
what they believe. Depending on the weight of prior commitments, changing may seem risky,
foolish, or taxing” (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985, 732). Hence, proposing a different path for
the future will require managerial efforts to persuade organizational members to pursue a
new path for the organization.
In circumstances when beliefs and visions for the future and the organization have to
change, strategic leaders will have to engage in sensegiving activities. Sensegiving refers to
the process of how visions are given or justified to others (Burgelman, 1994; Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991; Kaplan, 2008b; Rouleau, 2005). It occurs when managers try to
communicate what organizational change means to other stakeholders, such as employees
and investors. Sandberg and Tsoukas (2014) describe this process as such: “top executives
are first involved in making sense of what an organizational change initiative implies, but
once they have made sense of it, they then get involved in sensegiving, in their attempt to
communicate the new sense of the organization to its stakeholders”(Sandberg & Tsoukas,
2014, p. 19). Sensegiving activities are expected to modify cognitive representations that are
used to understand the organization and its priorities (Foldy, Goldman, & Ospina, 2008).
These new representations might also require changes in its organization’s architecture to
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seize these novel opportunities, a need that organizations often fail to recognize (O'Reilly &
Tushman, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005).
In this section, I briefly reviewed the implications of engaging with the future for an
organization in terms of sharing beliefs about what the future ought to be and what is the
organization’s role when moving towards that future, as well as the challenges that are likely
to be encountered as these beliefs evolve. These beliefs are important as they are known to
impact the identification of opportunities aligned with these beliefs and the conduct of
actions that have the potential to enact the environment. In the next section, I develop further
on these two parts of the process that are central to the pursuit of opportunities aligned with
one’s vision for the future.

2.3 Taking actions to shape the future
Enacting the future implies undertaking actions that will have for effect to change individuals’
behavior, to make these behaviors aligned with one’s vision for the future. Undertaking these
actions implies identifying and recognizing opportunities that have the potential to enact the
future, evaluating the identified possibilities as well as their anticipated consequences, and
acting on these opportunities to seize them.
Opportunities can be defined as a favorable juncture of circumstances for attaining a
goal. Opportunities are subject to ontological debate about whether they can be objectively
observed, waiting to be “discovered” by individuals, or whether they arise from the
interpretations and creative actions of individuals (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007;
Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010). Because enactment is obtained through interactions with
the environment, it is safe to assume that some opportunities aligned with one’s vision for the
future can be seen and objectively evaluated, while others are to be created to force people to
think about their environment and change their behavior.
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The process of opportunity recognition itself can be defined as “efforts to make sense
of signals of change (e.g. new information about new conditions) to form beliefs regarding
whether or not enacting a course of action to address this change could lead to net benefits”
(Grégoire et al., 2010, p. 415). For Grégoire and colleagues, these net benefits can be for
profits, growth, or competitive positioning, but also other forms of gains. With regards to the
phenomenon under study, the beliefs are about the future and the opportunities are nested
within these beliefs. Signals of change, however, remain important. They can modify beliefs
about the future, be used to evaluate which opportunities to pursue, and they can also lead to
the identification of opportunities arising from unforeseen events.
When pursuing an opportunity, small wins can contribute to initiate a path that will
lead to more substantial residuum of changes. Small wins implies seeking tangible outcomes
of moderate importance to attract allies and deter opponents (Weick, 1984). It can imply the
reformulation of issues into smaller problems. Small wins are particularly useful when an
issue is so large that it cannot necessarily be conceived, which can preclude innovative
actions. The idea of small wins was originally conceptualized in the context of policy-making,
but it is also expected to be found in the context of organizations engaging with the future. 4
The pursuit of opportunities might also involve seizing windows of opportunities.
Windows of opportunities correspond to opportunities to take advantage of these moments in
time when the organizations can interact with the environment to alter other’s view of reality
and legitimize new courses of actions. In a technology context, these windows of opportunity
4

A strategy of small wins can be illustrated with the example of the engagement of Alcoa in composite
materials in the 80s. At the time, the CEO of Alcoa had strong beliefs that, in the future, materials with different
properties would be necessary for industries like aerospace and microelectronics (Plourde, 2013). The
opportunity for Alcoa was the development of composite materials combining the properties of aluminum with
the properties of other materials. They initiated this shift through the development of specific applications of
composite materials that could be used to convince customers and suppliers to engage in this shift. This strategy
was very similar to the one adopted at its founding, when aluminum was unknown. Finding and developing
specific applications for aluminum (e.g. utensils, cables, foils) represented small wins that could be used to
pursue the opportunity offered by aluminum.
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correspond to a moment in time when new technologies can still be explored and tested
before adoption by users defines the way this technology ought to proceed (Tyre &
Orlikowski, 1994). These windows can be sensed through the feedback received through
interaction with the environment (Rudolph, Morrison, & Carroll, 2009). Sensing these
windows is based on timing (Albert & Bell, 2002) and, once identified, routines and practices
must be quickly enacted before the windows fade.
As mentioned earlier, the identification and the recognition of opportunities is closely
linked with the capture of signals in the environment. Within the organization, the
recognition of these signals is about mental models and structural alignment (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002; Grégoire et al., 2010). It is driven by cognitive schema, maps, and
sensemaking (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993; Weick, 1995),
and is filled by the ability of leaders to capture signals in the environment (Ansoff, 1987).
Signals can also be associated with events that are expected to happen but, nevertheless,
cannot be predicted as to when they will happen. Cognitive frames provide templates to
recognize these patterns and enact predetermined routines and practices to seize these
opportunities.
The ability to identify opportunities and to seize windows of opportunities cannot be
considered independently from the broader organizational context. The frames that are used
to capture signals in the environment can become institutionalized within the governance and
operational channels of the organization (Ocasio, 1997, 2012; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). For
instance, in multinational organizations, these patterns can be enhanced though an alignment
of interests and cognition (Mahnke, Venzin, & Zahra, 2007) and through the adoption of
attention-focusing and attention-sustaining devices (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009, 2011;
Bouquet et al., 2009). In the multi-business firm, novel opportunities can be identified and
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seized through greater integration across units (Joseph & Ocasio, 2012). The organizational
context will also matter in determining whether or not individuals will be willing to
communicate potential opportunities to the senior leadership (Bansal, 2003; Ren & Guo,
2011). With that regard, the time orientation institutionalized within the organization will
have a major impact on organizational members actions (Slawinski & Bansal, 2012). All of
these effects related to the organizational context are important because previous research
that focused on engaging with the future emphasized that the emergence and final
determination of enactment “is a function of a series of interlocking contextual actions
improvised in response to specific pattern recognition or projection often triggered by a
problem driven search or a serendipitous event” (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014). This suggests
that initiating a path aligned with a specific vision of the future is far from a linear process.
Given this, creating favorable conditions to discover this path is expected to be a central part
of an organization’s success when it comes to engage with the future.
Overall, taking actions that have the potential to shape the future is expected to be
demanding and to require resources, creativity, and persistence. As Smircich and Stubbard
(1985, p. 732) posit: “enactment test one’s physical informational, imaginative, and
emotional resources. Without sufficient resources (or without the ability to think
imaginatively about what might constitute resources), one simply cannot support many
conceivable enactments”. Many conceivable enactments are important because the future,
from a temporal perspective, corresponds to what has not yet happened. It is in the realm of
imagination, meaning that there is not one future but many possible futures (March, 1995). A
variety of actors in the environment are in a position to influence that future (Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985), sometimes with competing views and approaches
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(Kilduff et al., 2011). We can thus expect that an organization engaging with the future with
the intent to shape it will experience numerous failures before it becomes successful.

2.4 Research question
In the previous sections, I reviewed the implications for an organization to engage with the
future. I presented these implications as part of a process that requires the organization to
develop intentions that are informed by preferences with regards to what the future ought to
be and to take actions that have the potential to enact that vision. Taking actions implies both
the identification of opportunities aligned with beliefs about what the future ought to be, and
the pursuit of these opportunities, to create residuum of change in the environment.
One aspect that has not been discussed is the question of how an organization can
enhance its ability to enact a particular vision of the future and, more specifically, the
properties that can enhance an organization’s ability to shape the landscape. Properties
represent relatively unique features that distinguish organizations from one another.5 They
can be used to explain why some organizations succeed where others have failed. As argued
by King and colleagues (2010: p. 293), “the mission of the organization, its routines and
practices, and individuals’ roles within hierarchy may elicit certain forms of behaviors and
choices that are directly attributable to the organization rather than the individual”. This
suggests that properties can be enabled through the culture, the structure, the processes, and
the practices of an organization.
There is evidence in the literature that certain properties might contribute to enhance
an organization’s ability to engage with the future. Properties of fluidity and flexibility, for

5

I use the term “properties”, but “characteristics”, “features”, or “attributes” could be used to describe what can
make an organization effective at shaping the landscape. This terminology is aligned with the one used by King
et al. (2010), to emphasize that my focus is on the organization; it is deemed appropriate because I am not
looking at specific variables leading to success. I am looking at empirical concepts that are associated with
winning conditions for an organization attempting to engage with the future.
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instance, are deemed crucial for organizations evolving in dynamic environments (Eisenhardt,
Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). Properties of flexibility are also
deemed important for organizations developing novel ideas for the future (Narayanan &
Fahey, 2004). While these properties potentially apply to organizations that aim to enact their
environment, they have been studied from the perspective of organizations adapting to a
changing environment. Focusing specifically on the properties that can help an organization
engage with the future with the intent to shape it, I thus ask the following question:

(RQ) How can an organization enhance its ability to enact a vision of the future
aligned with its beliefs about what that future ought to be?
In particular, my goal is to: 1) identify the properties that can help an organization
enhance its ability to engage with the future; 2) understand why these properties are
important; and 3) understand how they impact the ability of an organization to shape the
future.
Understanding these properties is important. The future contains problems to address,
threats to be mindful off, and opportunities to identify and seize. If all organizations evolve in
a changing environment, not all organizations have the intention to shape the future.
Organizations differ in the way they conceptualize it, and depending on this
conceptualization, the future can be seen as the result of an unalterable path or up for grab
(van der Heijden, 2004). Organizations that adopt a conceptualization of the future as a future
of desire are the ones that are expected to change the rules of the game, forcing others to
adapt. By focusing on the properties an organization can develop to enhance its ability to
engage the future, I intend to generate insights on the specific features strategic leaders can
implement to help their organization succeed at engaging with the future.
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Chapter 3
3. Methods
To investigate my research questions, I conduct an historical case study of an organization
that dedicates its actions to the enactment of its environment. A single case study approach
allows for greater accuracy by developing contextualized explanations of a given
phenomenon (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). In the
current study, I obtain this accuracy by building on changes over time to identify decisions,
actions, and elements of context that have impacted the ability of the organization under
investigation to enact its environment. Given that properties are not static and are expected to
change over time (Buchanan & Bryman, 2007), this approach is the one that has the most
potential to lead to meaningful insights on which of those properties are deemed important
when it comes to shaping the landscape.
The case is based on the in-depth study of historical documentation (i.e. “traces of
history” considered as primary data), a method referred to as historiography (Lustik, 1996;
Rowlinson et al., 2014). Historiography typically focuses on one organization or a limited
number of organizations in order to make interpretations about why certain events occurred
and/or how they unfolded over time. This approach has a long tradition in strategic
management and organization theory (e.g. Burgelman, 1983; Chandler, 1962; Danneels,
2011; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Mintzberg, 1978) with numerous calls in the recent years for a
deeper engagement with historical methods (e.g. Burgelman, 2011; Farjoun, 2002; Kahl,
Silverman, & Cusumano, 2012).
Historiography is appropriate for this dissertation because historians tend to reject the
dualism of structure (determinism) and agency (voluntarism) and view the emergence of
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structures as the result of past decisions (Burgelman, 2011). In the phenomenon under
investigation, this dualism plays out at two different levels: the organization and the
environment. At the level of the organization, the adoption of structures, practices, and
processes that can be associated with certain properties corresponds to a process of
institutionalization. This process is the result of a number of decisions made by strategic
leaders over time. As Kiesler posits (1994: p. 611) “history teaches us to interpret existing
organizational structures not as determined by laws but as the result of decisions in past
choice opportunities, some of which were made intentionally and others more implicitly”. A
focus on traces of history about decisions made by leaders allows for “seeing” the type of
debates that took place within the organization to identify the reasons why specific decisions
were made with regards to the adoption of structures, processes, and practices.
At the level of the environment, the actions of the organization cannot be looked at in
isolation from the environment that the organization attempts to enact. The structures which
organizations that are engaging with the future attempt to change are institutional in nature.
They correspond to widely accepted norms, practices, and/or accepted beliefs about the
environment. Changing them requires actors to interact with other actors in the environment.
A focus on traces of history allows for “seeing” how leaders approached their environment,
and how they adjusted their actions based on the feedback they received from other actors in
that environment. It thus provides an opportunity to develop unique insights about the
challenges they encountered, why they encountered these challenges, how they modified
their approach, and how the changes they made with regards to their structures, practices, and
processes enhanced (or undermined) the organization’s ability to enact the future.
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3.1 Research setting: Greenpeace International
The organization I investigate in this dissertation is Greenpeace International. Greenpeace
International is an organization that is global in scope with a mission to raise awareness about
environmental issues. Its overarching goal is to elicit change in individuals’ behaviors. It
focuses on a diverse portfolio of issues, from the protection of whales to prohibiting the use
of genetically modified organisms. To address these issues, the organization challenges
prevailing structures and re-imagine possible meanings attached to current practices (Kilduff
et al., 2011). Its portfolio of action alternatives includes lobbying, fundraising, protests, and
non-violent direct actions, such as the climbing of high-rise buildings and the illegal
occupation of oil drilling platforms. These actions are intended to force change with regards
to specific environmental problems by leveraging the media to create what Greenpeace
founders call “mind bombs” (Dale, 1996; Weyler, 2004): images that stick to people’s minds
affecting their perception of issues.
A study in the context of Greenpeace International corresponds to unconventional
research (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010): research that focuses on an unusual setting to test theory
or explore phenomena or relations that are open to discovery. One aim of unconventional
management research is to tap into a phenomenon that is uniquely or most easily observed in
a non-business setting, but nonetheless has “critical implications for management theory”
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010: p. 668). The value of the case lies in the possibility of isolating a
phenomenon in a way that makes it transparently observable (Eisenhardt, 1989). There are
two aspects of Greenpeace that makes it a rich research setting for the current study: its focus
on a particular set of issues that are threatening the future of the planet, and the fact that it
operates as a multinational enterprise. Below, I elaborate further on these two characteristics
of Greenpeace and how they allow for a meaningful contribution to theory.
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3.1.1 Particularities of Greenpeace as an organization focusing on issues
Greenpeace is an organization that focuses on a specific set of issues. These issues varied
over the years, but revolved around a number of environmental problems surrounding the
destruction of ecosystems, the protection of species, and other issues related to peace and
disarmament. These issues were identified as threats for the future of the planet; they also
found their roots in human behaviors. It is through changes in human behaviors that these
issues can effectively be solved. Because these behaviors are well anchored in individuals’
habitus, they require changing the way individuals think about their environment to adjust
their behaviors accordingly.
Greenpeace addresses issues through campaigns. Campaigns correspond to elaborate
plans that are designed to influence a target, which can be a corporation, a government, or a
supranational institution. Campaigns typically include a variety of tactics associated with
activism, such as protests and direct actions (Spar & La Mure, 2003), as well as lobbying and
behind-the-scenes strategies. Campaigns vary in lengths, lasting from a few weeks up to 3 to
5 years, and include an explicit goal (e.g. change in the practice of a corporation, new piece
of legislation, etc.). Actions associated with a given campaign are carefully scripted and
practiced ahead of time. Once in motion, they cannot be undone, minimized, or disowned.
Greenpeace’s focus on issues through campaigns implies that the goals of the
organization are explicit and its actions are intended and in the public domain.6 This makes it
possible to identify the commitments of the organization and to track them over time. It also
provides an opportunity to determine whether or not the organization is succeeding at
shaping its landscape through residuum of changes.

6

Not all of their actions are public, as their strategies also draw upon behind-the-scenes strategies, such as
lobbying, but their campaigns to address issues always include some form of commitment in the public domain.
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Figure 1: Greenpeace Main Governance Channels

NROs send a portion of their
earnings to GPI. GPI will

facilitate communication of
best practices and provide
coordination on fundraising
to NROs, but it will not
raise funds over and above
NROs except in
exceptional circumstances
(e.g. funding for specific
projects or major donations
from individuals).

GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GPI) (since 1979)
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (since 1983)
• Supervises the Senior Management Team (SMT) of GPI;
• Oversees the formulation and the execution of the organization’s strategy.
GPI SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM (as of 1985)
• Facilitates the overall decision making processes as laid out in the Governance procedures;
• Facilitates the international planning and decision making processes on global Greenpeace campaigns;
• Coordinates and carries out global Greenpeace campaigns;
• Monitors Greenpeace's global strategic and financial performance;
• Develops Greenpeace’s presence in priority regions;
• Provides fundraising support and protects the Greenpeace trademark;
• Provides cost-effective IT/web support to NROs and regional offices.

COUNCIL (since 1984)
• Includes one representative from each country (called a “trustee”);
• Meets once a year at the Annual General Meeting (AGM);
• Elects/removes members of the International Board;
• Approves/refuses the annual Greenpeace International budget;
• Identify/approve/review environmental issues of strategic significance to be
addressed by the organization and decides on the main orientations.

GREENPEACE NATIONAL OFFICES (NROs) (see Figure 2)
• Contribute financially to Stitching Greenpeace Council by providing a percentage of their
income to GPI;
• Are registered as charitable organizations in their respective country and are subject to
annual independent external financial auditing reviews in accordance with local regulations;
• Operate in accordance with the legal framework of the country they are registered in;
• Are accountable for the use of the name Greenpeace in their country;
• Run national campaigns, participate in international campaigns, and contribute to new
campaign development;
• Accountable to GPI and to their own board of directors, which is elected by a voting
membership of volunteers and activists from the country.
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GPI does not
have formal
authority over
NROs, but
individuals
associated with a
specific function
at a NRO will
report to the
individual in
charge for that
function
internationally.

INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS
(reformed in 1984)
• Elected by the Council during the AGM;
• Appoints the International Executive Director (IED);
• Monitors the operations of GPI and the work of the IED;
• Review budget and audited accounts submitted to AGM.
A number of committees link the operations of NROs
with one another. The Executive Directors meetings
(EDM), for instance, was created in 1992 to exchange
knowledge about best practices and to make
recommendations on global Greenpeace operations.
NATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS
• Elected by a voting membership of volunteers and
activists;
• Oversees priorities and finances of the NRO;
• Appoints the Executive Director of the NRO;
• Appoints a trustee to Council.

3.1.2 Particularities of Greenpeace as an organization that is global in scope
Greenpeace is also an organization that is global in scope. It has activities in 40 countries,
with revenues of about 240 million euros collected from 2.5 million supporters worldwide (as
of 2014 – see Appendices 1 and 2 for an overview of the organization’s income and
expenditures over time). Its operations are divided between Greenpeace International (GPI),
which corresponds to the organization’s international headquarters, and national offices
(NROs), which manage Greenpeace's operations within their respective country. To
coordinate the work of GPI and NROs, Greenpeace had to adopt clear governance and
operational channels (see Figure 1). These channels, which evolved over the years, remained
centered around main bodies: the Council, which includes one representative of each country,
and the Board of Directors, whose members are elected by the Council. While the Council
meets once a year at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) to discuss priorities as well as
organizational issues, the Board of Directors meets four times a year to follow up on projects
carried out by the International Executive Director (IED) and the Top Management Team
(TMT) on behalf of Council. It is within these governance and operational channels that
priorities, strategies, and organization of the work are discussed and debated.
There are two particularities of Greenpeace as an organization that is global in scope
that makes it appropriate for the current study. First, it allows for observing the conversations
held within the governance and operational channels of the organization, to observe the
different phases of engaging with the future, including the determination of which future to
pursue (preferences), the sharing of this vision among all NROs, the identification of
opportunities to pursue, as well as whether or not the pursuit of these opportunities is
succeeding at shaping the landscape. This later point is important and makes the overall
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process transparently observable, more so than within an organization that is limited in
scope.7
Second, Greenpeace’s funding is restricted to individual donations to ensure the
transparency of the organization. The funds are collected by NROs with the support of GPI.
GPI does not raise funds over and above NROs. NROs share a portion of their earnings with
GPI. In return, NROs have a say in the orientations of the organization through the Council.
They also receive services from GPI with regards to key functions (e.g. campaigning,
fundraising, communications, etc.). Raising funds from individuals in different countries has
important implications for the organization. If Greenpeace is not able to provide evidence
that it is contributing to change behaviors on a global scale, it is unlikely that the organization
will be sustainable in the long term. Nevertheless, and despite fluctuations in the number of
donors and the amount of donations (see Graph 4 on page 69), the organization has been able
to sustain since its founding. This suggests that Greenpeace must have learned from its
successes and failures in order to last. This provides an opportunity to compare different
periods in the history of the organization to identify properties (or the absence of properties)
that contributed to Greenpeace's successes (failures).
Overall, the fact that Greenpeace focuses on issues addressed through campaigns and
operates on a global scale makes it a context where the phenomenon under investigation is
transparently observable (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989). Because Greenpeace
is an organization that is global in scope, its senior leadership has to define the goals for the
organization and share these goals with organizational members. Greenpeace's organizational
members also need to identify opportunities and undertake actions to seize these
opportunities in order to enact their vision for the future. Hence, the intentionality of the
7

Within an organization more limited in scope, the sharing of a vision for the future as well as the identification
and pursuit of opportunities are more likely to be discussed throughout informal communications.
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organization can be clearly identified within the governance channels of the organization, as
well as the reasons behind the commitments that are made with regards to specific problems,
since actions are carefully planned ahead of time and in the public domain once undertaken.
This makes the goals of the organization clearly identifiable and transparently observable
with regards to which future they want to pursue, how to pursue it, and with what effect.

3.2 Data sources
Given the research objectives, it was necessary to develop a comprehensive dataset. This
dataset includes historical documentation from Greenpeace's archives, historical accounts
from founders and independent analysts, media coverage, retrospective interviews with
individuals that were closely tied with the organization, and direct observation of the
organization in Canada. Sources criticism was central to the evaluation of each individual
source (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009: 107). Each individual source was serving a specific
purpose, as is discussed in this section.
3.2.1 Historical documentation
The primary source of data is Greenpeace’s archives. These documents were created as part
of normal life within the organization without being altered through a narrative or literary
text (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Megill, 2007).8 Because these documents were intended to
be used internally, they tend to present a high degree of authenticity (Gottschalk, 1969;
Rowlinson, 2004). They can be considered as “real time data” because they reflect the
discussions that were held within the organization at a certain point in time and the
challenges its leaders were facing (Blazejewski, 2011).

8

Historians consider these documents “primary sources” as they were not intended to be circulated to an
external audience at the time they were produced, making them more reliable sources when it comes to
understanding past decisions.
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Greenpeace's archives were available at the International Institute for Social History
(IISH) located in Amsterdam, Netherlands. The archives were donated to the IISH in 2004 by
the Stitching Greenpeace Council as part of a legacy of the organization to social history. The
archives at the IISH contain 151.4 meters of documents (approximately 200,000 pages)
covering the years 1979 to 2004. They include minutes from various committees, budget
proposals, special reports, reports on issues, proposals for campaigns, communications
between headquarters and the national organizations, personal notes from executive directors,
etc. As part of the convention between Greenpeace and IISH, access to these archives is
restricted. Individuals must submit a formal proposal to the IISH and the Stitching
Greenpeace Council evaluates each request on its own merit. I requested access to these
archives in April 2012 through the submission of a formal proposal to the IISH. Unrestricted
access was granted in May 2012.
My first visit to the IIHS to consult Greenpeace's archives was in June 2012 for a
period of three weeks (15 working days). During this first visit, I reviewed approximately 20
percent of all the documents available and scanned approximately 25 percent of these
documents (411 documents for a total of 10,204 pages – see Table 1 for a list of the scanned
documents). Priority was given to meeting minutes, proposals, internal communications
about issues, as well as important projects for the organization. These documents were
considered important because they provide information on the decisions that were made at
the time discussions about these decisions took place. They provide evidence of the internal
debates that took place in regards to the main orientations of the organization, the allocation
of resources, and the functioning of the organization. Two subsequent visits followed to fill
in gaps in the data and to clarify and/or confirm interpretations of specific events and
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decisions: second visit in December 2013 (3 days) and a third in July 2014 (1 day). Overall, I
spent a total of 19 days in the archives (approximately 134 hours).
To manage this large amount of data, I labeled each document based on the year of
production and the type of information it included (e.g. Board Meeting Minutes for the third
meeting of 1981 was labeled BMM1981c). I also organized the documents in PDF portfolios,
with one PDF portfolio for each category of document. I ended up with five main portfolios:
Annual General Meeting Minutes (39 documents – 3,210 pages), Board of Directors Meeting
Minutes (88 documents, 1,793 pages), Executive Directors Meeting Minutes (15 documents,
463 pages), Trustee Meeting Minutes (9 documents, 284 pages), and Senior Management
Meeting Minutes. Other documents (26 documents, 1,138 pages) corresponding to specific
projects or events, such as the “One Greenpeace” project, were not organized in portfolios,
but filed in different folders. Proposals (137 documents, 2,150 pages) were also managed
differently, as they provided additional information about issues and campaigns. They were
kept in folders labeled by year and were surveyed when additional information about a
project was required or when there was a reference to these proposals in the different meeting
minutes.
3.2.2 Historical accounts
A second source of information was historical accounts from the founders about their
experience with Greenpeace (Bohlen, 2001; Hunter, 1979, 2004; McTaggart, 2002; Moore,
2010; Weyler, 2004), as well as analysis of the organization from independent observers
(Dale, 1996; Lequenne, 1997). These accounts are associated with narrative sources and
provide interpretations of past events (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). The historical accounts
presented above were used to learn more about the modus operandi of Greenpeace and to
develop a sense of the functioning of the organization, its practices, the discussions that took
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place within the organization at different points in time, and the role of different actors over
the years. Several discussions in these accounts provided additional information about the
context of certain decisions identified in the meeting minutes, which contributed to enrich my
own interpretation of the case study.
3.2.3 Media coverage
Media coverage includes audio and video material from CBC/Radio-Canada archives, and
newspaper articles from European (Le Figaro, Le Monde, The Financial Times) and North
American publications (La Presse, New York Times, Wall-Street Journal) obtained through
Factiva and a French-Canadian database (Eureka – Biblio-Branché). This source of
information has been partly collected for the years 1979 to 2004 and has not been the object
of a formal analysis. Because individuals from outside the organization have produced media
coverage, it cannot inform reliably on the discussions that took place internally within the
organization. This source of information has been used sparsely to validate dates and seek
additional information for special events (e.g. the downsizing of the organization in 1994).
3.2.4 Retrospective interviews
For historians, retrospective interviews are notoriously unreliable, especially when they are
collected years later (Megill, 2007). Hence, this latter source of data was primarily used to
gain more knowledge about the functioning of the organization, to become more sensitive to
the challenges they were facing in their attempt to shape the landscape, and to discover the
motivations behind the forming of Greenpeace as (1) a formal international organization (i.e.
“Greenpeace International”) and (2) a professional organization (i.e. “Multinational of the
Environment” and “Greenpeace Inc.”).
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I obtained access to retrospective interviews used for a fifty-minute documentary
made by CBC/Radio-Canada. This latter source of information was audio recorded in June
2012 during a visit to the CBC/Radio-Canada archives. The material used for the
documentary includes 16 hours of video material with 15 individuals directly involved with
the organization (10 interviews were audio recorded, accounting for nine hours9 - see list in
Table 2). The topics discussed during these interviews include how the activists became
aware or were informed of some of the issues Greenpeace campaigned on, what led them to
take action, their tactics, as well as how the organization evolved over the years to become a
formal organization known as the “Multinational of the Environment” and “Greenpeace Inc.”.
These topics were covered through questions on their major campaigns and victories, and
critical events throughout the history of the organization.
3.2.5 Direct observation
Direct observation and informal discussions with several individuals were also used to
mitigate the fact that archives is a remote-sensing type of data (Ingram et al., 2012). Because
I was not familiar with the particular challenges encountered by activists, direct observation
was useful to enhance my ability to search through Greenpeace's archives and understand the
meaning of certain words they used, the approach favored by the activists with regards to
actions, and the culture of the organization. While direct observation is not considered as a
source of data by historians per se, it has been used by organizational scholars to enhance
their interpretation of past events. A prominent example of this can be found in Vaughan’s
(1996) study of the Challenger launch decision through a method she labeled as “historical
ethnography”.
9

Some interviews were conducted with the sons and daughters of the founders, talking about their parents and
how they perceived their involvement with the movement. Given the time constraint during this trip to
Vancouver, those interviews were not recorded.
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Direct observation was based on participation in Greenpeace's activities (5 activities for
a total of 59 hours of observation). To date, this includes attendance at Greenpeace public
events (2), volunteer meetings (2), and a three-day Earth Defenders training camp where 22
prospective Greenpeace activists were introduced to the art of campaigning, non-violent
direct actions, and civil disobedience – tactics that are the core of Greenpeace's strategy – by
eight Greenpeace activists and campaigners10. For all the events I participated in, I kept
written notes (40 pages) and verbal notes through a voice recorder (15 recordings: 66
minutes). This second option was the one favored for Greenpeace's activities because it was
more discreet (recording was done when I was aside from the group). Table 3 provides a
summary of the activities attended and the notes and recordings taken during these activities.
In addition, informal discussions were conducted with environmentalists (8),
Greenpeace activists (17), and Greenpeace campaigners (9). Whenever possible, I took
detailed notes summarizing the exchange.

10

Following the participation in the Earth Defenders training camp, I was invited to the official training offered
to Greenpeace activists specialized in direct actions. This invitation was declined after discussions with the
organizer: all Greenpeace activists specialized in direct actions have to be willing to face arrest, which means
that any information regarding the participants must remain confidential. Furthermore, the effectiveness of
Greenpeace direct actions is based on the trust activists have with the other members of the team and the fact
that all members of the team have equal status. Bringing an external observer to this team that is not in the same
predisposition as the other members may have threatened the “esprit de corps” that is expected from the group.
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Table 1: Historical documentation from Greenpeace International (1979-2004)
Data produced within Greenpeace
Annual Reports (1992-2004)
Annual General Meeting Minutes (1979-2001)
Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (1979-2002)
Executive Directors Meeting Minutes (1992-2002)
Trustees Meeting Minutes (1983-1995)
Campaigns Team Meeting Minutes (1991-1994)
Other Committees (1987-1997)
Proposals (1987-1998)
Country Profiles (1989-1994)
Global Resources Inventory Study (2001)
Report on One Greenpeace project (2001)
Greenpeace Global Presence (1998)
Strategic Plan (1998)
Finding Talent (1996)
Strategic Thinking Report (1996)
Emergency Response Team (1991)
This is Greenpeace Project (1992-1993)
Total

Number of
documents
12
39
88
15
9
4
64
137
17
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
394

Total pages
312
3,210
1,793
463
284
62
786
2,150
256
323
78
31
84
22
31
104
209
10,198
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Table 2: Interviews from CBC/Radio-Canada
Interviewee
Pierre Lacoste

Pierre Gleizes
Rémi Parmentier

Steven Guilbeault
Rex Weyler

Sylvaine Zimmerman
Paul Watson
George Payrastre
Patrick Moore

Laurent Trudel

Link with Greenpeace
Admiral in charge of the French external intelligence agency from
1982 to 1985. He gave the Green light to the sinking of the
Rainbow Warrior in 1985 in a port in New-Zealand, a sinking
during which a Greenpeace activist was killed.
Photographer for Greenpeace since 1980.
Founding member of Greenpeace International (1979) and several
Greenpeace national organizations, including Greenpeace France
(1977), Greenpeace Spain (1984), Greenpeace International's
Mediterranean Project (1986), and Greenpeace Latin America
(1987). He was a member of Greenpeace International’s Political
Team since its creation in 1988, and the organization’s Political
Director until 2003.
Greenpeace campaigner and Quebec spokesperson from 1997 to
2007.
Served as a director of the original Greenpeace Foundation in
Canada, as a campaign photographer, and publisher of the
Greenpeace Chronicles. He was among the first members of
Greenpeace and a cofounder of Greenpeace International in 1979.
Greenpeace campaigner from 1987 to 1989.
Greenpeace activist from 1969 to 1977; Founder of the Sea
Shepherd Conservation Society in 1978.
Documentary filmmaker and activist who followed Greenpeace in
its early years.
Greenpeace activist from 1971 to 1986; President of Greenpeace
Foundation in Canada from 1977 to 1986; Founding member of
Greenpeace International in 1979; Member of the international
board of directors from 1979 to 1985.
Greenpeace activist from 1972 to 1979.
Total:

Interview Date
March 15th 2011

Interview Length
53:54

March 18th 2011
March 15th 2011

39:27
1:06:58

March 24th 2011

53:10

March 2011

1:21:52

March 24th 2011
March 2011

27:53
1:07:04

March 2011

23:22

March 2011

1:01:09

March 24th 2011
10 interviews

1:11:14
9:04:03
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Table 3: Greenpeace activities attended for direct observation
Activity
Forest Alert! 10 years
after

Date
April 4th
2012

Earth Defenders
Training Camp

September
21-23rd 2012

Greenpeace Introduction
Session

October 3rd
2012

Greenpeace Volunteers
Monthly Meeting

November
28th 2012

Greenpeace Volunteers
Monthly Meeting

January 30th
2012

Location in Canada
Montréal, QC

Description
Showing of the movie Forest Alert! Followed by a discussion of
what has happened since then and what are the current fights; 15
people present; Duration of 4 hours; No recording; 12 pages of
handwritten notes (notebook).
Orangeville, ON
Activist Skillshare and Retreat; Agenda included campaign
strategy, how to work with the media, building groups and
growing support, non-violent direct action and civil disobedience;
22 prospective Greenpeace activists and 6 Greenpeace
campaigners present; Duration of 48 hours (started at 6pm on the
Friday night and ended at 6pm on the Sunday night); 11 verbal
recordings for a total duration of 46 minutes; 16 pages of
handwritten notes (sheets) + 4 pages of notebook notes.
Toronto, ON
Mandatory session to all individuals who want to become
Greenpeace volunteers; Topics covered include the history of the
organization, its values, its current projects and the opportunities
offered to volunteers; 18 people present; Duration of 3 hours; 2
pages of handwritten notes + 2 verbal recordings for a total
duration of 6 minutes.
Toronto, ON
Monthly meeting for Greenpeace volunteers; Topics covered
include yearly campaigns and recent victories, opportunities in the
coming year, and assessment of how well/bad the organization did
in the past year; 16 people present; Duration of 2 hours; 4 pages of
written notes (notebook); 1 verbal recording of a duration of 4
minutes.
Toronto, ON
Monthly meeting for Greenpeace volunteers; Topics covered
include upcoming volunteers opportunities; 14 people present;
Duration of 2 hours; 2 pages of written notes + 1 recording of 3
minutes.
59 hours
Total: 5 Activities
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3.3 Method for analysis and analytic constructs
My approach to history is at the micro organizational level, and it leverages historical
documentation from archives to examine and theorize about organizational properties
(Kipping & Usdiken, 2014). More specifically, it corresponds to an analytically structured
history where analytic constructs are used to search archives and to reconstruct a narrative
where the organization is substituted to structures and events (Rowlinson et al., 2014).11
Analytic constructs serve the purpose of bounding the attention of the researcher to specific
aspects of the organization under investigation (Ingram et al. 2012).
The analytic constructs that I use to structure my narrative are: rationality (i.e. ability
to identify superior opportunities); plasticity (i.e. ability to act and seize opportunities); and
shaping ability (i.e. ability to legitimize new opportunities and shape/construct the
opportunity space). These dimensions were used by Gavetti (2012) to theorize about the role
of individual agents within organizations in the pursuit of cognitively distant opportunities.
My research differs substantially from Gavetti in that I focus on the organization as opposed
to individual agents, but the dimensions of rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability
nevertheless provide an analytical frame for the current study.
There are many different analytical constructs that could be used to analyze the data,
but the constructs proposed by Gavetti to explain why firms fail to engage with the distant
are akin to the process of engaging with the future. Engaging with the future corresponds to
engaging with the distant from a temporal perspective. It requires the identification of
opportunities aligned with one’s vision for the future. It also requires to persuade

11

Under this approach, the organization is considered as an actor on its own, at the expense of the names of the
individuals that were responsible for making decisions. A prominent contribution to strategy using this approach
is Chandler’s (1962) work on strategy and structure. The corporate entities are subordinate to the concepts of
the M form as well as strategy and structure, and the narrative is structured around these concepts at the expense
of names and events.
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organizational members to pursue these opportunities and to undertake actions that will
impact the landscape. It thus provides an opportunity to contextualize what distant is referred
to, to embrace and extend the literature on the nascent field of behavioral strategy. More
important, the performance of an organization engaging with the future cannot be assessed
through traditional metrics of performance (e.g. endurance in time, return on investment,
profitability, growth, etc.). Shaping the future requires impacting the landscape through a
residuum of changes. The construct of shaping ability proposed by Gavetti to determine how
successful an organization is at engaging with the distant thus provides precision with regards
to what type of performance we are talking about.
Below, I detail how these three dimensions are closely linked with the process of
engaging with the future, and how they can help me move from the narrative to the
generation of theoretical insights on the properties that contribute to enhance an
organization’s ability to engage with the future.
3.3.1 Rationality
Rationality corresponds to the ability to identify superior opportunities (Gavetti, 2012),
which are assumed to be (1) economic in nature12 and (2) cognitively distant. In Gavetti’s
view (Gavetti, 2012; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007), opportunities that are cognitively distant are to
be searched, discovered, and evaluated. It is based on the assumption that they can be
objectively compared and assessed by leaders in organizations. For Gavetti (2012), failures to
identify superior opportunities are explained by the limited ability of a strategic leader to
manage the mental processes that underlie the identification of cognitively distant strategies.

12

The opportunities Gavetti refers to correspond to asymmetries between prices and the rent-generating
potential of some of their constituent elements.
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With regards to engaging with the future, rationality corresponds to the ability to
identify opportunities that are aligned with a particular vision of the future. As mentioned in
the second chapter of this dissertation, the future is in the making. Hence, it is not possible to
describe the future as a real object that can objectively be discussed. For a specific vision of
the future to materialize, opportunities have to be identified and/or created and be pursued.
The valuation of these opportunities will be based on what vision of the future is to be
enacted.13
In the case under investigation, Greenpeace envisioned over the years many possible
futures, but its distant foresight (or, at least, the one that is driving the organization’s actions)
is the one of a clean and sustainable future. The opportunities identified by Greenpeace
correspond to issues that are global in scope or universal: climate change, deforestation,
protection of biodiversity, etc. The pursuit of these opportunities might require the
identification of small wins and other opportunities aligned with the meta-issues it aims to
address.
3.3.2 Plasticity
Plasticity refers to the ability to act on opportunities (Gavetti, 2012). It is usually considered
in the perspective of firms adapting to their environment (Levinthal & Marino, 2015).
Because of bounded plasticity (which can be associated to some form of cognitive or
identity-based inertia), firms might fail in their pursuit of superior opportunities. In Gavetti’s
view (2012: p. 274), “strategic leaders’ limited ability to manage the mental processes that
underlie internal audiences’ adoption of new strategic representations and identity codes to

13

The beliefs can be right or wrong, but the evaluation of opportunities is based on the valuations one makes
about whether or not the identified opportunities have the potential to serve these beliefs.
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‘move toward the distant’ is a central behavioral impediment to achieving complete
plasticity”.
With regards to engaging with the future, an organization might be able to identify
opportunities that have the potential to enact its vision of the future, but be unable to pursue
them. The reasons for this can be manifold: the pursuit of opportunities might require a
change in the way the organization conceptualizes its landscape or a change in the
organization’s architecture It might also be that the portfolio of action alternatives is not
sufficient and the organization needs to develop new capabilities.
In the context of Greenpeace, the decision to pursue a specific opportunity is decided
within the governance and operational channels of the organization. Although a decision can
be made in Council to pursue a given opportunity, this does not necessarily translate into
actions. Because Greenpeace is an organization that operates globally, it can happen that a
number of priorities are not being followed by NROs. To facilitate the pursuit of
opportunities, the organization adopted a number of structures, processes, and practices that
are discussed in the data section.
3.3.3 Shaping ability
Shaping ability corresponds to the ability to legitimize opportunities and shape/construct the
opportunity space (Gavetti, 2012). The opportunity space corresponds to a specific portion of
the landscape, and the environment will be enacted for that portion of the landscape that is
concerned by an opportunity. For Gavetti (2012), shaping ability failures are explained by the
challenge of persuading external audiences to embrace conceptions that are cognitively
distant.
Engaging with the future means embracing external audiences in order to shape their
thinking about what future to embrace. It implies convincing others to take actions aligned
43

with one’s vision of a preferred future. Hence, it is about legitimating a specific course of
actions that is embedded within a specific vision of the future. Because the future is formed
one step at a time, the shaping ability of an organization can only be observed based on the
residuum of changes associated with specific commitments.
In the context of Greenpeace, the landscape is multidimensional. It is also adaptable
and can be broken into different landscapes (water, earth, air, geographies, etc.). Throughout
the years, Greenpeace's conceptualization of its landscape changed to adapt to the collective
understanding Greenpeace members had of their role and their environment. The space for
Greenpeace's opportunities varied depending on what the issue was at hand. For instance, its
actions ranged from issues related to formal institution (e.g. International Whaling
Commission), whereas the opportunity space could be considered as well defined with clear
rules of the games, boundaries, and actors, to issues that concerned a plurality of actors that
were not formally connected with one another.

3.4 Analytical process14
The analytical process to answer my research questions builds on (1) periodization and (2)
the analytic constructs of “rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability”. Periodization is a
common method used by historians to break the history of individuals or organizations into
manageable portions to help move from a narrative to analysis (Abbott, 2001; Rowlinson,
2004). Periodization was obtained through the collection of information on Greenpeace and
the identification of variations in Greenpeace's priorities over time. The analytic constructs

14

Although the analytical process is presented as a linear process, it was an iterative process between theory,
data collection, and data analysis. The initial questions that triggered my interest for the research setting (how
does an issue become attended by a MNE internationally and how does the organizational context impact this
process) led to additional data collection and analysis. In the process of analyzing the data, it became clear,
however, that the issues that were the focus of Greenpeace were part of broader objectives of shaping the future
of the planet. This observation forced me to reconsider the analytical framework initially proposed for my
dissertation to take into consideration these motivations behind the organization’s actions.
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were used to revisit each period and to compare them with one another. They contributed to
binding my attention to specific dimensions of Greenpeace's activities within each period to
develop theoretical insights on the properties that contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability
to engage with the future. Below, I provide further details on the different steps that led to the
theoretical insights presented in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. I also provide a map
illustrating this process (see Table 4), along with the data sources for each period identified
in the study (see Table 5).
3.4.1 Step 1: Collecting information on Greenpeace over time
The first step in the data analysis consisted of collecting information on Greenpeace over
time. This step included developing maps and timelines representing changes within the
organization over the years. The anchoring for these maps and timelines consisted of (1) the
organizational focus in terms of issues; (2) the organizational context, with a focus on the
organization’s governance and operational channels, structures, processes, and practices,
including the events that led to their adoption; and (3) the organization’s performance. These
maps were used to synthesize information and to facilitate subsequent analysis.
In terms of organizational focus, I created a map of the different issues tackled by the
organization from 1980 to 2002. The issues appearing on this map are the ones that were
discussed within the annual budgeting process and approved in Council. This map is
displayed in Figure 7 and Figure 8 (between Chapters 4 and 5). Information displayed on this
map was verified and counter-verified using the different sources of information to ensure
accuracy in their representation. The representation is based on how the different issues were
managed internally. In total, a number of 5 iterations took place, in addition to a third visit to
Greenpeace's archives to validate information. This map was important for subsequent
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analysis: all issues on this map were considered international priorities and led to actions by
GPI and NROs.
With regards to the organizational context, my main focus was on the governance and
operational channels of Greenpeace, as well as of the processes and practices implemented
over the years. This includes changes in leadership (i.e. executive director), changes in the
mission and values of the organization (e.g. adoption of a formal mission statement), changes
in structures (e.g. adoption of policies with regards to subsidiaries having to report to
headquarters, in the legal structure of the organization, or in the financial redistribution
system), changes in the practices used internally (e.g. use of policies about issues or change
in the way offices collaborate with one another), changes in the way information is presented
(e.g. use of issue areas to discuss issues during meetings or in the way proposals are brought
up to the committees), changes in the repertoire of action alternatives (e.g. international
campaigns versus national campaigns), and changes in the resources available (human and
financial) and their allocation (e.g. use of contingency funds, long-term planning, etc.). The
timeline resulting from this exercise is displayed in Appendix 3 for reference. This summary
was important in order to provide information on the key measures that were adopted over
the years and could be used later on to identify periods that were relatively homogeneous as
well as their junctures (see Step 2). A limited number of events were listed on this timeline:
these events were included because they either forced the organization to change or provided
elements of reflection about the functioning of Greenpeace as an organization.
Finally, with regards to Greenpeace's performance, I focused on measures of
effectiveness and efficiency: (1) membership and income, as a proxy for the overall support
of the organization by donors (presented in Graph 1 in Chapter 5); (2) victories obtained by
the organization in its attempts to influence formal international institutions and multinational
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corporations (presented in Graph 3 in Chapter 5); and (3) profitability as well as fundraising
as a percentage of expenditures, as measures of how efficient the organization has been in
managing its funds (presented in Graph 2 in Chapter 5). These dimensions were selected
because they could be tracked over time and they provide objective measures on how well
the organization was doing in fulfilling its mission.
3.4.2 Step 2: Identifying variations in Greenpeace context over time
The second step in the data analysis consisted of identifying variations in the organizational
context over time to establish periods that could be used to facilitate the analysis. Depending
on the researcher’s objectives, periods can be based on changes in the senior leadership,
changes in strategy or organizational design, or external events (Plourde, 2013; Rowlinson,
2004). In the current study, periodization was used to identify periods that were relatively
homogeneous in terms of the culture, design, processes, and practices used within
Greenpeace. Turning points (also referred to as “junctures” by other authors – see Plourde,
2013) from one period to another were based on significant events for the organization that
led to a reflection on the changes to be undertaken. This is consistent with methods used to
identify periods within organizations based on social parameters, “when novel elements are
introduced and subsequently institutionalized in the new structure” (Whipp & Clark, 1986:
19). In determining the junctures, I paid particular attention to crises (e.g. the bombing of a
vessel of the organization by the French secret services, organizational crisis caused by
financial difficulties, etc), as crisis plays a major role in the development of intentionality
(King et al., 2010).
This second step in the analysis of the data led to the identification of four periods in
the history of Greenpeace. Beside the pre-Greenpeace International era where the different
Greenpeace groups were unrelated to one another, the years 1979-1991 were years of
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exponential growth when Greenpeace shifted from a decentralized form of organizing, with
NROs enjoying significant independence and autonomy in deciding on their priorities, to a
centralized form of organizing, where GPI (i.e. international headquarters) was playing a
prominent role in setting up the organization’s agenda. The events surrounding the sinking of
the Rainbow Warrior by the French Secret Services in 1985 is used as the turning point
between what I label the “Muddling Through” period, where Greenpeace was attempting to
organize itself as an international organization, and the “Centralization to engage into long
jumps” period, where GPI asserted its influence over NROs by gaining control over a number
of activities central to Greenpeace’s operations. It is also during this period that the desire to
engage into long-term thinking about issues as well as the positioning of the organization
became explicit.
The last two periods, which cover the years 1991-2001, are associated with “One
Greenpeace”. “One Greenpeace” is a concept that emerged from the desire to develop an
organization that is neither centralized nor decentralized, two forms of organizing that were
deemed inappropriate given Greenpeace’s activities. Under “One Greenpeace”, all NROs
were expected to work with one another without GPI being formally involved in all decisions,
and GPI was expected to provide guidelines on the main orientations of the organization. GPI
is also expected to provide assistance to NROs in their ODPs, and to create the right context
for NROs to effectively develop creative solutions. I divided the period dedicated to “One
Greenpeace” into two: the period 1991-1995, where attention is dedicated to solving an
organizational crisis and to imagining how Greenpeace ought to operate, and the period
1995-2001, dedicated to the implementation of measures that favored the development of a
global organization in the spirit of “One Greenpeace”. Two events influenced my decision to
use 1995 as a turning point: the successes obtained with the Brent Spar campaign, which was
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a major departure from previous campaigns, and the arrival of a new CEO that contributed to
reform the organization.
These periods are used to present the history of Greenpeace in Chapter 4. This
narrative provides a general description of what happened in Greenpeace's history to provide
subsequent background to the reader. This way of presenting periods in the history of
Greenpeace is consistent with prior studies that built on periodization to present changes over
time within an organization (e.g. Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982;
Ocasio & Joseph, 2008). The information presented in this narrative is mostly factual and
relates to the functioning of the organization. Each piece of information was verified and
counter verified. To facilitate the reading, sources have been left aside, at the exception of
specific pieces of information that could not be validated through another source.
3.4.3 Step 3: Revisiting the periods using analytic constructs
The third step in my data analysis consisted of revisiting the periods identified in Step 2
using the analytic constructs of “rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability”. The use of
analytic construct – common in historiography – was chosen to facilitate the analysis of the
data. Analytic constructs are used in historiography to help the researcher move from a
narrative to analysis (Rowlinson et al., 2014). It also helps the researcher to keep his focus on
the phenomenon under study (Ingram et al., 2012).
For each period, I looked at Greenpeace's beliefs about the future, the ability of
Greenpeace to identify opportunities aligned with these beliefs (“rationality”), the ability of
Greenpeace to seize the identified opportunities (“plasticity”), and the ability of Greenpeace
to create change with regards to the identified opportunities through its actions (“shaping
ability”). The analysis of the rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability for each period is
based on an interpretation of the data and is presented in Chapter 5. Because it is an
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interpretation of the data, each dimension is presented for each period with supporting data
(both quotes and factual data), with an explanation for my interpretations of the dimension,
and why Greenpeace was doing well or not so well during each period with regards to the
identified dimensions.
3.4.4 Step 4: Developing insights on the properties that contributed to Greenpeace
success
The fourth step in the analytical process was to develop theoretical insights on the properties
that can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the future. This fourth step was
based on the comparison of the “rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability” of the
organization across the different periods, and is derived from the data. This led to the
identification of three properties that contributed to make Greenpeace a more effective
organization when it comes to engage with the future: flexibility, stability, and diversity.
Based on the analysis of the case, specific dimensions for each property could be identified.
Supporting data for the importance of flexibility, stability, and diversity is presented
throughout Chapter 5. Formal propositions, along with explanations for the importance of
these properties, are presented in Chapter 6. The properties along with their specific
dimensions are discussed in relation with the appropriate literature in Chapter 7.
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Table 4: Data analysis process

Purpose of analysis

Focus of analysis
Analytical tools

Step 1
Identification of factual
information that can be used
to describe Greenpeace over
time

Events, structures, processes
and practices
Factual analysis

Data analysis process
Step 2
Step 3
Comparing the periods to
Identifying periods in the
identify similarities and
history of Greenpeace that
differences that explain the
were relatively homogeneous
performance of Greenpeace
in terms of the way the
with regards to its ability to
organization was operating
shape the landscape
Events, structures, processes,
Periods in the history of
and practices
Greenpeace
Periodization
Analytical constructs

Step 4
Developing explanation as to
why the properties identified
in the previous phase can
enhance an organization’s
ability to engage with the
future
Rationality, Plasticity, and
Shaping ability across periods
Observation/Interpretation

Analysis of Greenpeace over
time through the different
events, maps, and graphs on
resource allocation, and
graphs on performance to
identify periods that were
relatively homogeneous;
junctures were used to
separate one period over the
other; junctures were
identified based on critical
events
Identification of periods that
can be used to “break” the
history of Greenpeace into
manageable chunks

Analysis of Greenpeace
periods using the analytical
constructs of “Rationality”,
“Plasticity”, and “Shaping
Ability”; the analytical
constructs were used to focus
my attention on specific
dimensions of the data, to
make interpretations as to
what explained Greenpeace
successes/failures

This final phase in the analysis
consisted in theorizing on the
identified properties; it was
based on my observation and
my interpretation of the case,
building on the previous
analysis

Identification of properties
that contributed to Greenpeace
success over the years

Table of events
Map of issues over time
Graphs on resource allocation
Graphs on performance

Identification of four periods:
1979-1985
1985-1991
1991-1995
1995-2001

Identification of three
properties:
Flexibility
Stability
Diversity

Tables, Figures, Graphs

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Explanations on why and how
the properties identified in the
previous phase can enhance
the organization’s ability to
engage with the future
9 propositions on the effect of
flexibility, stability, and
diversity on the identification,
the pursuit, and the capture of
opportunities aligned with
one’s vision for the future
Chapter 6

Description of analysis

Identification of “historical
facts” through the analysis of
“traces of history”; historical
facts correspond to
information about what
happened in the past that is
undisputable (although the
interpretation for these facts is
up for grab)

Intended outcome(s)

Information that can be used
for subsequent analysis

Key outcome(s)

In the dissertation
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Table 5: Data per period
Period 1: 1979-1985
Stakeholders communications
Annual reports
Formal channels of communication
Annual General Meeting Minutes
Board of Directors Meeting Minutes
Executive Directors Meeting Minutes
Trustee Meeting Minutes
Campaign Team Meeting Minutes
Internal reports and other
documents related to strategic
planning
Proposals
Long-Term Plan
Strategic Plan (1993)
Strategic Plan (1998)

Data per period
Period 2: 1985-1991
Period 3: 1991-1995

Real time
Real time

Real time
Real time

Real time

Real time

Retrospective
Prospective
Prospective

Period 4: 1995-2001

Retrospective

Retrospective

Real time
Real time
Real time
Real time
Real time

Real time
Real time
Real time

Retrospective
Prospective

Retrospective
Prospective

Prospective
Prospective

(1) Retrospective: provides edited information on what has been done in the past.
(2) Prospective: provides edited information on what will (or should) be done in the future.
(3) Real time: reflects real time discussions; can include retrospective and prospective information as part of the discussions.
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Chapter 4
4. A brief history of Greenpeace International
Even though the focus of this study is covering the years 1979 to 2001, it is important to
understand what led ‘Greenpeace’, a social movement, to become ‘Greenpeace’, a formal
international organization. Greenpeace was born when Vancouver-based activists decided to
protest against nuclear tests to be conducted by the US Navy in Amchitka, Alaska, in 1971.
To protest the nuclear tests, the activists had plotted to send a boat within the nuclear test
zone and to report on what they would see through various media. The plot was based on the
Quaker philosophy of “bearing witnesses”. By sending a boat within the nuclear test zone
and by reporting on what they were to see, they wanted people to react to the tests and
demonstrate that they were willing to risk their life for the cause. The group did not make it
to the nuclear test zone, but nevertheless reported their trip through various media. Thanks to
the efforts of a team that had stayed on shore to organize public events and communicate
information coming from the boat, their actions led to an important public mobilization. This
public mobilization ultimately forced the US government to abandon its nuclear test program
in the area within a few months.
In light of the successes obtained in raising awareness on the dangers of the US
nuclear tests, the activists decided to formally adopt the name ‘Greenpeace Foundation’ and
to conduct another action the following year, this time in Mururoa, against the French
government conducting nuclear tests in the area. The actions did not prove to be successful.
Nevertheless, the crew decided to return in 1973. This time, however, an incident occurred
between the French navy and the crew. During the altercation, the French navy boarded the
sailboat and crewmembers were severally beaten. A female crewmember took pictures of the
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altercation and hid them in her vagina, saving the evidence of the assault. Back on shore, the
images were sent to various media worldwide. From this point on, other groups started to use
the name ‘Greenpeace’ for their own activities, Greenpeace being associated more with a
philosophy of actions than a formal organization.
From 1974 to 1979, the ‘Greenpeace’ name remained unregistered, which led to its
free use by an expanding number of independent and unconnected groups of people. It is
only in 1977 that the basis for an international organization started to develop. In October of
that year, the groups, upon the initiative of the Greenpeace Foundation, met for a “global
reunion”. There were two objectives to the meeting: resolve political tensions and address
financial issues faced by the Greenpeace Foundation. The meeting did not result in any
agreement. Tensions emerged around the issue of decision-making rights and the fear by
several groups of losing autonomy. A second meeting was to be held in January 1978.
Meanwhile, Greenpeace San Francisco registered the name ‘Greenpeace USA’ in an attempt
to take control over the other Greenpeace groups in the USA, and the UK group, under the
recommendation of David McTaggart, registered a business under the name ‘Greenpeace UK
Inc’. The second meeting resulted in more tensions between the different Greenpeace
factions, and as the financial difficulties encountered by the Greenpeace Foundation in
Canada became more salient, the Greenpeace Foundation filed a lawsuit against the San
Francisco-based Greenpeace USA in the summer of 1979.
The crisis was officially resolved in November 1979 when the different factions
reached an agreement. Under this agreement, a new entity would be created as a Dutch
Stitching: “Stitching Greenpeace Council” (commonly known as “Greenpeace International”
– GPI hereafter). This new entity would become the trademark owner of the name
‘Greenpeace’. As part of the agreement, there would be a single Greenpeace national
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organization (NRO) per country, and that organization would have exclusive rights over the
name Greenpeace for that country. In exchange, each NRO would provide a percentage of its
revenues to GPI to cover the expenses of the operations at sea and provide the funding
necessary to cover the expenses of the international headquarters. There would also be formal
governance channels to facilitate decision-making processes with regards to which issues
should be funded for campaigns and which ones should not. All the Greenpeace groups but
two accepted this agreement,15 and GPI was officially born.

4.1 Period 1 (1979-1985): Muddling through an unorganized, decentralized
organization
The period from 1979 to 1985 was dedicated to establishing the functioning of Greenpeace as
an international organization. Organizational members had to set-up a financial, an
operational, and a governance structure that would allow them to coordinate the work
conducted by various NROs. The key achievements during the “muddling through” period
were the creation of an international secretariat, the foundation of the Marine Division, and
the reaching of an agreement over the principles behind the financial structure of Greenpeace
(i.e. NROs paying a “pledge” to GPI). The development of Greenpeace was inhibited during
this period by the fact that NROs used to be fully independent, making any attempt to
organize their work a negotiation process, which GPI had little influence over.
From 1979 to 1982, the discussions were unorganized, mixing several issues –
organizational and environmental – within the same agenda items. It was frequent during
those years to see a discussion evolve from an issue to how money should be managed. The

15

Greenpeace Hawaii and London Greenpeace decided to maintain their independence. Although they were
unrelated to Greenpeace International, they were authorized to keep using the name “Greenpeace”, as long as
they made it clear that they were not affiliated with Greenpeace International.
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key elements of discussions at that point in time were about the principles behind the creation
of Greenpeace, the basic functioning of the organization, and how to cover the overhead of
the international secretariat. Many of these processes discussed were quite simple to establish,
requiring only some form of clarification as to how things should be done. This discussion
surrounding the process for determining commitments illustrates well this point and also
provides an idea of how limited were the resources of the organization at that time:
“Unless our financial picture improves, no further international campaigns can
take place. Should financing become available and a new campaign is put before
the trustees - 1) proposal shall be sent to trustees by office proposing, including a
deadline for votes (and Council); 2) Council shall contact each country to
request their vote; 3) Council shall inform the proposing country and the other
trustees of the result of that vote.” (SGC AGM 1980, July 28-31 p.)

As the number of NROs increased, voting by majority was introduced, although there
was confusion over voting rights. For instance, it was mentioned during the 1981 AGM that
no voting membership request had been made because Australia and New Zealand felt they
were not ready, which came as a surprise to Council members. The criterion to upgrade from
a non-voting member to a voting member was then clarified: a country member had to be
solvent, it had to be active and/or capable of doing campaigns, and it had to report in a
manner acceptable to Council. It was also stated that the country member had to have some
expertise in management, both for administration and campaign work, and present their
proposal for obtaining voting status in writing at least 30 days ahead of Council.
The confusion in the organization’s procedures and processes also existed with
regards to Greenpeace’s focus, with a general lack of agreement about which issues should
be considered international. Many offices were working on different projects, sometimes
with no link at all with one another, a feature inherited from the pre-GPI era where all
Greenpeace groups were independent. Discussions about issues were not organized by issue
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area or common themes, and there were no clear guidelines that could facilitate discussions.
Members regularly questioned what was an international issue/campaign and what was not,
with issues shared by more than one NRO not even recognized as being alike despite obvious
similarities. Some offices also refused to commit to move forward with actions that were
aligned with the organization’s objectives if other offices did not make the same commitment.
This translated into a limited number of issues securing support for funding, as illustrated
through Graph 1 on the allocation of resources for the year 1982.
Graph 1: Resource Allocation 1982

As of 1982, however, this situation started to change. The organization had obtained a
major victory at the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Following this victory, which
had been obtained through greater coordination from GPI, a variety of measures were
adopted to organize the work of the different NROs. First, the Council agreed to standardize
the accounting year for all offices, to standardize the Greenpeace logo, to create an inventory
of assets falling under the responsibility of the Marine Division, to create an inventory of the
libraries of the European and North American photography departments, and to consolidate
advertising and merchandising purchases to develop economies of scale. Second, the Council
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voted for the separation of the functions of Chairman and Managing Director, and for the
creation of a Board of Directors to oversee the work of the secretariat and make decisions
between AGM/Council meetings. Voting in Council was then determined by the ability of
NROs to pay 24 per cent of net income to GPI. The board at that point was made up of four
members: two representing ‘Europe’ and two representing the ‘ANZUSCA’ region
(Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and Canada). Board members were elected from the
ranks of Executive Directors, Trustees, and Campaigners within these regions and took an
active role in the management of Greenpeace.
With regards to operations, the Council voted for the adoption of clear procedures for
managing the international campaigns: the organization of discussions about environmental
problems by issue areas, the creation of a Council Campaign Committee for administering
the approved funds for campaigns area, and for selecting the international campaigners in
charge of managing the day-to-day activities. International coordinators, which were by then
used for all international campaigns, were responsible for coordinating the work of the
different offices. The double-veto principle was also designed at that point, allowing
international campaigners to veto an action that might be detrimental to GPI and the national
campaigners to veto an action to be conducted in their country by GPI or another NRO that
might be detrimental to their national objectives. A formal reporting system was also
established as a way to ensure that campaigns were staying within budgets and spending
done carefully.
The changes in the way the organization was governed permitted it to carry more
international campaigns and increase the number of priorities (see Graphs 2 and 3). The
changes, however, did not prevent issues from being denied funding – Trophy Hunting, the
slaughtering of Kangaroos, and Reprocessing – all provide examples of proposals aiming to
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raise awareness about issues that were denied support. Nevertheless, it was a much improved
situation compared to the one that prevailed in the previous year, where close to all proposals
were dismissed by organizational members.
Graph 2: Resource Allocation 1983

Graph 3: Resource Allocation 1984

Despite the changes mentioned above, Greenpeace remained very decentralized with
GPI having little influence over NROs. NROs remained free to fund any project that they
deemed relevant for their volunteers and supporters. Some NROs even saw their voting rights
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suspended because of their refusal to comply with the agreed principles. An example of this
can be found in the refusal of Greenpeace Netherlands (see Figure 2 on voting rights) to
transfer licensing rights of their logo to GPI. The case in point was that under the new
framework negotiated between GPI and NROs, all copyrights were to belong to GPI, to make
them free to use by all NROs:
“Netherlands: If we transfer the trademark, we get back only the right to use it.
Our position is that we will not transfer it until we have an agreed right to use it.
The fact that we transfer money and manpower makes us part of Greenpeace
International.
Canada: What document would you show to prove that you are part of
Greenpeace Council?
Netherlands: The bylaws of Greenpeace Council.
Canada: Do you agree that your opposition to transfer of the trademark is in
violation of those bylaws?
Netherlands: We refuse to transfer the trademark at this moment. Our
contribution is our involvement.
Chair: What we are talking about here is protection of the name Greenpeace.
Netherlands: We agree that the name is important. National offices should be
able to decide on policy and there should be limits on Council's interference with
national offices.” (Board Meeting Minutes, November 23rd 1983, p. 2)

This episode is representative of the conflicts that were taking place within the
organization, with NROs still resisting the centralization of activities at GPI. The fact that the
individuals working on campaigns were the same as the ones responsible for the management
and the administration did not help as there was no separation of power between the
governance and the operational channels.
This situation was to change on July 10th, 1985, however, with the sinking of the
Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace’s main ship, by the French Secret Services. The sinking of the
boat, which caused the death of Fernando Pereira, a crewmember and photographer, brought
significant visibility to Greenpeace. This visibility translated into a sharp increase in
donations to GPI and NROs. The additional funds allowed for an increase in the number of
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services offered by GPI to NROs, and the expansion of the senior management team to
coordinate the work of the organization on a worldwide scale.
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Figure 2: Greenpeace Global Presence with Voting Rights (1979-2000)

Voting status granted by
the board of directors at
their discretion.

Voting status granted upon recommendation
from the board, with the condition that certain
minimal standards are met. These standards
include a minimal financial contribution to GPI.

Year
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Graph 4:: Greenpeace Membership and Donations Over T
Time (1981-2002)a
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Based on annual reports and AGM minutes. Greenpeace incomes correspond to all the funds raised by NROs worldwide in USD. Greenpeace membership
corresponds to the number of donors worldwide.
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4.2 Period 2 (1985-1991): Centralizing to engage into long jumps
From 1985 to 1991, Greenpeace experienced significant growth, both in donations and
supporters (see Graph 4), and scope, both geographically (growing from 15 NROs in 1985 to
29 offices worldwide by 1991 – see Figure 2) and in terms of issues of interest (growing from
four issue areas in 1985 to nine issue areas by 1991 – see various Graphs on resource
allocation at the end of the presentation of this period and Figure 7 and 8 at the beginning of
the next section). The organization also became more bureaucratic with several attempts from
GPI to centralize the organization’s key functions at the international headquarters in
Amsterdam, and to exert greater control over the message, both internally (across the
different NROs) and externally (with the media and the public). Long-term objectives were
developed during this period and choices were made about which issues should be prioritized
across the organization with the explicit aim to focus the organization’s attention on the most
important issues it could impact rather than having NROs prioritizing issues that were
primarily of interest to their local supporters.
A number of measures favoring greater coordination and standardization of practices
across the different NROs were adopted during the turmoil surrounding the bombing of the
Rainbow Warrior: policies on controversial issues were discussed to ensure greater coherence
in all Greenpeace activities; an auditing contract was signed with a single international
auditing firm to solve problems with regards to differences in terminology, format and
interpretation of figures; the photo division was moved from Paris to Amsterdam as part of a
plan to bring the three service divisions and the administration under the same roof; an
international media coordinator role was created to educate the media about what Greenpeace
was about and to facilitate media access for planned campaigns and during actions; the
lobbying work conducted regionally and internationally across issues was centralized under
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the Convention project to strengthen, in the long term, the preservation of the oceans; a skill
sharing program was initiated to facilitate knowledge transfer between NROs; and new rules
were formally adopted with regards to voting rights, tying a NRO’s right to vote in Council
to its financial contribution to GPI (i.e. the 24 percent rule).16 As a result of this increase in
resources available to GPI, the Board of Directors was slowly moving out from daily
administration to give greater responsibilities to the executive committee.
Meanwhile, how the organization approached the activities related to its mission was
changing. From this point on, science was used as a way to engage into the most impactful
issues and to develop deep knowledge about complex problems. The Greenpeace Science
Unit was created and a principle on the use of science within Greenpeace campaigns was
adopted, stating that Greenpeace was to build its campaigns on qualitative evidences rather
than quantifiable evidences to protect the reputation of the organization from counter-attacks
from corporations that could question their findings and methods on the basis of different
quantifiable evidences. Hence, based on this policy, the mere presence of pollutants would be
considered more important than its quantity. This principle was then tied to the precautionary
principle, stating that in case of doubts, it is better to wait to ensure that a technology or a
practice is fully safe for humans and the environment. From this point on, the Greenpeace
Science Unit was used by the different NROs and GPI as a way to develop evidences of
environmental issues and to provide background for policies on a number of complex
problems, such as the use of chlorine by various industries, the release of pollutants into the
atmosphere, or the development of new technologies that can impact biodiversity, such as
biotechnologies.
16

The 24 percent rule, however, will be loosely applied, becoming less and less enforced over the years, with
each office’s voting status still determined by the political process of a vote of Council, giving GPI an important
say on whose NROs have the right to vote and which ones do not through its influence over Council and its
control of the organizational agenda.
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To improve the effectiveness of communications – both internally and externally –,
the Council voted for the creation of Greenpeace Communications Ltd. The aim was to
streamline operations and to exert a better control of information by consolidating all mediarelated activities. Greenpeace Communications originated from a merger of the Photo
department in Paris and Greenpeace Films, and was established in London, UK, where most
media agencies were located. Greenpeace Communications was to provide communication
services to GPI and NROs. Its mandate was also to secure maximum media coverage for
Greenpeace campaigns and to provide international news agencies with photos, prints, and
video material originating from, or acquired by, Greenpeace. Greenpeace Communications
soon became central to Greenpeace's strategy, providing training as well as advices to NROs
and GPIs.
The Political Unit was also created to supervise the Conventions Project, to develop
intelligence for behind-the-scenes strategies, and to state the position of the organization on
controversial issues in the political environment.
During this period, Greenpeace's approach to new countries changed as well.
Potential new countries were carefully evaluated and compared based on their potential for
growth in memberships and fundraising, and specific issues were targeted to facilitate market
entry.17 This new approach was in sharp contrast with the ‘Muddling Through’ period, where
groups from new countries could become members of Greenpeace on the basis of a simple
request.

17

For instance, eight new potential locations are considered in 1985: Argentina, to increase Greenpeace
presence in Latin America (opened in 1985); Norway, conditional to a positive outcome on the whaling issue
(opened in 1986); India, a non-aligned country, at the forefront of disarmament, and a country with a high level
of awareness for environmental issues, especially since the events in Bhopal (not realized); Italy, which counts
on enormous support, and which might become a priority if the Mediterranean campaign goes ahead; Finland ,
because of its link with USSR, and a potential entry through the Baltic Sea and its strategic importance for the
campaign; and Africa, because it corresponds to a clear blank spot for the organization.
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It is during the ‘Centralization’ period that Greenpeace engaged openly into ‘distant
foresight’ and attempted to anticipate the changes that were occurring globally and what was
Greenpeace's role in this new world, with a particular reflection on the impact of
multinational corporations (SGC 1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to Council, p. 23). As part of this reflection, Greenpeace launched its first strategic planning exercise in 1986,
which culminated in 1988 with the publication of the Long-Term Plan. The strategic
planning exercise was led by GPI and the Council was invited to provide its feedback.
Brainstorming sessions were conducted over a series of meetings to establish a list of the
most important threats to the planet in the decades ahead, and which ones were the ones
Greenpeace should target.
By 1987, the group delivered a preliminary report identifying, among other things, a
list of major environmental problems (deforestation, proliferation of nuclear power,
destruction of the atmosphere, climate change, development of genetically modified
organisms, etc.). Council members once again provided feedback and the Long-Term Plan
was finally published in 1988. The Plan called for a number of initiatives: the creation of a
‘Terrestrial Ecology’ campaign; expansion into Russia, Latin America, and Japan in a ‘first
tier’ expansion, and China, India, and Africa as a second-tier expansion; and a new voting
right system. The ‘Terrestrial Ecology’ campaign was primarily built around a single issue
(i.e. the slaughtering of Kangaroos in Australia) and was implemented as a short-term
measure, but abandoned two years later. Geographic expansion in first-tier countries occurred
within two years, but failed for second-tier countries in the short and medium term. The
revision of the voting right structure led to the implementation of the regional trustees voting
system.
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Although few of the recommendations of the Long-Term Plan ended up being
implemented, the report nevertheless had an enduring effect on Greenpeace: it provided
direction to the organization. Many of the issues targeted as priorities at the time were the
ones Greenpeace was focusing on several decades later. These priorities guided Greenpeace's
resource allocation process, leading to further actions for issues Greenpeace was already
involved with and policies for issues Greenpeace had no prior involvement with.
By 1991, GPI had managed to increase its influence over NROs and Council – at least
in determining the organization’s agenda –, a drastic change compared to the situation that
prevailed a decade earlier and throughout the ‘Muddling Through’ period. NROs had to work
on the priorities determined by GPI, with close to 95 percent of budget pre-allocated to
specific campaigns, and have their actions approved by GPI ahead of time. Greenpeace
Communications was also exercising significant influence over the process with a strict
control of information directed outside Greenpeace. By the end of the period, the first signs
of an emerging organizational crisis started to appear with expenditures increasing at a higher
rate than incomes (see Graph 11), and NROs reporting difficulties in selling their issues to
local supporters. The centralization trend that had occurred in the recent years was identified
as an impediment to their capacity to engage volunteers in their causes.
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Graph 5: Resource Allocation 1985
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Graph 6: Resource Allocation 1986
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Graph 7: Resource Allocation 1987
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Graph 8: Resource Allocation 1988
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Graph 9: Resource Allocation 1989
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Graph 10: Resource Allocation 1990
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Graph 11
11: Greenpeace's efficiency over time (1988-2002)a
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Based on annual reports and minutes from the board of directors. GPI and Greenpeace surplus/deficit provide information on the free cash flow generated by GPI
and NROs. Fundraising expenditures provide guidance on the efficiency of the organization regarding the use of its resources, fundraising expenditures
usually being used as a proxy for the efficiency of NGOs.
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4.3 Period 3 (1991-1995): Solving the crisis and imagining ‘One Greenpeace’
The years following the centralization period are dedicated to resolving a critical issue for
Greenpeace: how to operate as a single, global organization dedicated to the protection of the
environment, a concept known as ‘One Greenpeace’. ‘One Greenpeace’ was deemed
necessary because of the increasing tensions between GPI and NROs, and amongst different
NROs. The sources of these tensions were manifold. There was, on one hand, the increased
reliance on a bureaucratic form of organizing, with GPI playing a prominent role in the
establishment of priorities. On the other hand, NROs were struggling to follow guidelines
that they felt were often disconnected from the concerns of their supporters. The financial
difficulties experienced as of the early 90s’, after years of continuous growth from 1971 to
1991, contributed to exacerbate these tensions and forced the organization to focus on
organizational issues that had largely been ignored until then. ‘One Greenpeace’ was then
seen as a necessary condition to put these tensions aside, to adapt to a globalized world, and
to increase Greenpeace's effectiveness.
Signs of financial difficulties started to appear with a first deficit for GPI in 1990
(which went almost unnoticed), and a second year of deficits in 1991 (see Graph 11), for both
GPI and Greenpeace. These deficits were symptomatic of the way Greenpeace had evolved
over the recent years: a bureaucratic organization driven primarily by GPI. The Council
discussed some issues related to the crisis as well as different viewpoints in terms of the
direction to be taken, but with no clear consensus over a course of action. It was recognized,
however, that the organization had to be more responsive to its changing environment and
more responsive to the challenges faced by NROs. As preliminary measures, a number of
working groups are established to provide solutions to some of the issues faced by
Greenpeace: a Rapid Response Team Working Group, responsible for designing a system
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that would allow Greenpeace to deploy an emergency plan in the case of unexpected events
(e.g. oil spills, nuclear incidents, or any other disaster that falls within Greenpeace’s focus
and that might require a rapid response); a Voting Rights Working Group in charge of
rethinking the governance of Greenpeace, and to give more weight to small NROs and/or
NROs located in strategic markets; and a Global Issues Working Group in charge of deciding
on which issues had to be prioritized.18
In 1992, Greenpeace's financial difficulties became more salient and the crisis was
now in a full blow out. The situation was judged as sufficiently important for David
McTaggart, former Chairman and Executive Director, to share his vision about the original
idea behind Greenpeace through a letter to all members (SGC 1992 AGM, Chairman’s
Speech to Council, p. 41-45: reproduced in Appendix 4). The speech provides a sense of the
organizational climate at the time, where open conflicts were frequent. The speech is also
important because it includes some of the founding elements of what would later be known
as ‘One Greenpeace’, a concept that had been more or less in the air before. Following
McTaggart’s speech, and upon Greenpeace Germany's request, Council approved the
creation of a Working Group to provide answers with regards to the reasons behind the crisis
(SGC 1992 AGM Minutes, p. 8). It was made explicit that the role of this group was not to
identify scapegoats, but to analyze the mistakes that were made so that the whole
organization could learn from them. The working group reported back to Council later in the
meeting, emphasizing the lack of a clear strategic direction for the organization as well as the
need for greater integration and clarity in the lines of accountability.
Council agreed to the working group’s suggestion to address these issues within the
18

Besides the Voting Rights Working Group, which will see its recommendations for a regional trustee system
implemented, the Rapid Response Team and the Global Issues Working Groups will see their work
compromised by the restructuration. The Global Issues Working Group, in particular, will see its work
suspended until 1992 as its members will not be able to meet, and will eventually publish its report in 1993.
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planning process. A number of short-term measures aiming to improve Greenpeace's
effectiveness were also voted in: the revision of the Training Project to cope with increased
competition for media attention; the creation of an International Action Team to decrease
response time when major unexpected events occur; the creation of a working group on
internal communications to deal with issues of multilingualism; and greater coordination
among the fundraisers of different countries to share best practices and develop economies of
scope. Meanwhile, a ‘Regional Trustees’ structure was created to give governance authority
to those offices disenfranchised by the economics of the 24 per cent rule.
The 1993 AGM was a turning point in the crisis, with a clear consensus that the
organization was too bureaucratic and hierarchical to have the flexibility necessary to
effectively fulfill its mission. As a basis for discussions for the ‘new Greenpeace’, Paul
Gilding, the new Executive Director of GPI, circulated two documents: the Strategic Plan and
the Global Resource Report. The Strategic Plan, which was the result of an organization-wide
consultation, provided a reflection on the internal challenges faced by Greenpeace and what
was required for the organization to respond to its changing environment. Internally, the
report claims that the change in the management structure made the organization expensive
to run and that increased demand for resources and their decreasing availability, in addition
to changes in leadership across all boards, contributed to exacerbate the crisis. Externally, the
report claimed that a shift in paradigm occurred in the external environment and that the
organization had to adapt to this shift if it was to continue to be an agent of change.
The report identifies a number of tangible measures to be adopted to favor greater
effectiveness and efficiency, as well as for a deeper reflection of what Greenpeace is about.
One of the central measures of the report is the creation of area advisors with a broad range
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of expertise (i.e. campaigning, fundraising, media, finance).19 The goal of area advisors was
to “help eliminate the need for all issues to go through the International Executive Director's
office, which is an impractical arrangement. This network will create direct links with and
between offices to facilitate the direct exchange of expertise across national borders. The
intention is that only those things that cannot be resolved between offices end up in the center”
(SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 23). The report also includes a reflection on how coordinators
must be supported in order to improve Greenpeace effectiveness in tackling issues, and how
the selection process should take place.
The discussions on what had be achieved by Greenpeace to be successful led to
discussions on the adoption of a formal mission statement, which could be used as a catalyst
to unify the different NROs and facilitate collaboration, while leaving them enough
autonomy to pursue their mission (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 36):
“International and national campaign staff cooperate in the process of
developing campaign proposals, defining policies and formulating goals,
strategies, objectives and tactics. The basis of the relationship is the reality that
the former are in the best position to judge what will contribute positively
internationally to the global Greenpeace mission, while the latter are in the best
position to judge what will or will not be effective in their respective countries.”

The plan also called for a revision of the way resources were allocated. It favored a
format where 50 percent of resources should be allocated to priority campaigns, 20 30 percent

19

Prior to 1993, all issues had to go through the International Executive Director’s office to centralize
information and decision-making.
20
‘Priority campaigns’ (or priority targets) are similar to what was called ‘campaign pushes’ (i.e. very
specific goals representing a move forward for the relevant issue area and/or for Greenpeace or for
environmental goals generally). It is not an entire campaign, but a distinct element of a larger on-going
campaign. Other issues that might be priority targets include an anticipated shift in position at key
international foray, requiring a period of intensive high-profile work to prevent or encourage the shift;
or a way of setting the environmental agenda (e.g. by encouraging a shift in attitude or perceptions on a
given issue). Priority campaign pushes are generally pro-active. The timeframe for priority targets will
necessarily be flexible, varying from one or two months to one or two years, depending on the goals.
The campaign priorities will probably require a commitment of substantial organizational resources and
energy.
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to ongoing campaigns,21 and 20 percent to opportunistic campaigns,22 as opposed to 95
percent of resources pre-allocated to specific campaigns ahead of time, as it had been used
before. This way, Greenpeace could maintain unallocated funds to respond to unexpected
events. This shift in approaching issues will deem important, and will ultimately lead to a
reduction in the number of issue areas, as well as a shift in the way issues were approached:
instead of specific problems discussed during Council, area advisors and campaigners were
to be requested to provide general guidelines with a time horizon of two to three years, and
the issues were to be discussed at a general level, to give more flexibility to NROs and
international coordinators. This notion of flexibility was an important component of the
Strategic Plan, and implied the design of an organization that is neither centralized nor
decentralized, but rather builds on the strengths of NROs and GPI (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes,
p. 19-20):
“With less of a resource base in Amsterdam, the structure will flatten, resulting
in less hierarchy and bureaucracy. In order to encourage NROs to maximize their
capability to support and co-operate with each other (particularly via the
transnational ‘buddy system’) and thereby eliminate the need for building up a
large centralized infrastructure internationally, there will be central strategic
directions that are implemented locally.”

While there was wide agreement for the Strategic Plan, its implementation implied further
layoffs, which increased the tensions between NROs and GPI. As a response to these
tensions, the Board of Directors decided to fire Paul Gilding in 1994 on the grounds that his
actions were detrimental to the organization. Following this decision, the Board of Directors

21

‘On-going campaigns’ are similar to what was called ‘issue campaigns’, although these may have a lower
profile compared to campaigns with prioritized targets. These are to be managed by specialist campaigners, with
permanent staff, long-term objectives that fit in with the long-term goals of Greenpeace as set out in the
Statement of Purpose, with all the elements of an action-oriented, public campaign.
22 'Opportunistic campaigns' are described as purely ‘reactive’; responding to an unexpected event like
an oil spill or a nuclear accident. In certain cases, an opportunistic campaign may develop into an
ongoing or prioritized campaign. In other cases, it would be a short-term hit.
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lost a vote of confidence and was to be replaced, resulting in greater instability in
Greenpeace's leadership. The search for a new executive director and new board then began,
with a specific focus on finding a leadership team that could lead the organization towards
‘One Greenpeace’. Meanwhile, a new document, ‘Making the Global Bargain Work’, was
produced and circulated. The Global Bargain was designed to provide a starting point for the
restructuration and highlights four key principles that are non-negotiable (Paper submitted to
the SGC AGM, 22-23 April 1994, by the Board and Executive Committee, p. 1):
“We aim to function as ‘One Greenpeace’; We all work together to make
strategic decisions about organizational direction and then reinforce them with
resource decisions which reinforce that direction and enable it to be
implemented; We work to overcome artificial barriers of ‘national and
international’ which divide our campaign and programme resources and get in
the way of our work; Once we have agreed priorities and allocated resources,
supervision and implementation of our programme is carried out largely by
national offices.”

The Global Bargain set up the basis for collaboration between the NORs to focus on
what united them rather than what differentiated them to make the organization more
effective. The NROs had already agreed on putting all their resources on the table for
discussion; on the need to become more strategically focused through selecting priorities; to
give more weight to the Resource Allocation Committee (RESAC) to help overcome the
difficult obstacles for making priorities operational and effective; the need to simplify and
clarify budgeting, planning, and the management systems; on the crucial role of GPI of
monitoring and holding accountable of NROs; and, on the understanding that GPI “cannot
and should not control everything that is “international”, and that decentralized, locally
grounded implementation is critical to the success of our work”. As a result of these
discussions, Japan was selected as a test case for the implementation of the Global Bargain.
However, it is only after the hiring of a new Executive Director that the Global Bargain and
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the Strategic Plan will have an opportunity to be fully implemented, putting an end to a
period of confusion and instability.
By the end of the period, the most important restructuration efforts had taken place.
The organization was perceived as leaner23, more focused, and increasingly flexible:
“Although the process is not yet complete, we have now passed some of the
worst corners in this exercise. Even the creation of Greenpeace International in
1978, and the formalisation of the original political control structure in 1983, do
not compare to the current process in terms of the concerted effort that has been
made on all levels of the organization. Much remains to be done, and we should
have no illusions about the future. But Greenpeace is emerging as a leaner and
assuredly tougher organization, prepared for the challenges ahead. We will
campaign on fewer issues, and we are more aware of the limits of our resources
and the need to acutely focus our work. In addition, our new structure will give
us greater flexibility than was possible before. (Report by the Board to Council,
1994, Annex 1, p. 2)”

The flexibility of the organization was to come in part from the allocation of resources which,
within Greenpeace, could be said to be revolutionary. Organizational members were not,
however, willing to go that far at that point in time, as illustrated by the discussions that took
place at one of the board meetings in 1994:
“The proposal for the 'flexible fund', which meant that campaign objectives,
strategies and tactics were not matched at this point, in any meaningful way
with resource allocation, and would not be until some point in the undefined
future. Although the Board appreciated the intent to give increased flexibility
to the campaigns, the Board found it impossible to agree to this proposal,
which was, in effect, the establishment of a $4,000,000 contingency fund
which was unconnected to the activities recommended in the proposals, and
which was to be agreed without any criteria for how the funds would be
applied, no framework within which this would take place, nor any strategy
as to how it would be distributed among international campaigns and national
and regional offices.” (GC Board Meeting Minutes, September 10-12, 1994, p.
4)

23

110 staff positions had been eliminated for the budget year 1994 alone. Among those positions, 90 were
coming from the pool of 140 international campaigners (15 of those 90 positions would later be “picked up” by
NROs) (CG Board Meeting Minutes, September 10-12, 1994, p.4).
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This perspective would change with the nomination of Thilo Bolde as International
Executive Director, and the actions surrounding the Brent Spar campaign.
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Graph 12: Resource Allocation 1992
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Graph 13: Resource Allocation 1993

85

Graph 14: Resource Allocation 1994
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4.4 Period 4 (1995-2001): Becoming ‘One Greenpeace’, a globally responsive
organization
The period from 1995 to 2001 focused on becoming a globally responsive organization. The
period was in continuity with the previous one in the sense that it was dedicated to ‘One
Greenpeace’, but differs from it as it was more stable and focused on the implementation of
“One Greenpeace” rather than its design. The transition occurred in early 1995 with two
important events: Thilo Bolde was named Executive Director of GPI, and Greenpeace UK
launched a campaign against Shell for its disposal of the Brent Spar oilrig. The hiring of
Thilo Bolde was particularly important as he was explicitly hired for his vision for the
implementation of the Strategic Plan.24 Greenpeace UK initiative, on the other hand, proved
to be highly successful and provided a template for future work.
The most important component of Thilo Bolde’s initiatives was the Programme of
Reforms, a restructuration plan that provided guidelines to create the context required for
Greenpeace to be successful. As stated in the report, the “lack of clarity in authority between
Council, Board, and Executive Director distracted leadership from the primary tasks of
creating vision, focusing our objectives, and finding ways to work effectively internationally”
(SGC 1996 AGM Minutes, Annex 7: The Programme of Reform, p. 2). The new system
redefined the Board of Directors’ role as ‘Arm’s Length’, removed from management
decisions, and gives the International Executive Director clearer and greater authority vis-avis NROs through the Organizational Development Plans (ODP), its role in hiring executive
directors, intervention powers, and other structures. The Programme of Reforms also
24

Thilo Bolde came from the German office, and had been actively involved in making sense of the crisis and
developing a new direction for the organization. The Board of Directors, at the time, was concerned with
finding the right person for the position, to avoid a similar situation as the one they encountered with Paul
Gilding, who had been unable to lead the organization towards the implementation of the Strategic Plan. Before
he was officially promoted to the position of Executive Director, Thilo Bolde was invited to share his vision for
the implementation of the plan with the Board of Directors, a process that occurred over a few months.

87

includes new Articles of Association that maintain Council's role as ultimate supervisory
authority: to elect and dismiss the Board of Directors, to set the budget ceiling (by weighted
vote), and to play a key role in the shaping of the long term strategy and objectives. The
Programme of Reforms also includes new rules of procedure that involve NROs’ Executive
Directors for input into budget and campaign prioritization and policy development, roles
that were previously under the responsibility of Council. The Programme of Reform also
acknowledges that the regional system had failed to fully enfranchise smaller NROs, and the
new vote determination system grants an equal vote to all NROs meeting certain minimum
performance criteria appropriate to the country in which they operate (see Figure 2 on voting
rights). In 1995 and 1996, the Programme of Reform quickly becomes an organizational
priority, with four employees dedicated to its implementation.
Meanwhile, the events surrounding the sinking of the Brent Spar oilrig led to an
important mobilization within the organization and contributed to renew interest for
Greenpeace's actions in the media. Greenpeace's actions against Shell, contrary to
Greenpeace's approach until then, did not originate from centralized planning held at GPI and
pre-approved by Council, but through an initiative held by Greenpeace UK. The Brent Spar
events challenged the dominant assumption that priorities had to be set up through a topdown approach. Beside the sampling error,25 Brent Spar was a success with respect to
Greenpeace being able to seize the opportunity created by the visibility they obtained to push
their agenda. From this point on, issue areas became less important. Instead, general
guidelines prioritizing a number of items were set, and key opportunities that had the
potential to become major successes were nurtured and tracked. Once a project demonstrated

25

Greenpeace had made a sampling error on the quantity of pollutants on the oilrig. The sampling proved to be
inaccurate, and Shell later filed a lawsuit against Greenpeace, negatively impacting Greenpeace's reputation and
relationship with the media (Dale, 1996).
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its potential, it was scaled up and diffused throughout the organization.26 For this strategy to
be successful, it required greater collaboration across functions. To facilitate cross
campaigning, all issues and opportunities were discussed within the Joint Campaign Meeting
(JCM), the Executive Director Meeting (EDM), and the Senior Management Team (SMT),
committees created to favor greater integration in Greenpeace activities.
The role of GPI, under this new template, was to create a context that favored the most
successful projects to rise through the ranks (SGC 1998 AGM, p. 16). As part of creating this
‘context’ – and in light of the improvements that had occurred since the implementation of
the Programme of Reforms –,27 ‘One Greenpeace’ came back as a desirable focus for
Greenpeace as an organization (SGC 1997 AGM, Board Report to Council, p. 5). One major
issue with ‘One Greenpeace’ was in its definition: it was considered as a vague idea that was
best described as what it was not rather than what it was. It built on a healthy tension between
decentralization and centralization to allow Greenpeace to maximize its impact, with a
specific role for GPI that was not in establishing priorities but in creating the right context for
the organization and ensuring that NROs are effective in fulfilling their mission:
“Although this tension between decentralization and centralization remains to a
certain extent, Greenpeace International has a central role in conducting and
coordinating international campaigns, monitoring national and regional
Greenpeace offices, representing Greenpeace worldwide, organizing fundraising,
and organizing the overall strategic debate in Greenpeace.”28

The commitment to ‘One Greenpeace’ slowly became more explicit, with the Blue Sky
26

This practice, implicit in Greenpeace actions at first, becomes explicit as of 1998, with the creation of lists of
key opportunities to be discussed within Greenpeace governance and operational channels, which can count as
many as 20 projects that have the potential to become ‘Big Hits’.
27
Greenpeace was in a much-improved position: communications between GPI and NROs was greatly
improved compared to the period 1991-1995; the OECD NROs were also self-sufficient, and several
strategically important offices (Brazil and Argentina) were moving rapidly towards self-sufficiency; GPI also
experienced a surplus for the first time in six years; greater collaboration between NROs is also reported.
28
Greenpeace (1998) “Prioritizing the Core Functions of Greenpeace International” extracted from the 1998
Long Term Strategic Plan as agreed at the March 1998 Executive Directors Meeting and submitted by the
Strategic Management Team to the Stitching Greenpeace Council Annual General Meeting and agreed by
Council.
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discussions that aimed to improve the organization’s effectiveness and which led to a number
of outcomes: the creation of Global Teams; the creation of Centers of Excellence, whereby
global tasks will be delegated to the location where they can be most effectively performed;
the creation of the Campaign Council and the Executive Council to improve NRO/GPI
communication and decision-making. These initiatives soon demonstrated their effectiveness,
and the successes obtained through this approach further inform where Greenpeace should
focus its time and efforts.
Overall, the period from 1995 to 2001, the last observed in this study, was one where
the organization was moving towards becoming a globally integrated enterprise. It was one
where senior management was increasingly concerned with learning from past events,29 and
where they were determined to achieve more with fewer resources. Strategic planning
became an ongoing process, with GPI in charge of establishing general guidelines for NROs,
monitoring NROs with regards to their own ODP, and creating a context that encourages
collaboration between NROs as well as the development of creative solutions.

4.5 Greenpeace context from 1979 to 2001 in review
Overall, Greenpeace changed significantly from 1979 to 2001. Table 4 provides a
comparison of the key information surrounding governance channels, as well as the process
for resource allocations. Figures 3 to 6 provide visual representations for the relationships
between NROs and GPI.
In the first period (1979-1985), GPI acted as a forum for discussions and NROs
enjoyed significant autonomy in their activities. Governance channels were blurred, but
simple, as the organization was very limited in scope. The process for resource allocation
29

Examples of these can be found in internal reports in 1996 and 1997 that aimed to learn from successful
campaigns that had occurred in the past 15 years and attempts as well as from the crisis from the early 90s’
(EDMM 1997a p. 9/3).
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was in the making, with projects being considered on a one-on-one basis for funding through
a pool of money provided by NROs in parallel to their own pool of resources they could use
at their discretion.
In the second period (1985-1991), GPI asserted its authority over NROs by
centralizing key functions. Governance channels were improved, with the Board of Directors
providing recommendations to Council, including on priorities. GPI was in charge of
overseeing the execution of the policies and the coordination of projects across the different
NROs. The process for resource allocation was closely managed, with a clear screening
process in place.
In the third period (1991-1995), GPI and NROs negotiated a new agreement to
enhance the effectiveness of the organization. This new agreement was conceptualized as
“One Greenpeace”. Governance channels were modified for the sake of greater effectiveness
in the management of the organization. The process for resource allocation was also
reviewed, with several committees being formed to seek how this process should be managed.
In the fourth period (1995-2001), GPI and NROs shared responsibilities to work as
“One Greenpeace”. Governance channels were well established, with clear responsibilities
for Council, the Board of Directors, and the Executive Committee. Nearly all NROs enjoyed
voting rights, with one office equaling one vote. The process for resource allocation was also
better defined, with GPI providing guidelines to NROs on priorities, and NROs working
within these guidelines.
The periods presented in this chapter were intended to provide background material to
the subsequent analysis. In the next section, I revisit these periods, this time with the
intention to make interpretations as to what contributed to Greenpeace's successes (failures)
in engaging with the future.
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Table 6: Greenpeace Context over time
Period 1 (1979-1985)
Governance Channels

Period 2 (1985-1991)
Governance Channels

Period 3 (1991-1995)
Governance Channels

Period 4 (1995-2001)
Governance Channels

• All financial and operational decisions • All major policies are voted in
• All major policies are voted in
• Policies are approved in Council
are made in Council and by the Board
Council following recommendations
Council following recommendations following recommendations from
of Directors for GPI;
made by the Board of Directors;
made by the Board of Directors;
committees;
• GPI oversees the execution of the
• NROs are assigned with voting rights, • GPI oversees the execution of the
• Board of Directors in charge of
and Council is formed of one
policies and the coordination of
overseeing legal and financial matters;
policies and the coordination of
projects across the different NROs; • Campaign-related discussions held by
representative from each NRO;
projects across the different NROs;
• NROs that contributed significantly in • NROs voting rights tied with pledges • NROs voting rights tied with
the Joint Campaign Committee
terms of visibility and funding for
to GPI, but the rule is loosely
composed of international
pledges to GPI, and different
Greenpeace are granted voting rights.
applied.
coordinators, fundraisers, and the
categories are used to describe
senior management team;
offices;
• NROs are affiliated with a region,
• All issues concerning the management
of NROs discussed during Executive
and the region has a voting right on
Directors Committee;
its own that counts as an additional
voice.
• Voting rights tied with NROs
autonomy: nearly all offices have
voting rights during this period.

Process for Resource Allocation
• NROs propose their projects for
international funding (i.e. expenses
covered by a shared pool of money and
considered as ‘international priorities’);
• Lack of agreement about what
represents an international issue,
leading to the adoption of a formal
definition in 1982;
• Projects are considered on a one-on-one
basis until the adoption of issue areas in
1983 to facilitate the process.

Process for Resource Allocation Process for Resource Allocation

Process for Resource Allocation

• Under review, with various working • GPI is expected to provide guidelines
• Proposals are prepared by
on ‘what’ issues Greenpeace work on
groups to discuss what should be
international coordinators working
without telling ‘how’;
Greenpeace orientations;
for GPI, are circulated to the Board
• NROs are expected to collaborate with
of Directors ahead of Council, to be • Recognition that neither
one another and to develop innovative
officially approved in council
centralization nor decentralization
solutions based on GPI guidelines in
work.
• NROs projects must be reviewed for
terms of what matters;
approval by GPI
•
Priorities, or ‘flagship’ campaigns, are
• All submitted proposals fall under an
circulated across the organization
issue area and are managed under
before a commitment is made.
that same issue area.

Dominant Perspective

Dominant Perspective

Dominant Perspective

Dominant Perspective

Bottom-up

Top-down

Unclear

Top-down for guidelines
Bottom-up for projects
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Figure 3: Greenpeace Structure Period 1 (1979-1985)

Figure 5: Greenpeace Structure Period 3 (1991-1995)
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Figure 4: Greenpeace Structure Period 2 (1985-1991)

GPI and NROs negotiate a new agreement for ‘One Greenpeace’

Figure 6: Greenpeace Structure Period 4 (1995-2001)
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Chapter 5
5. Rationality, Plasticity, and Shaping Ability across
periods
In this section, I revisit the different periods of Greenpeace using the analytic constructs of
“rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability”. Analytic construct – common in
historiography (Ingram et al., 2012; Rowlinson et al., 2014) – was used to facilitate the
comparison of the periods to derive insights as to which properties contributed to
Greenpeace's ability to engage with the future. For each period, I looked at Greenpeace's
beliefs with regards to the future, its ability to identify opportunities aligned with these
beliefs (“rationality”), its ability to pursue the identified opportunities (“plasticity”), and its
ability to create residuum of change through the identified opportunities (“shaping ability”).
Greenpeace's beliefs were identified through the discourse within the organization
with regards to the future of the planet and Greenpeace's role in enacting that future. These
beliefs evolved over time, moving from implicit beliefs expressed through the actions
undertaken by organizational members to explicit beliefs institutionalized within the mission
statement of the organization and its explicit objectives. The discussions held within the
governance and operational channels of the organization provide evidence for this shift over
time.
Greenpeace's focus in terms of priorities captures its ability to identify opportunities.
Over the years, the focus of the organization shifts from unequivocal and unambiguous issues
towards more ambitious objectives. This later set of issues was based on projections of the
future to determine which ones were the ones that needed to be addressed now in order to
offer a better future to the next generations. This change in focus is illustrated through
Figures 7 and 8, which provide a map of the issues prioritized by the organization over time.
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Supporting data from internal discussions held within the governance and operational
channels of the organization provide additional information on the process, as well as
evidence for my interpretation of the rationality of the organization.
Greenpeace's ability to pursue opportunities is partially linked to the identification of
opportunities. With that regard, Figure 7 and 8 provide some information on the opportunities
that came up to be pursued by the organization over time (these priorities had to be approved
through the AGM, which is a condition to pursue an opportunity). The ability of the
organization to pursue opportunities is also interpreted based on the discussions held within
the governance and operational channels of the organization, as not all opportunities that
came to be prioritized turned out to be pursued by organizational members. Evidence
supporting my interpretation of Greenpeace's ability to pursue opportunities is provided
throughout the narrative.
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape is illustrated through the residuum of
changes created by the organization. Residuum of changes is exhibited through “victories”
(see Graph 15), which provides information on tangible results obtained by Greenpeace
organizational members in shaping the landscape. These victories include the adoption of
pieces of legislation at formal institutions and changes in the global practices of multinational
corporations, which both have a direct impact on a variety of actors in the environment.
Below, I describe the rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability for each period and
provide an explanation for the difficulties encountered/successes obtained by the
organization with regards to each dimension. This explanation is presented for each period
with supporting data (both quotes and factual data), with an explanation for my
interpretations of the dimension, and why Greenpeace was doing well, or not so well, during
each period with regards to the identified dimensions. This section concludes with a
presentation of the key insights derived from the comparison of the different periods.
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Figure 7: Greenpeace priorities (1980-1991)
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Figure 8: Greenpeace priorities (1992-2003)
New categorization of issues
based on 1) Ongoing; 2) Priority;
and 3) Opportunistic campaigns
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Graph 15: Greenpeace victories over time (1979-2006)a
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Victories are used as measures for Greenpeace shaping ability. I distinguish between two types of victories: agreements negotiated unde
under formal international
institutions (e.g. International Whaling Commission, London Dumping Convention, UNESCO, etc.) and changes iin
n the global practices of MNEs (e.g. Apple,
Samsung, Nokia, GE, etc.). Agreements obtained at international institutions shaped the landscape by providing a set of rules for governments and industries.
Changes in the global practices of MNEs, on the other hand, shaped the landscape by providing a new set of practices promoted by industry
ind
leaders, which
contributed to establish new norms within their respective industries.
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5.1 Period 1 (1979-1985): Muddling through an unorganized, decentralized
organization
As described in Chapter 4, the first years of Greenpeace as a formal international
organization were dedicated to the establishment of a set of structures and practices to
coordinate the work of the different NROs. This first period was characterized by the
absence of an explicit vision for the future, which led to frequent discussions about
Greenpeace’s role. This was particularly true when long-term projects were discussed
internally. This situation prevailed throughout the period, although implicit beliefs
about the future can be observed through Greenpeace’s actions, which entailed that
logic of shaping the landscape.
A salient example for the absence of an explicit belief about the organization’s
role can be found in the internal discussions that took place about some projects that
were more long-term oriented and/or slightly different in terms of objectives than more
conventional projects. The discussion on a project involving Multilateral Development
Banks illustrates this point:
“Netherlands also supported the idea, and felt that it would be a long-term
project that would take us into other areas, including the energy policy
area […].
Germany stated that it strongly opposed the proposal. They are afraid that
Greenpeace would be put into the corner of being against everything – a
sort of radical left-wing position. Greenpeace takes direct action and gains
public support because of these actions. We are not known for being
political or intellectual heavyweights. Our message is simple, and that is
why we are successful. Germany doubts whether Greenpeace could
communicate the MOB information, and doubts also whether it is
necessary to research any more energy issues. The Greenpeace role is not
to dictate, but rather to save the world by showing what is going on
[emphasis added]. They don’t believe we should write up banking policies,
nor that our task is to influence the banks.” (SGC 1984 AGM, p. 17)
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As we can see from this excerpt, even if the notion of shaping the landscape was
implicit in Greenpeace’s actions, the focus was on the present. Most of the issues the
organization was working on were specific problems that could easily be observed (see
Figure 7), defined, and communicated to a large audience through simple images, and
Greenpeace’s role was to expose these problems. There were a few mentions of a focus
on the future as part of Greenpeace’s mission, but attempts to engage into long-term
planning and long-term projects outside of what they were already doing raised
concerns and questions from members about what Greenpeace was about. This absence
of explicit beliefs about the future and what was Greenpeace’s role with regards to the
future had an important impact on Greenpeace’s rationality, plasticity, and shaping
ability, which are discussed below.
5.1.1 Rationality
In the absence of an explicit vision for the future, organizational members could not
agree on a process to identify and select opportunities to pursue. The difficulties
encountered in identifying opportunities were a matter of understanding what represents
an opportunity for Greenpeace as an international organization and how to process
information to evaluate opportunities. This was explained, in part, by a lack of a shared
frame of reference to categorize issues and a shared understanding of what represents
an international issue. In this context, discussions on the priorities of the organization
were done on a piece-by-piece basis based on the submission made by NROs. The list
of priorities shown in Figure 7 for the years 1980 and 1981 is illustrative of this point,
whereas less than 5 priorities identified as “international” led to an agreement by
organizational members in terms of whether or not they represent opportunities for the
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organization, despite the submission of more than 12 proposals for each of these two
years.30
In terms of defining what represents an international opportunity, there was an
obvious lack of a shared frame of reference to discuss potential opportunities. In fact, it
was common at the time to find projects that had an international dimension and were
shared by more than one office, but because of a lack of understanding on these
definitions and/or because of personal conflicts, organizational members were unable to
properly discuss opportunities. The most salient example of these situations can be
found in a discussion on Arctic Pilots, a project proposed by the Danish office and that
was intended to put a halt on the transportation of oil and natural gas by large tankers in
the Arctic region. Originally proposed in 1979 and rejected on the basis that it was not
international enough for Greenpeace, the project was modified and submitted again for
approval in 1981. This time, however, the Danish office changed the location of its
action to make it more “international”. Upon the submission of the Danish proposal, the
following discussion took place:
“Proposal: to campaign against the transportation of natural gas. The
major concern is wildlife disturbance. It takes place in Northern Canada.
Discussion: It is not a priority for Greenpeace Canada (Pat – Canada).
Is there any way you can address the issue closer to Denmark (Pete – UK).
Conclusion: that Denmark reconsiders its proposal and will come back
with a new proposal at the next Council meeting. Janus will also report to
Council within the next 6 months concerning this proposal and any plan for
direct action.
Suggestion: Contact Greenpeace Canada to see how much involvement
there could be (Pete – UK).” (AGM 1981, December 12th p. 25)

30

Because the map was intended to show the continuity over time, many issues from that era have been
not been included in the figure. These issues include Haitian refugees, overpopulation, deforestation, as
well as other issues aligned with what would become the focus of Greenpeace in the following years, but
were addressed by only 1 or 2 NROs at the time. They were brought to the AGM agenda on the floor, and
had not been screened by the Board or the International Chairman ahead of time.
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The comment from Greenpeace Canada is interesting because the issue that was being
discussed was actually in line with some of Greenpeace Canada’s priorities. In fact, it
was very similar to the Supertankers issue the Canada office had been proposing as an
issue of interest to council since 1979. It was also in accordance with a joint proposal
between Greenpeace Canada and Greenpeace USA submitted to the 1980 AGM. The
same situation prevailed in 1981 where, once again, both NROs were unable to
recognize that the problems they were facing were part of the same issue: the
transportation of oil and gas by supertankers in fragile ecosystems.31 Later on during
the 1981 meeting, it was time to discuss the proposal from Greenpeace Canada, which
led to further discussions about what represents an international campaign:
“Proposal: to stop supertanker traffic occurring and increasing in
critical natural habitats.
Discussion: on national versus international
I see no involvement/commitment of the European offices in this. It will
receive much support; it offsets some bad relations and it is one of the
few international issues which is favorable to fishermen. (Pat – Canada)
AGREED BY MOST TRUSTEES:
There is still no clear understanding on how to deal with the differences
between national and International campaigns. This is seen as a national
campaign. There is no involvement of the European offices. (AGM 1981,
December 12th p. 37).”

Hence, despite the similarities between the proposals, Greenpeace Canada and
Greenpeace Denmark refused to see their issues as part of the same problem, and both
projects were denied funding. Nevertheless, these discussions opened up a conversation
about what represents an international opportunity for Greenpeace. Meanwhile, most
projects and opportunities pursued by Greenpeace remained carried by NROs, falling
under their sole responsibility. These projects, while having the potential to shape the
31

The proposals were focusing on different locations (Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean), but were
nevertheless addressing the same issue: the transport of oil and gas in fragile ecosystems.
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landscape in their respective countries, could not be identified as superior opportunities,
or at least, superior opportunities for an international organization like Greenpeace (i.e.
opportunities to shape the global landscape with regards to the identified issues as
opposed to the local landscape for several issues that had a more limited impact).
The situation highlighted above changed with the involvement of Greenpeace in
the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling. At that time, commercial
whaling was an issue of concern for all NROs. Furthermore, the issue was associated
with the practices of a specific industry and this industry was regulated by the
International Whaling Commission (IWC), a formal international institution that
established quotas on the number of catches each country was authorized per year. By
having all NROs involved in the pursuit of this opportunity, it was believed that
Greenpeace could effectively put an end to commercial whaling on a worldwide basis
through the adoption of a ban on commercial whaling at the IWC, something that no
other international organization was in a position to achieve.32 McTaggart, in his
memoirs, made the following remark regarding the pursuit of this opportunity and how
it differed from what Greenpeace had done up until then:
“Ramming up all our various national offices together into Greenpeace
International was more an instinct than a plan. But now that there’s a
project that needs a truly international organization, well, we’ve got one.
[…]” (McTaggart, 2002: p. 157)

32

Evidence of this is provided by a conversation that occurred in 1980 between David McTaggart,
Chairman of Greenpeace International, and Peter Scott, founder of World Wild Fund for Nature, where
both discussed what could be achieved to favor the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling by
the IWC. During the conversation, which has been reported by both McTaggart (2002: chapter 15) and
Scott (Huxsley, p. 297) in their respective memoirs, Greenpeace was the only organization in a position
to coordinate actions and behind-the-scenes strategies on a worldwide basis. By leveraging Greenpeace's
international position, they could convince other countries to join the IWC in favor of the whales, to force
the adoption of a moratorium.
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This was made possible by the organizational design of Greenpeace that was
significantly different from other organizations pursuing similar endeavors (i.e.
international NGOs), with a governance structure that permitted the execution of a
coherent international strategy through its NROs. The opportunity identified at that
specific point in time was the one with the most potential because organizational
members already had knowledge of the issue, could conceptualize the landscape (i.e. a
formal institution where policies were debated and adopted), and believed they could
solve the issue through the adoption of a specific piece of legislation (i.e. moratorium
on commercial whaling).33
In light of the successes obtained with the commercial whaling opportunity, it
became obvious to organizational members that focusing on a limited set of
international priorities could help them enhance their shaping ability. It is for this
reason that, as of 1983, categories were used to limit the focus of the organization and
to facilitate the evaluation of opportunities (see Figure 7), as only projects falling within
these categories could be discussed in Council for evaluation. Subsequent
environmental problems falling within these categories could then be proposed by
organizational members as potential opportunities for worldwide change and discussed
on a common basis.
Nevertheless, and although the ability to identify opportunities was improving,
the organization was still struggling due to the lack of effective processes for decisionmaking. The case in point is the Gulf campaign, which was perceived as a missed
opportunity by some organizational members:
“A lot of people have worked hard and long to make Greenpeace what it is
33

The same reasoning applied for nuclear waste dumping at sea, although this opportunity was more
limited in space, being mostly contained within Europe and the North Sea.
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today – an international organisation which has a reputation unequalled in its
ability and willingness to take on campaigns and win them. These people
work for Greenpeace in the belief that we are building an organisation capable
and eager of taking on those environmental issues which will directly
influence and change the areas of crucial eco-political decision making. To
this objective, in the battle for people’s hearts and minds, we enable the
spotlight of international publicity to be directed on to the problems with
which we are directly linked. The Gulf campaign fitted this role exactly. […]
It would have brought us in contact with Middle Eastern powers for the first
time in our history and offered us a chance to expand in a way which may
have had a lasting and beneficial effect on Greenpeace and on its credibility.
In short, it was an opportunity this board should have seized with both hands
as it was a ready-made campaign for an organisation which has its
philosophical roots in internationalism and spontaneity.” (Letter from the
Chairman, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, November 25th 1983,
Appendix 1 p. 1)

Although there were only six individuals to discuss the opportunity, they could not
agree. This led the Chairman of the Board to question why situations like that occurred,
and to invite other Board members to reflect on the situation:
“[…] The way in which this board of directors handled the Gulf campaign
raises serious questions as to the nature of our decision making process,
and suggests to me that there is something fundamentally wrong in the
structure under which we work. To carry on our business without
addressing ourselves to this basic problem would be irresponsible. We
must, as a matter of utmost urgency, turn our attention to our constitution
and ask ourselves why we cannot decide, quickly and positively, to act on
global environmental issues in the way in which this board was established
to do.” (Letter from the Chairman, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes,
November 25th 1983, Appendix 1 p. 1)

Despite these failures, the situation that prevailed at the end of the period
with regards to the ability of the organization to identify opportunities was
greatly improved compared to the one at the beginning of the period, as we can
see from Figure 7. Greenpeace’s focus was on issues that were current and
observable, with very limited ambiguity and equivocality about their cause and
what had to be done to solve the problems, but they remained international in
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scope which, for an organization like Greenpeace, could be defined as superior
opportunities.
5.1.2 Plasticity
The ability of Greenpeace to pursue opportunities was closely linked with its ability to
identify opportunities, as both were linked with one another during those years. As a
newly formed organization, the decentralization of activities was a clear impediment to
both the identification and the pursuit of opportunities, and the problems encountered
with regards to both abilities had similar roots.
In terms of structures and processes that could facilitate the pursuit of
opportunities, effective governance and operational channels were still in the making.
When the Council could identify specific opportunities to pursue, they could not
necessarily pursue these opportunities effectively. This was particularly true in the early
years, when NROs were not used to working with one another and were not accustomed
to superseding their authority to GPI. The following excerpt where the Chairman of
Greenpeace International complains to the Council about the absence of collaboration
with regards to how to pursue opportunities illustrates this later problem:
“First the pooling of funds for the international campaigns that I
introduced in November is not working. Netherlands is the only country to
have contributed so far. I'm getting bloody tired of asking for funds which everyone immediately thinks is 'for our overhead which is low': And
I’m also very tired of -everyone calling the Council a money tree
expecting to pluck-another few grand from it but when asked to participate.
I therefore propose the following in place of the pooling method. Each
country when proposing an international-campaign submit the usual
studies, plans, objective, etc. with a detailed budget, then the proposing
country says 'how much they will pay towards this campaign, at which
time there is a vote on whether to proceed or not.” (SGC AGM 1980, p. 5)
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Once the process for deciding on opportunities to pursue was clarified and how
the different NROs were to contribute to the identified opportunities, however, a course
of action could quickly be decided. Because the problems addressed were relatively
simple to grasp (i.e. issues could easily be grasped through simple images: whaling,
nuclear waste dumping, seal hunt, etc.) with a well-defined opportunity space (i.e. the
landscape could easily be conceptualized and identified), bringing organizational
members on par with the task to be performed could be achieved despite a form of
organizing that lacked formal authority. There was only a need for minimal
coordination to pursue these opportunities. It was basically a shift in objectives, moving
from local and independent initiatives conducted in parallel towards actions coordinated
by GPI that leveraged the work of each NRO to target formal international institutions.
Despite this, situations occurred when agreed plans could not be pursued because
of a lack of trust and coordination among NROs. This lack of trust and coordination can
be illustrated through the disarmament campaign, which involved actions in France and
the USA. The USA failed to move forward with the agreed plans, resulting in France
not carrying out its own part of the agreed plan, which France justified through a letter
to Council:
“The board of France wished to recall that: at the December 1980 meeting
of the Greenpeace Council the campaign in Mururoa against French
Nuclear tests was approved on the condition that a campaign against US
tests in Nevada would be carried out before the Mururoa campaign. Within
a year little constructive work has been carried out apparently to make this
campaign in Nevada happen. […] A campaign directed only at French
nuclear tests is more than questionable politically. […] Because the same
commitment stated twice within a year has not been respected, and
because we believe in the Greenpeace philosophy which is going against
environmental abuse without discrimination of nationality, and to go after
the worst, we will not accept the proposal of the Rainbow Warrior going to
Mururoa before a real Greenpeace campaign has been carried out in
Nevada; in addition should there be a real Nevada campaign, we cannot
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support a campaign against French tests alone.” (Letter from Rémi
Parmentier, SGC AGM 1981, p. 57)

Once again, the work conducted by Greenpeace to facilitate the adoption of a
moratorium on commercial whaling provided an opportunity to learn how to pursue
opportunities that were international in scope. The following excerpt from the 1980
AGM is illustrative of the consensus regarding the whaling opportunity and how to
pursue that opportunity based on the failures of previous actions:
“Everyone agreed that scientifically it was fairly organized but the
lobbying and relationship between the NGO's was not organized at all and
we were more than responsible. There would have to be some large
changes next year and a much better plan, especially in the use of our
offices worldwide. For example Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
Denmark (into Scandinavia), contacts in the Spanish block; France,
Holland, and to some extent Denmark by their excellent conservation
attitude proved that by working within the country year round and lobbying
in their own language pays off.” (SGC AGM July 30th, 1980, p. 33)
“Am disappointed with this year's preparation for IWC, especially
lobbying delegates, relationship NGO's, elitist attitude; need to delegate
responsibilities and all work together. Must start preparing now for next
year moratorium – sperm anyway should be highest priority on our list. We
are getting too spread out - must move now before losing our momentum.
Must work worldwide, only group capable of this, our strength and noting
it. Each person, office, must have specific and planned responsibilities with
emphasis on whaling block.” (Greenpeace Chairman, SGC AGM July 30th
1980, p. 34)

To facilitate the pursuit of opportunities (and learning from the commercial
whaling opportunity), GPI and the NROs agreed to create a new position: international
coordinators. International coordinators were individuals associated with a specific
issue; they were in charge of coordinating the activities conducted by the different
NROs involved with a given issue. The creation of this new position within the
organization was sufficient to develop the plasticity required to seize the identified
opportunities: the coordinator facilitated communications between NROs, and the
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coordination of actions. Besides the creation of this new position, the standardization of
practices also helped, as it allowed the organization to focus on opportunities instead of
on discussing processes and practices.
Nevertheless, failures to pursue opportunities still occurred. The Gulf campaign,
discussed above, was one of these failures, which highlighted the need for faster
decision-making with regards to the pursuit of opportunities:
“The problems of the Gulf campaign were only a symptom of the real
underlying problem:- the lack of an international outlook by what
professes to be an international body. We need a board which is balanced
and looks at each issue from an international perspective. Looking to the
future, I would ask you to consider the election of a higher body - a
cabinet - in which the trustees from all countries invest the decision
making power. This would allow for quick decision making, would give
the organisation a less nationalistic focus and would remove the barrier
preventing the admittance of new nations. It is your organisation and your
decision, and before we discuss it, I want you all to keep in mind that we
have within us the capability to take this organisation, its impact and its
effectiveness, still further than we have done already. I believe this can
only happen if we are honest in our wish for international cooperation.”
(Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, November 25th 1983, Appendix 1 p.
1)

These failures became less frequent, however, thanks to the implementation of
clear procedures for managing international campaigns, which included, among other
things, the establishment of a reporting system, the design of the double-veto principle,
and the set-up of a Council Campaign Committee.
5.1.3 Shaping ability
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape during this first period was initially modest.
Although the organization was creating a residual of changes in the form of media
coverage and change in public opinion, many of its actions were failing to force other
actors to adapt. This situation changed, however, when Greenpeace played a key role in
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the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling at the IWC in 1982 (see Graph
15). This moratorium was obtained by Greenpeace after the organization realized it had
to change its approach if it wanted to have an impact on the issue it was targeting
(Huxley, 1993; McTaggart, 2002). This new approach involved the introduction of
lobbying to influence the IWC from the inside, and the coordination of actors internal
as well as external to Greenpeace, to speak with one voice. Because the IWC was one
institution with identifiable actors and explicit rules about its functioning and how to
change the rule of the games with regards to the practice of commercial whaling, it was
possible for Greenpeace to create the change necessary to change the future with
regards to the hunting of whales.34
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape using a diversity of approaches that
included lobbying in addition to non-violent direct actions and protests, and through the
coordination of the activities conducted by its various NROs, was confirmed in 1983.
Using a similar approach as the one used to obtain a moratorium on commercial
whaling, the organization obtained a ban on the dumping of nuclear waste at sea at the
London Dumping Convention. A diversity of approaches subsequently became a core
tenet of the organization.
Beside the residuum of changes observed at formal international institutions, the
ability of Greenpeace to legitimize new ideas can also be observed in the level of
support it received from independent donors during this period, on the rise from this
point forward (see Graph 4). The support received from donors was important, as it
contributed to provide greater legitimacy to Greenpeace actions. It can thus be seen as
34

A detailed account of the events at the IWC and their subsequent impact on Greenpeace activities has
been presented to the European Group of Organization Studies (EGOS) in July 2014 and to different
audiences at the Ivey School of Business (October 2013), HEC Montréal (November 2013), the John
Molson School of Business (JMSB) (November 2013), and the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
(December 2013). A working paper of this account is available upon request.
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both a manifestation of Greenpeace's shaping ability, and a component of what
contributed to Greenpeace's ability to shape its landscape. Furthermore, besides the
changes at formal international institutions, Greenpeace NROs also experienced
numerous victories in their respective countries.35

5.2 Period 2 (1985-1991): Centralizing to engage into long jumps
Period 2 was initiated following an unpredictable event: the bombing of the Rainbow
Warrior. The event led to a significant increase in donations (see Graph 4). It also put
the organization under greater scrutiny. Because the organization’s profile was
becoming more prominent, the senior leadership engaged into a discussion on the future
of the planet, as well as the future of Greenpeace, in an attempt to position Greenpeace
for the long-term. This reflexivity about Greenpeace's goals and role in society occurred
over the course of two years. It entailed discussions about what were Greenpeace's
goals, what should be its priorities, and how the organization could reach its objectives.
It was during this period that the goal of Greenpeace to shape the future of the planet
became explicit:
“The goal of Greenpeace is difficult to explain in one sentence. We are
against war, pollution, and depletion of species. We want to save the
planet and its inhabitants from any form of mass destruction. We are in
favor of ecological healthy economic activities. We support peaceful
revolution to conflict. We want to preserve the environment. However, we
are realists. We recognize that people have an impact on their
environment.” (Long Term Plan on the role of Greenpeace in Society,
1988, p. 3)

By clarifying its goal, Greenpeace made it clear that it was operating with the
perspective that the future could be shaped, which corresponds to an understanding of

35

These victories are excluded from the data presentation because the key focus is on opportunities that
can be defined as “superior” which, given Greenpeace's position, are international in nature.
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the future as a future of desire (van der Heijden, 2004). They also made it explicit that
they were not the only ones impacting the landscape, and that they had to be cognizant
of this fact.
Besides the organization’s goal and its understanding that the future can be
shaped, Greenpeace's senior leadership also made the means to achieve the
organization’s goal explicit: influencing formal and informal institutions, including
governments and corporations. The following quote from the Long-Term Plan provides
evidence for this point:
“Greenpeace causes people to change the activities of institutions.
Greenpeace can stop environmental destruction for short periods through
direct action. However, only institutions such as governments and
corporations can make major changes. If Greenpeace wants to stop war
and pollution, then it must influence people with the power to make
institutions change their behavior. To achieve this on a global scale,
Greenpeace Council should agree on a wide range of issues, including:
which are the most important global environmental problems; which ones
Greenpeace can deal with; which institutions can make the required
changes; which ones Greenpeace should concentrate on; and how
Greenpeace can best influence them.” (1988, Long Term Plan on
Greenpeace methods, p. 3)

These explicit beliefs about the future, Greenpeace's goals, and the means to achieve
these goals influenced the criteria’s used to identify and select opportunities to pursue.
To a minor extent, it also influenced the development of structures, processes, and
practices to pursue opportunities and conduct actions that had the potential to influence
external audiences that were aligned with the organization’s objectives.
5.2.1 Rationality
In terms of ability to identify opportunities, there was a clear intention on positioning
Greenpeace as an international organization that has a global impact. This positioning
was clear from the very beginning of the period and was no longer controversial within
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the organization. For instance, in referring to the involvement of multinational
corporations and multilateral banks in their “attempts to ‘carve up’ the world” (SGC
1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to Council, p. 2) – a project that was highly
controversial two years earlier –, the Executive Director could directly relate to the
positioning of Greenpeace as one of a few organizations in a position to pursue these
opportunities to justify the organization’s commitment:
“This increasingly complex global environment is where Greenpeace must
act and react, and make its specific contribution to the shaping of a world
in peace and ecological balance. It is essential that we pool our resources
to this end. In the international arena today there are really only two truly
international non-governmental organizations: Greenpeace and Amnesty
International.” (SGC 1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to
Council, p. 2)

This positioning was clear and influenced subsequent discussions with regards
to opportunities. On that point, the challenge for Greenpeace was not identifying
opportunities as much as selecting which opportunities should be pursued and how.
This task was difficult because Greenpeace's newly acquired visibility made several
individuals contact the organization concerning issues they were facing (i.e. the
Executive Director was frequently contacted to provide tangible support from
Greenpeace on a number of environmental and social issues). To make sense of what
should be the opportunities the organization should pursue, the senior leadership
initiated a strategic planning exercise:
“I want to strongly emphasize that I do not anticipate that Greenpeace will
be able to address all the major issues that we may be able to define
through such an exercise. I do believe, however, that it would be extremely
beneficial for us, both internally and in our external contacts, to be able to
demonstrate that we do have a clear and well-defined perception of what is
going on in the world today. By demonstrating our perception of the
complexity of the global situation we can also make clear why we have
chosen to work on some specific issues that we believe are the most
crucial ones and those, which we expect to be successful in tackling in our
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own unique way.” (SGC 1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to
Council, p. 4)

This exercise, which was limited to the senior leadership, was seen as a way to
identify the opportunities that could maximize Greenpeace's impact. One outcome of
this exercise was a list of issues in order of priorities. Some of these issues were more
complex, as they were not issues that could be grasped easily through simple images.
For instance, issues like the depletion of the ozone layer and climate change could not
be physically seen. Furthermore, some of these issues were highly equivocal: contrary
to issues like whaling where human action could clearly and unambiguously be
associated with the depletion of whale stocks, issues on the list (e.g. global warming,
depletion of the ozone layer, depletion of the genetic pool leading to a loss of
biodiversity) encompassed a range of problems which, taken together, were
symptomatic of more significant issues. As a result of this exercise, issues were put in
order of priority based on (1) the urgency to act on them, and (2) the potential for
Greenpeace to have an impact on them. The following quote from a Trustee from
Germany illustrates how these two criteria were explicitly discussed by NROs as
relevant for the organization:
“Greenpeace should not aim at sorting out the most important
environmental problems as targets for its campaign, but rather
concentrate its efforts on areas, where it has the greatest impact on the
public thinking. Greenpeace can contribute to and trigger change, not
more and not less.” (Comment from the Trustee from Germany, SGC
AGM 1987, p. 271)

Meanwhile, in parallel to the discussions surrounding the Long-Term Plan,
conversations were taking place on an annual basis to allocate resources. In order to
facilitate discussions and process information to manage the resource allocation process,
114

senior leadership kept on building on issue areas which were representative of
Greenpeace main orientations (see Figure 7 and 8). They also kept on discussing
specific problems within these issue areas, as illustrated by the Graphs on resource
allocations over time included in the previous sections. A major determinant for the
approval of the pursuit of an opportunity was the proposal, which had to clearly define
the objectives of a campaign, the timeline, and the expected outcome. The international
coordinators, in collaboration with the senior leadership and NROs, were responsible
for carrying this task. The way the process had been developed inherently favored
opportunities that were related to what the organization was known for or was already
involved with (i.e. water-based actions related to simple issues). Issues that could be
easily identified, with a well-defined opportunity space that fit with the organization’s
main orientations, continued to be favored throughout this process over more salient
issues, or issues that were perhaps more detrimental to the future of the planet, and
identified through the Long-Term Plan.
5.2.2 Plasticity
Greenpeace's ability to pursue opportunities was closely tied with the implementation
of structures, practices, and processes that helped its decision-makers discuss
opportunities across the organization and allocate resources to pursue them. Thanks to
the centralization of activities that occurred during this period, the coordination of the
work conducted by the different NROs facilitated the pursuit of opportunities that were
global in scope. It also provided GPI greater control over the message and greater
influence in the allocation of resources to specific issues/campaigns. The increase in
donations that occurred following the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior (see Graph 4)
also facilitated the funding of a number of new activities carried on by international
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headquarters. All these resources proved to be effective when addressing issues that
were relatively simple and falling well within Greenpeace's historical mandate, as we
can see from the map representing the organization’s priorities over time (Figure 7 and
8).
In addition to the centralization of activities that enabled Greenpeace's ability to
pursue opportunities, the organization started to develop greater flexibility in the way it
conceptualized problems. This helped the organization develop projects to address
issues that were localized (i.e. contained in a specific ecosystem) but not necessarily
visible or that were more difficult to “sell”. They achieved this by playing between
specific problems (e.g. emission of pollutants by specific industries) and ecosystems
(e.g. the overall protection of a lake, sea, or land area). For instance, issues related to
biocides and pesticides could be addressed by focusing on ecosystems, such as inland
waters and the Great Lakes. By switching between ecosystems and specific problems,
Greenpeace was able to think about problems in different ways and able to pursue
“small wins” aligned with priorities (e.g. protection of the atmosphere, depletion of
biodiversity, etc.) that might have been otherwise abandoned.
Still, while Greenpeace was able to pursue opportunities already falling within
established issue areas, the organization was struggling to pursue more complex issues,
such as climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer. These two issues had been
identified as priorities as early as 1986. Nevertheless, various attempts to introduce
these issues within Greenpeace's portfolio failed to receive support or to be enacted.
The following excerpt from the Long-Term Plan illustrates this point:
“When the list of Greenpeace campaigns is compared to a list of the
generally accepted major global problems it is clear that several problems
are not addressed by us. None of the issues below are being addressed by
Greenpeace in a substantial way: warming of the planet’s surface,
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depletion of underground fresh water resources, mass destruction of
vegetation and soil, depletion and manipulation of genetic resources via
genetic engineering and economic control, non nuclear militarization.
These topics give a broad indication that Greenpeace is still not dealing
with some of the world’s most serious environmental problems” (LongTerm Plan 1988, p. 22).

Although opportunities had been identified, the organization kept on focusing
on issues contained within a well-defined opportunity space (i.e. international
institutions or a specific ecosystem with clear boundaries), and the opportunities tackled
by the organization remained simple problems that could be grasped through simple
images, despite the organizational foresight on the most salient issues threatening the
planet. This situation prevailed until the end of the period, despite the allocation of
resources to projects targeting issues identified though the Long-Term Plan. The
allocation of resources for a potential campaign on Rainforest, for instance, was still
opposed by certain offices, including Greenpeace Denmark (see SGC AGM 1989, p.
15). In fact, it is only after a few years that a campaign to protect rainforests would
receive a significant portion of the organization’s budget through the “Amazon”
campaign as of 1997. The same goes for Genetic Engineering, which received formal
approval for further investigations on the topic (see SGC AGM 1989, p. 16), but did not
receive approval for a formal commitment by the organization until many years later. It
is only in 1990 that these issues started to gain more traction within the organization,
but even then, the level of commitment remained low with many NROs preferring to
stay away from these issues in favor of more traditional issues.
The reasons for the inability of the organization to pursue more complex
opportunities are manifold. Some organizational members were skeptical about
Greenpeace’s role with regards to these issues and the need to adopt explicit goals. This
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required international campaigners to consistently come back to Council to persuade
organizational members of the importance of these issues for Greenpeace. For instance,
climate change had been identified as crucial for the future of the planet, but it was still
necessary to emphasize the role of Greenpeace in these issues:
“Following on from his introduction, the Coordinator reiterated that the
conclusions of the UN scientific process on climate change, agreed by
governments, provided a valuable baseline for the campaign. The
conclusions equated effectively to the elimination of fossil fuels as energy
sources. Demonstrating this as being possible was Greenpeace's role - no
other organization was likely to.” (SGC AGM 1990, p. 32)

When a campaign against an oil producer was discussed internally, a year later, one
member responded with the following: “Are we seriously discussing taking over an oil
company? Are we out of our mind?” (Internal communication through Greenlink in
relation with a proposal to conduct a campaign against an oil company, September 27th,
1991).
In addition, the process for the allocation of resources was considered deficient
for the new directions to be favored by the organization:
“The Board recognised the problems of annual resource allocation, both
personnel and monetary, between the different marine animal projects and
recommended that the Executive Director combine the current Greenpeace
campaigns to protect whales, small cetaceans, and turtles into one larger unit.
It is the Board's opinion that the marine animal/species issues could be
better handled as a unified campaign. This would allow campaigners to be
assigned to specific species projects based upon talent and programme need.
The Board hoped that such a regrouping would give the organisation the
flexibility it needs to deal with the changing emphases and priorities of
these issues” (Board Meeting Minutes, August 28-30 1990, p. 2)

This lack of flexibility came along with the perception that Greenpeace had to
find ways to better manage its internal diversity, which had to come through the voting
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rights of NROs and the implementation of structures, processes, and practices that
would foster the attention of NROs towards global concerns:
“Every national office should be represented at Council’s, and that a
practical structure, and not a voting structure, what was more important. UK
suggested that the following questions were essential to the debate: "What
resources are available to open national offices? What resources can be used
to better understand different cultures? And what resources are available to
support further expansion?" The UK would agree to expanding into regions
where Greenpeace did not already have a presence on the basis of
fundamental environmental problems.” (SGC AGM 1990, p. 10)
“The USA stated that "reasonable representation" should bring about
structures and processes which give voice to regional perspectives. USA
said that all national offices unavoidably functioned nationally throughout
the year, but that it was important they acted in a manner which reflected
global rather than national concerns - even if it's only during the council
Meeting. They suggested that a foundation for practical steps be drawn up.”
(SGC AGM 1990, p. 10)

All in all, and despite the centralization of key functions at GPI, Greenpeace
was struggling as an organization to pursue the opportunities identified through the
Long-Term Plan.
5.2.3 Shaping ability
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape appeared to be enhanced compared to the
previous period. Evidence of this can be found in the victories obtained at formal
international institutions and through a combination of lobbying, campaigning, and
non-violent direct actions (Graph 15): a worldwide ban on incinerating organochlorine
waste at sea in 1988, a moratorium on high-seas large-scale driftnets in 1989, and the
signing of a Treaty for a 50-year prohibition of all mineral exploitation in the Antarctic
region in 1991. These victories occurred in parallel to a growing membership (Graph 4),
which was considered as instrumental to Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape,
providing additional legitimacy to Greenpeace’s actions.
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If Greenpeace was able to shape the landscape for issues that were relatively
simple, this was not the case for more complex issues, such as climate change and
transportation. The organization was struggling with finding a way to legitimize new
courses of actions with regards to these opportunities. This struggle can be explained by
internal as well as external factors. Internally, organizational members were struggling
to find projects that would be relevant to NROs (see section above on plasticity).
Externally, organizational members were unable to influence governments to adopt
pieces of legislations related to these issues. Part of the problem with that regard was
that the landscape for these opportunities was part of a global common (Ansari, Wijen,
& Gray, 2013) being constructed by a variety of actors. These actors included
governments and corporations, a fact that was recognized by the senior leadership (see
quote on beliefs from the Long-Term Plan on p. 117 and 118). This was a sharp
contrast with other opportunities pursued by the organization where formal
international institutions could be clearly identified. For instance, commercial whaling
was governed by the International Whaling Commission; the depletion of specific
species could be addressed through CITES; ecosystems like the North Sea or the
Mediterranean sea could be protected by persuading a limited number of countries to
adopt specific pieces of legislation. For issues like climate change or the depletion of
ozone layer, there were no formal international institutions that could effectively impact
the landscape as a whole. To impact the landscape with regards to these more complex
opportunities, the organization had to identify potential small wins.
Even though the organization kept on focusing on formal institutions, some
individuals were cognizant of this weakness in Greenpeace's approach. In commenting
on the Long-Term Plan, one trustee made the following remark:
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“Greenpeace should not restrict itself to change the policies of governments.
In modern societies government policies in many cases are short-term and
reactive in the sense that they take up movements from the society and react
to public pressure and special interest groups. It is certainly true, that
corporations have more of a long-term plan, and we should try to influence
their policies more than in the past. Again, we must not forget the general
public and other constituents of society” (SGC AGM 1987, p. 275).

One possible path was through the global practices of corporations, yet,
Greenpeace had limited influence over these actors. The organization was also
perceived anti-business. These two conditions did not help the organization in
persuading businesses to change their practices. The organization thus kept on focusing
on governments and international institutions until the end of the period when the
organization obtained its first major “victory” when the publishing industry decided to
adopt more sustainable practices. It is also around that time the Board of Directors
requested the consideration of a number of alternatives by campaigners and executive
directors to be more effective at influencing external audiences on environmental issues.
The following requests from the Board provide evidence for the consensus that was
starting to build around the need to broaden the different means used by the
organization as well as its targets:
“IV.3. Investigative television reports: The Board requested that the
Communications Division General Manager should, when hired, analyse the
costs and benefits of developing a series of Greenpeace investigative
television reports. The Board requested the Executive Director and his
Deputy to further develop this proposal.
IV.4. Education: The Board requested the Executive Director and his Deputy
to seek, with the relative campaigners, new approaches to education and
educational projects taking into account the advantages and versatility of
computer networks, for possible inclusion in the 1992 proposals.
IV.5. Religion: The Board supported study of possibilities of influencing the
major world religions to utilise their networks for environmental change.
IV.6. Comic Books: The Board requested the Executive Director to further
develop with the books division the idea of presenting comic book versions
of all Greenpeace's campaigns.” (Board Meeting Minutes, February 1991, p.
5)
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Many of these ideas will eventually be explored, but not until signs of decline in
membership and income would start to show (see next section).

5.3 Period 3 (1991-1995): Solving the crisis and imagining “One Greenpeace”
Period 3 was one of crisis. Membership and income were in decline (see Graph 4); the
organization had also become more expensive to operate over the years (see Graph 11).
These two conditions led to important financial difficulties for the organization. This
translated into numerous requests to review Greenpeace's priorities, to revisit the
principles behind Greenpeace's actions, as well as the way activities were organized.
The most important initiative to solve the crisis was the Strategic Plan, officially
initiated in October 1991:
“The Board intends to define with the Executive Director clear international
organisational priorities to increase the organisation's effectiveness in
tackling global environmental challenges and to enhance internal consensus
on the organisation's role. Both the 1987 Long Term Plan and the Survival
Agenda Project provided useful work for the current direction. We will build
upon this work through the development of a strategic plan. It is then the
Board's intention to lay out a strategic direction for the organisation utilising
fora for interaction with the organisation ie Council, Trustee, campaign and
International Board meetings.” (October 24-25 Board of Directors 1991)

The process concluded with the publication of the Strategic Plan, which included a
formal mission statement and description of Greenpeace's role in society:
“Greenpeace is a movement made up of people of many races and places, of
diverse beliefs and lifestyles: people prepared to stand up for life in all its
diversity, actively protecting the environment to ensure the vital functioning
of natural systems in our lifetimes and beyond.” (Strategic Plan, 1993, p. 1)

Besides providing Greenpeace with a formal identity and mission statement, the
Strategic Planning exercise comprised a review of all Greenpeace's activities, including
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its ability to identify opportunities, its ability to pursue them, and its ability to undertake
actions that are successful at shaping the landscape.
5.3.1 Rationality
During the period of crisis, the ability (or inability) of Greenpeace to identify
opportunities was pointed to as a reason for the difficulties encountered by the
organization. This led to the creation of a number of working groups and roundtables
falling under the Strategic Planning exercise to reflect on the main orientations of the
organization, and the Global Issue Working Group to identify the “opportunities to be
pursued” by the organization. The conclusion from the numerous groups was that the
best positioning for Greenpeace was the one initiated in the previous years: to focus on
global issues such as climate change, genetic engineering, and deforestation, organized
according to orientations. The main challenge, from organizational members'
perspective, was to obtain small wins that could serve the work of Greenpeace in
persuading external actors to act on the aforementioned environmental problems.
The first signs of difficulties were brought to the attention of the senior
leadership in 1991 by Greenpeace Germany, which raised its concerns about the
difficulties to engage with the orientations initiated following the Long-Term Plan.
These concerns were mostly ignored, and Greenpeace Germany came back in 1992
with a request to review priorities and opportunities. The purpose of the meeting was to
try and clarify some misunderstandings on a number of issues resulting from recent, as
well as ongoing, debates within the organization. In particular, these focused on the
subject of the extent to which they were facing a world that deals with the question of
the environment in new and more complex ways and how it affected their work. The
conclusions from the group can be read as follow:
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“The fears expressed by GP Germany, GP Netherlands and GP UK, that
the organization is moving away from environmental issues into other
priorities, were largely removed. What is stated here are affirmations of
common understandings about basic Greenpeace principles (particularly
our independence) and ways of working which the group feels are shared
by most if not all of the organization. However, there was concern
expressed by the three offices that some recent debates questioned these
agreed principles.” (Informal meeting held by Executive Directors in July
1992)

In parallel to the discussions held by regional trustees and executive directors,
the decrease in financial resources forced the organization to limit activities to a number
of opportunities aligned with the main orientations of the organization. The
campaigners submitted their own list of 16 priorities (tropical forests, ozone, global
warming, chlorine, directed kills, nuclear industry, ocean ecosystems integrity,
disarmament/militarization, agriculture, hazardous waste trade, paper-production cycle,
fisheries, biotech, free trade and finance, Antarctica, dirty industry transfer)36 to be
matched with 9 areas of work (ocean ecosystems, disarmament, nuclear industry, Heip,
forests, agriculture, chlorine industry, global warming, ozone). The regional trustees
then discussed these priorities, in addition to the board of directors. Again, the key
questions were more about how to categorize issues and prioritize them rather than
whether or not they were opportunities worth pursuing, as there was a clear consensus
on the importance of these issues and how they were aligned with the objectives of the
organization:
“Most of the issues identified address more than one of the goals, and
some of them address all of the goals. As we tried to squeeze the issues
under the goals, we found that the following 'fit’, more or less: To Protect
Biodiversity (Ocean Ecosystems and Forests); To Protect the Atmosphere
(Global Warming; Ozone); To Stop Toxic Pollution (Chlorine; HEIP); To
Stop the Nuclear Threat (Civil Nuclear). Disarmament, whether or not it is
36

Population was also raised as an issue of concern, but it was decided to not discuss this topic
(confidential campaign team meeting minutes, May 18, 1992, p. 25)
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restricted to nuclear testing, fits very uneasily under the Nuclear umbrella;
and Agriculture could fit equally well under Taxies, where it has
traditionally been categorized, or under Biodiversity.” (Extraordinary
Board Meeting Minutes, May 1992, Annex 1 on priorities)
“The Board thanks the International staff for the expeditious delivery of
the Issues Papers. The Board reiterates its continued concern for the need
to focus the organization, and to take into account the reduced resources.
The organization must create a clear profile and avoid spreading resources
too thinly over too great a number of issues.” (Board Meeting Minutes,
June 19, 1992, p. 3)

While the need to focus the organization on a more limited set of issues was clear, the
way of identifying opportunities remained very much aligned with what had been done
in the past. Meanwhile, if not all organizational members could agree on what
Greenpeace should do, there was an agreement that Greenpeace's role was to undertake
long-term projects, as illustrated by the following discussion from the 1992 AGM (p.
5):
“One of the main, if not the primary constant of Greenpeace's identity and
success as an organisation over the past 20 years has been its dogged,
long-term (generally 5-15 years) pursuit of key campaign goals, which
engaged all of much of the organisation over a period of years in pursuit
of agreed strategy: the Commercial Whaling Moratorium; an end to the
large vessel based commercial harp seal hunt; LDC Radwaste Ban; the
Ocean Incineration Ban; 50-year protection for Antarctica; the Basel Ban;
etc.” (SGC 1992 AGM minutes, p. 5)

As the financial difficulties encountered by the organization continued, it became
clear that a broader discussion about the process to identify and select opportunities to
pursue had to be revised. The discussion involving a number of organizational leaders
on the national-international relations illustrates the consensus that emerged over the
need to review this process:
“There is a risk of longer term prioritization process: It could undermine our
ability to react spontaneously to unforeseen events. Too much detailed
forward planning doesn’t fit into matrix approach, it will have negative
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effect on flexibility. Hard to make realistic long-term campaign plans,
reality change constantly” (National international relations, June 7th1993, p.
7, consensus reach upon a discussion led by Stephanie Mills that
encompassed a number of strategic leaders from various departments and
NROs)

This idea of seizing opportunities arising from unforeseen events continued to
spread out across the organization and found its niche in the Strategic Plan report
published in October of 1993. Within this report, there was an explicit recognition that
the parameters that allowed Greenpeace to succeed in identifying opportunities in the
past had changed, and they had to adapt accordingly:
“We must observe and analyze our situation, then make judgements, but
we should recognize that there will be much confusion along the way.
Strategy and analysis must be fast, fluid, adaptive, and creative. In the
hurricane of our chaos driven world, we certainly need the strategic
clarity of our goals and objectives. Beyond that though, planning is
largely a moment to moment series of good decisions that adapt to the
chaos around us: what we grab, what we let go of, what we duck, what
we throw, which way we jump.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993,
p. 2)

On how to work with opportunities to achieve organizational objectives, and the
need to develop these objectives, it was proposed to favor simplicity in the definition of
Greenpeace orientations, as well as greater flexibility for national organizations, to
allow them to identify and seize opportunities for small wins:
“A basis for clear and consistent messages to our opponents, supporters,
fellow campaigners elsewhere, media and decision-makers. The
Greenpeace mission – and its implications – should underpin every
document we produce and every press conference we give. International
and national campaign staff cooperate in the process of developing
campaign proposals, defining policies and formulating goals, strategies,
objectives and tactics. The basis of the relationship is the reality that the
former are in the best position to judge what will contribute positively
internationally to the global Greenpeace mission, while the latter are in the
best position to judge what will or will not be effective in their respective
countries.” (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 36)
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Overall, with regards to Greenpeace's ability to identify opportunities, there was
a recognition that it was not possible to predict or anticipate all possible courses of
actions that could allow the organization to effectively shape the landscape. Many
potential opportunities aligned with the organization’s objectives were to remain
unforeseen until to occur, hence the need for greater flexibility. It was also believed that
the organization had to become more focused, and that the number of campaigns should
be reduced and prioritized, to favor the ecologically most relevant issues.
5.3.2 Plasticity
In line with the reflection that took place for the identification of opportunities, the
ability of Greenpeace to pursue opportunities was also put under scrutiny. Based on the
discussions held within the governance and the operational channels of Greenpeace,
this ability can be described as weak. In fact, many issues identified as priorities were
not being followed by NROs. Two issues reflect the inability of the organization to
pursue opportunities in a coherent way: the use of fossil energy, which was contributing
to climate change, and the development of genetically modified organisms (GMO),
which was presumed to represent a danger for biodiversity. The following discussions
held by the board and the campaign team in 1991 and 1992 illustrate this point that
although opportunities could be identified, there was incapacity to follow the priorities
established within the governance channels of the organization:
“The Board found the alternative proposal from Greenpeace Switzerland,
Belgium, Austria and the UK on Genetic Engineering well argued.
However, the Board and Council agreed last year that Genetic Engineering
would become a specific policy direction rather than a campaign. […] The
Board does, however, agree that Genetic Engineering in itself is a very
important issue. Greenpeace should continue to reflect on the priority and
the level of resources it wishes to devote to this area given the financial
situation.” (Board Meeting Minutes October 24-25, 1991, p. 3)
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“There is no clear oil campaign work being proposed by national offices,
except for the ecosystem approach. There is no acceptance from some
offices that the toxics campaign no longer exists. A lot of national offices
are not reflecting international priorities” (Campaign Team Meeting,
September 7, 1992)

These difficulties continued throughout the period as the different boards and
committees were concerned about finding a way to be more effective at pursuing and
seizing opportunities. The structure of Greenpeace, in particular, was pointed to as a
reason for the difficulties experienced by the organization:
“There was agreement that the present organizational structure is not
working. Not only is it non-representational of campaigns but it is also
making the decision-making process erratic and difficult. Political
Division and Comms are presently merged as a higher priority than
Campaigns and there is no clear delineation of the Service Divisions'
responsibilities. Their function and mandate need clarification.”(Campaign
Team Meeting Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 1)

And later on, building on a recent example where the structure prevented the diffusion
of information, it was suggested that greater integration between the campaign and
service division could enhance the effectiveness of Greenpeace at addressing emerging
issues that could undermine the organization’s legitimacy:
“Service Divisions should help convey the campaigns' messages but
should not make these message themselves. Kelly raised her experience of
an article in GP USAs magazine as an example of the potential negative
impact of isolation of campaigns from service divisions such as comms
and political division. In this example the magazine had published an
article on Dupont which was also carried by the Swiss magazine. The
editor of the Swiss magazine received a letter from Dupont disputing the
facts the article presents. Kelly only found out about the article and the
subsequent response from Dupont nearly two weeks after it had happened.
The potential legal implications in this case are obvious.” (Campaign
Team Meeting Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 2)

It was believed that greater integration could improve communications between units; it
was also believed that it could help sustain a clear focus over time to engage
128

organizational members regardless of their organizational affiliation, both in terms of
service division and location:
“In terms of the planning process, establishing priority is about how much
money we give to a project or campaign. However, this should not be the
only criterion. It helps to provide a focus for the activities of the
organisation over a period of time which would attempt to include drawing
in high level of support from Service Divisions and also attempt to focus the
priorities of national offices in a supportive way.”(Campaign Team Meeting
Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 3)
“As the organisation is addressing a wider range of issues the possibility
for overlaps between campaigns is increasing. By exchanging and
comparing the campaign policies, these areas can be more easily identified.
The same policy format should be used in order to facilitate comparisons.
It was agreed that having a policy is helpful in order to define the
parameters of the debate.” (Campaign Team Meeting Confidential Minutes,
March 25 1992, p. 2)

In addition to Greenpeace's ineffective structures, the way the organization had grown
made organizational members discuss more about processes than the actual issues that
needed to be addressed, creating distractions that prevented them from focusing on their
primary mission:
“The reality is that the simple answers are not there. We are a complex
organization in a complex world. Centralized planning does not work. […]
Our growth and increased complexity has led to increasing bureaucracy and
complexity of management and systems. Distracted by debates over
ideology, preoccupied with planning and other processes divided by internal
rifts over dogma and resource commitments, we debate endlessly.” (A
Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993, p. 3)

Along with the need for greater integration across units, an enduring element often
mentioned by organizational members as an explanation for Greenpeace's difficulties
was the lack of flexibility. This came from the recognition that they did not have the
ability to act on opportunities. For instance, some NROs were able to identify
opportunities in line with the most salient issues threatening the planet, but NROs could
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not effectively pursue these opportunities because they were not able to allocate
resources to these opportunities quickly enough. The flexibility discussed by
organizational members was associated with the allocation of operational and financial
resources. It was perceived as necessary to be able to seize opportunities arising from
unexpected events, as well as to promote initiatives by NROs.
For operations, this flexibility was expected to come from the possibility of
having individuals work on different campaigns, as opposed to the way where
campaigners worked solely on their area of expertise:
“It was felt that when a situation arises and campaigners need to work on a
campaign other than their own, it may be preferable for them to remain
within their campaign and highlight the other. Switching a campaigner
from one campaign to another requires more planning.” (Campaign Team
Meeting Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 2)

Financial flexibility, on the other hand, concerned the funding of projects and the
possibility to release funds on a quick notice. Although there was an agreement for the
importance of flexibility, the question was how to enable it in practice and how to
establish processes to release these funds when needed:
“The Board acknowledges the organisation's positive response to the
suggestion to establish a flexibility fund. Although, through the contingency
fund, a certain amount of flexibility was ensured in the past, the Board
recognises that the present campaigning climate demands the establishment
of a definitive process to allow resources to be accessed quickly. The Board
requests the ED as part of the proposal process to present clear guidelines
for the use of the flexibility fund. It was noted that the guidelines should, in
addition to establishing criteria, explain the process by which the funds can
be accessed and outline a mechanism by which the use of these funds can be
evaluated. The Board further advises the ED to ensure that financial and
resource related flexibility should be built into all areas of the organisation's
activities during the proposal process.” (Extraordinary Board of Directors
Meeting Minutes, May 1992, p. 12)

This flexibility was also called for in the way there was a mutual understanding that the
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organizational structure had to be more flexible and that practices had to be clarified in
order to make it practical for the organization:
“Flexibility is needed both in the planning and practice of the organization’s
structure. The lack of clarity that exists regarding the organization’s current
working practices clearly shows that basing the organization on a
hierarchical system of line management, and fitting our work into clearly
defined boxes, does not work well, and especially not when management
takes place over great distances.” (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 19-20)
“Flexibility is regarded as a key element for future campaigning. A pool of
people with flexible roles will be needed; people who can be utilized where
they are most effective. The timeframe for priority campaigns will range
from one or two months, to one or two years, depending on the goals. It was
also pointed out that part of the rationale for introducing the matrix
approach to campaigning last year had been to enable the organization to
mobilize considerable resources at short notice in order to address specific
campaign goals not foreseen in campaign proposals. There is therefore a
basis to work on ‘priority’ and ‘opportunistic’ campaigns within the existing
structure, which should be further developed.” (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p.
19-20)

To develop greater flexibility, the strategic plan suggested the creation of rapid
response teams – to seize opportunities created by unpredictable events –, the creation
of area advisors – to identify lower-level opportunities –-, and the adoption of an
explicit mission statement – to make sure the goals were clear to all organizational
members. The most important measure, however, is the transformation of the resource
allocation process to categorize opportunities according to three different types:
ongoing, opportunistic, and priorities. By separating opportunities according to these
three categories, the senior leadership wanted to be able to seize opportunities arising
from unexpected events while simultaneously being able to continuously track issues as
part of an ongoing process, to be able to develop projects that could contribute to
reshape the environment, and allocate more resources to the ones gaining momentum.
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Along with flexibility, stability was another dimension that had been identified
as critical to Greenpeace's success. This stability concerned the structure of the
organization to ensure that individuals had the opportunity to refine their understanding
of the challenges faced in the implementation of a campaign:
“As it relates to this discussion, there are three key points, which need to
be accepted as requirements for co-ordinators (or whoever is responsible)
to successfully pursue these goals over time: stability or constancy of staff
over time; coordinators must have the authority and the support to keep
the campaign focused on a clear internationally agreed objective, while at
the same time recognising that decentralised, locally grounded
implementation is critical to the success of our work; A focused,
translatable global strategy: co-ordinators must be held accountable for
establishing, pursuing, and ultimately implementing a clear international
strategy, which both serves the international objectives of the campaign
AND which is sufficiently grounded in national realities (through national
staff) to make it work; and ultimately for achieving the objective of the
campaign.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, p. 8)

The form of stability discussed then also implied some form of continuity in the
priorities of the organization, which had been changed almost on a yearly basis
throughout the period, as we can see from Figure 8.
Finally, diversity was perceived both as a strength and a weakness of the
organization. It was perceived as a strength because it was considered a key to shape
the future of the planet, a motto that was explicitly included in the Strategic Plan:
“We need to learn a lesson from the ecosystems we defend: our diversity is
the key to our survival. Campaign diversity, cultural diversity, political
diversity, and economic diversity: we need to focus the strength of our
differences on shaping the future of the world, not let it divide us and
threaten the future of Greenpeace. Say that they need to change more on
diversity as well.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993, p. 3)

While a strength, it was also a weakness as Greenpeace had been unable to capture its
benefits. This is a concern that could be observed through the numerous conflicts
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between individuals from different NROs; it was also a concern that was openly
discussed during the sessions that aimed to enhance the effectiveness of Greenpeace:
“Nationalism plus nationalism plus nationalism does not equal
internationalism. We should not be a federation. We need office
exchanges - more substantial and longer term recruitment - not just
people from different countries/regions. Also people who have diverse
experience/perspective challenge ourselves to do away with stereotyping.
GP needs to make fundamental commitment to being a global citizen
with global principles (mission statement) change planning process so
there is ONE GP plan, not a series of national and international plans.
There should be pressure on key international GP decision-makers to
learn/experience outside of their home country, with international
presence on national boards.” (Team Campaign Meetings, 19930607 –
National international relations, p. 6, consensus reached upon a
discussion led by Stephanie Mills)

Managing the diversity was also a question of practical concerns, as it was creating
difficulties when it was time to develop coherent strategies:
“NROs are developing strategic plans on their own, timing of international
process is such that it is difficult to know what international plans are so they
can be incorporated in national strategy. There is a need for more (detailed)
planning in an integrated way between offices. National campaign
coordinators and international coordinators should jointly develop proposals”
(Campaign Team meeting on national international relations, June 7th 1993, p.
7, consensus reached upon a discussion led by Stephanie Mills)

Integration, along with the adoption of internationalism as a value, was seen as a way to
build bridges across the different cultures, and to take advantage of this diversity.
Internationalism, in particular, emphasized the global over the local and the notion that
borders do not exist; it was seen as a philosophy that had to become central to
Greenpeace's culture and identity:
“True internationalism is about seeing ourselves in this way, as parts of the
Greenpeace whole. If we wish to tackle global environmental problems, and
ask nations to set aside short term self interest for the greater good, then we
must be prepared to do the same.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993,
p. 12)
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Despite having a vision as to what would allow the organization to identify,
pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future, attempts to
implement the plan proved to be largely unsuccessful. At the exception of a few
initiatives, most of them created additional tensions and instability. As a result, acting
on new opportunities was coming second to the reorganization, and the organization
was still struggling to engage with more complex issues, such as genetic engineering,
climate change, and global warming, despite a significant increase in the resources
allocated to these issues (see previous Graphs on resource allocation).
5.3.3 Shaping ability
During this period, Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape was mixed. On one
hand, the organization was still able to influence the adoption of agreements at formal
international institutions (6, as shown on Graph 15). On the other hand, the organization
had to recognize that its influence was fading and was struggling in having the impact it
was aiming for. Reflecting on Greenpeace's decline in performance and inability to win
campaigns, and the changes in the external parameters, the Executive Director
summarized the difficulties encountered by Greenpeace this way:
“The parameters of the external debate had changed, our issue became
mainstream, our campaigning didn't adapt, we lost our confidence. We
were attacked, and we were weak, off balance, preoccupied and divided.
The biggest loser in all this struggle has been the effectiveness and
efficiency of Greenpeace as a campaign organization.” (A Strategic Plan
for Greenpeace, 1993, p. 3)

These impressions on Greenpeace's fading influence were supported through a
significant decline in membership and income that occurred between the years 1991
and 1995 (see Graph 4).
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The diagnosis as to what was affecting Greenpeace's ability to shape the
landscape relates to a number of factors. In referring to the pessimism regarding the
declining influence of Greenpeace, both internally and externally, the Executive
Director from Germany wrote the following comment in September 1991 to Steve
Sawyer, International Executive Director:
“This very negative sounding description coincides with what in our view
is very successful work, especially in the last few months. […] In
describing the situation it must be said that these successes have not been
sufficiently noted, or have been preferred not to be noted, by the press,
media and public. Our image consists in the main of the inflatable dinghy
image. This is positive and important for us, but it is not sufficiently
known, over and above this, that we carry out background work as well as
actions, and that we are also involved in countless positive projects and
attempts at solutions. This incomplete picture has not been able to
reconcile our financial power, on the one hand, with the inflatable dinghy
image on the other. The consequence must drawn from this - that we must
present ourselves differently in public in the future. A further consequence
is that a campaign's work with the press, media and public constitutes a
central challenge per se; that is, such work has a value in itself, since it
publicizes the organization and its activities and ultimately produces the
public pressure we need in order to bring about changes. We believe that
the notion that a campaign can be content with a specialist public must be
critically scrutinized. We only achieved what we achieved in the paper
campaign through bilateral talks with the industry and publishers because
there is great respect for us publically. But we can only keep this respect
for any length of time when we also make our work publicly credible.”
(September 21st, 1991 – communication from Thilo Bolde to Steve Sawyer,
reproduced in Top Management Team meeting, p. 39)

Along with this diagnosis on Greenpeace's situation, the Executive Director for
Germany made a number of recommendations, including a greater focus on solutions as
a means to provide tangible evidence that the problems of concern for Greenpeace were
not impossible to solve. In his communication to the International Executive Director,
he continues:
“The demand, made on us from the outside, that it is now time to provide
solutions since environmental awareness already exists, is in our view
double-edged. It is double-edged because solutions, at least partial ones, do
135

exist to a lot of problems. But these solutions are not put into practice on
account of the political and economic balance of power. In the energy
campaign, for example, we know what is necessary, that is, a decentralised
energy supply, the increased use of alternative energy sources and the
efficient use of energy. This does not come about because the economic
circumstances do not allow it. We also know what is required to solve the
problem of the destruction of the ozone layer, that is, stopping the
production of chlorofluorocarbons and their substitutes. And we know too
what is necessary in order to manufacture at least chlorine-free paper. This
means that one of GP's primary tasks is to show that solutions already exist,
and to gain acceptance of these solutions with political pressure.”
(September 21st, 1991 – communication from Thilo Bolde to Steve Sawyer)

This call came to be heard by organizational members, and a number of NROs started
to work on potential solutions as an additional way to influence actors to engage with
the path proposed by Greenpeace. The focus on solutions appeared to start paying off in
the following year with the release of Greenfreeze, a technology that aimed to reduce
the use of CFC in refrigerators and freezers, a gas that had been known to contribute to
the destruction of the ozone layer. Commenting on the organization’s performance, a
report from the board refers to this success:
“Despite the turmoil we have succeeded in moving forward in our
campaigns, and have achieved high media visibility and successes
throughout the year: From Moruroa to Rio to Novaya Zemlya, to new
concepts such as the CFC-free fridge, Greenpeace has continued to be at
the forefront of the environmental movement throughout 1992.” (Report
by the Board to Council, October 23rd 1992, Annex 1, p. 2-3)

This reflection on the development of solutions as part of Greenpeace's portfolio of
action alternatives came along with a call for a greater focus on multinational
corporations. Globalization was a major trend in the world. If the organization was to
succeed at shaping the landscape, influencing multinational corporations had to be
central to Greenpeace's actions.
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In addition to a greater focus on multinational corporations as an actor of
influence, there was an agreement that they had to take advantage of every opportunity
falling in line with their long-term objectives. This included opportunities generated by
unpredictable events because these events enjoy significant visibility without the
organization ‘pushing’ the issue in the media. Hence, the unpredictable events
represented windows that could serve the organization by providing opportunities to
connect causes and effects in people’s minds.
Overall, Greenpeace was still influential during this period, but had to be more
creative and active if it was to succeed in the long term. The organization attempted to
diversify its targets as well as the different means it used to persuade external actors to
change their behaviors. This led to some successes in shaping the landscape, but these
successes did not necessarily correspond to high-impact successes. Instead, they can be
described as small victories.

5.4 Period 4 (1995-2001): Becoming ‘One Greenpeace’, a globally responsive
organization
The fourth period was one where Greenpeace's rationality, plasticity, and shaping
ability were finally aligned, allowing the organization to create residuum of changes in
the landscape. This period, the last one observed in this study, corresponds to a period
where Greenpeace had developed enough flexibility to seize opportunities that were
aligned with the higher order opportunities identified by the organization. This
flexibility allowed Greenpeace to influence both formal institutions and global
organizations, contributing to the enactment of the organization’s vision for the future.
During Period 4, Greenpeace renewed with greater stability in its structure and
processes through the program of reforms. The focus on engaging with the future was
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explicit in the beliefs of the organization, and the vision behind the development of a
new structure as well as the implementations of new rules were aligned with what was
perceived as necessary changes if the organization was to be successful at shaping the
landscape. The beliefs of the organization with regards to its role and mission are well
illustrated in the following excerpt from the Global Presence Report:
“Our self-understanding as [Greenpeace] as well as the public perception of
[Greenpeace] is that of a global campaigning organization, which is
worldwide present. We act (or at least try to act) as a catalyst for change in
an internationally coordinated approach as "One [Greenpeace]", i.e.
speaking with one voice, based on mutually agreed positions on a broad
spectrum of issues which are adapted to different regions and countries in
the world. These positions are the result of an intensive international
discussion process with broad input from the [Greenpeace] presence's that
form the global organization.” (Greenpeace Global Presence report, 1998, p.
2)

The orientations of the organization with regards to the future of the planet had not
changed at that point: the objectives were still the same. What had changed, however, is
that the organization was actively seeking opportunities to reflect on changes in their
environment, and how these changes had to be taken into consideration in Greenpeace's
approach. Such discussions had become part of internal ongoing discussions, contrary
to previous periods where such discussions were definite in time. The following
discussion, held in 2000, is representative of these discussions and how they had
become institutionalized within the organization’s processes:
“The key changes we need to respond to have been the decline in the
importance of national boundaries socially and politically, the rise of the
Internet and new forms of communication, the networking of economies and
the growth in the power and scope of transnational corporations. [Despite
these changes] The vision and mission remained the same as they had
always been. The vision is to have a clean, green and peaceful planet. The
mission is the type of organization that Greenpeace is: one driven by spirit
and strategy, confronting violence with peace and, above all, acting as a
catalyst for bringing about profound environmental change. Greenpeace's
role must change: it must become a truly global organization. Not
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international, but transnational. If we can reach agreement on the role within
the organization it will guide and encourage the necessary process of
change.” (SGC January 2000 Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, p. 6)

This new mindset was reflected in all spheres of Greenpeace's activities, as well as
organizational members were constantly discussing how to improve their effectiveness
as an organization with regards to all phases of engaging with the future: to identify
potential opportunities aligned with the organization’s objectives, to pursue the
identified opportunities, and to persuade actors in the environment to address the issues
the organization was targeting.
5.4.1 Rationality
The ability of the organization to identify opportunities aligned with its vision for the
future was characterized during this period by an explicit understanding that it was not
possible for GPI to predict which courses of actions were more likely to succeed at
shaping the landscape. The Brent Spar campaign, a campaign that went beyond any
expectations, and that was not planned by GPI but by a NRO, played a major role in
this recognition:
“The [Brent Spar] campaign did not arise from a single 'issue box'. It is a
positive factor that it was able to take place despite this. Of course no one
in [Greenpeace] realized the full potential of the [Brent Spar] campaign in
advance. At the time it was the powerful symbolic qualities of the target
that attracted internal interest, together with its amenability to
[Greenpeace] campaign methods, especially actions, and because it was
expressive of [Greenpeace] core values - marine based, value led, etc.
Because [Greenpeace] was sufficiently flexible to allow this campaign to
go ahead it has opened up a whole new era, in my view, in our
campaigning. Its redirective potential externally and for [Greenpeace] is
huge and positive. It would have been a serious indictment if it had been
planned because it did not fit in an issue box.” (SGC 1996 EDM Minutes,
Brent Spar Evaluation, p. 5)
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Hence, it was recognized by Greenpeace's senior leadership that although they
could identify projects that had the potential to succeed, they could not predict which
ones would succeed and through which course of action. This recognition translated
into a different approach to identify potential opportunities. This started with the
abandonment of a rigid template where the environment was defined in terms of issues:
“Aside from what rigidly sticking to issue boxes would say about
[Greenpeace], there are more general reasons why defining the
environment in terms of issues is problematic and would result in missed
opportunities - more so than ever post Brent Spar. Issues are seen as
problems, which are contested. Science discovers and defines these
problems and the diplomats and politicians then take over. Policy is
developed – measures, and then targets and timetables are agreed. On the
surface these processes look smooth and logical.” (SGC 1996 EDM
Minutes, Brent Spar Evaluation, p. 6)

The abandonment of rigid frames to define issues in the environment came along
a call for greater flexibility in the process, as illustrated through the following
quote taking from Council: “It was generally agreed that the campaign priorities
were a good starting point but greater flexibility is needed to enable further
refinements” (SGC AGM, 1997, p. 20). The case in point was that many
opportunities were still unforeseen and required to be explored, more so than
issues prioritized in the past. In referring to the list of issues being prioritized by
the organization (which included climate change and the loss of biodiversity in
forests as the top two priorities, as well as the protection of the global commons
of the oceans, whales, the threat generated by genetic engineering, and the
damages caused by persistent organic pollutants), the supporting documentation
granted increased flexibility in terms of more specific objectives, as well as in
the actions to be undertaken by the organization:
“There will be a thorough debate about the future direction of what are
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the broad goals and objectives. Questions such as how we take our work
on new oil exploration beyond Northern Europe and North America, and
how we might address the emerging objectives of the Amazon Forest
campaign, outside the scope of the Long Term Strategic Plan this year
and that will be developed through the normal planning process.” (SGC
1997 AGM Annex 7 p. 5)

The new approach consisted of establishing guidelines on what was important to
the organization, and letting NROs work on projects that they believed had the potential
to succeed. These guidelines were taking the form of broad issues, as exemplified in
Figure 8, with an overall pool of resources for the whole organization. Then, they
started to track projects that had the potential to succeed, to evaluate them and favor
their diffusion to other countries once they proved to be successful (see note on Figure
8). The objective of this approach was to focus on testing actions that could serve their
objectives, as opposed to discussing what had the potential to work:
“As part of the process of looking at hot issues, a series of discussions to
identify long term or overarching goals for Greenpeace had been held by a
small working group in the spring. The conclusion had been that this was
not a productive way forward and that Greenpeace should focus more on
doing and setting up mechanisms to encourage strategic innovation than
through theoretical discussions.” (SGC 1998 AGM, p. 16)

This latter point was associated with the ability to pursue opportunities as well as
actions that were driving discussions on what had the potential to succeed, and viceversa. The role of GPI in the identification of opportunities was then to focus on broad
priorities – to provide guidelines to NROs – and to track down projects that had the
potential to contribute to the enactment of the vision of the organization for the future.
5.4.2 Plasticity
In line with the changes that took place in the way Greenpeace was identifying
opportunities, the organization modified its structures, processes, and practices to
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facilitate the pursuit of opportunities. Many of the changes were based on the Strategic
Plan, but the changes were also based on several discussions that aimed to learn from
successful campaigns. The Brent Spar campaign was particularly insightful because it
occurred at a time when most campaigns were failing to attract attention in the media.
Central to the initiatives adopted throughout this period was the Program of
Reforms which placed greater emphasis on stability in structures, to allow the
organization to focus on its priorities:
“The attempt to construct an appropriate and effective governance system
that would resolve areas of conflict and ambiguity, had created extreme
difficulties for the organisation over the past years. For the first time the
organisation went beyond words, and had unanimously agreed the
mechanisms to form a unified organisation through a reform programme
that provided for strong international leadership and clear strategic decisionmaking and direction organisation wide. It was widely agreed that the
organisation should give itself the opportunity to work with the governance
structure over the course of a few years, in order to be able to realistically
evaluate its practical value. […] This approach would constructively
contribute to the essential tasks of continuing and strengthening the
emerging consolidation of the organisation, and free the organisation to
concentrate on its international campaigns” (SGC AGM 1996, p. 5)

The measures promoted to enhance Greenpeace's ability to seize opportunities
included the adoption of simple goals to grant NROs sufficient autonomy to design
projects that had the potential to succeed, and to test them they were also intended to
facilitate the move of resources around the organization more quickly in order to seize
emerging opportunities. A new resource allocation process was adopted that
emphasized contingency as well as a ‘war fund of 10%’, and greater integration among
the different units. This later point became central to the new organizational design as it
was intended to foster greater collaboration between the different units without the
involvement of GPI, and to facilitate the diffusion of information within the
organization.
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The adoption of these measures facilitated the work of NROs, permitting them
to allocate time and efforts on different projects. These projects could later be replicated
if they proved to be successful. A salient example of this greater capacity to pursue
opportunities is the GMO campaign on soya beans. The GMO campaign was the result
of close to 10 years of discussions on the issue. Many organizational members were
skeptical of the value of focusing on the issue despite the fact that it was an issue of
concern for Greenpeace. This led to numerous failures to engage with the issue despite
a significant portion of the budget dedicated to the issue. It is only in 1997 that an
initiative conducted by a NRO proved to be successful. Because of the new structure, it
was possible to quickly take advantage of this win to pursue this opportunity in other
locations. If it wasn’t for the new structure, the project might have never been approved.
This newly acquired flexibility thus facilitated the work of NROs in pursuing
novel opportunities. In light of the successes obtained, the organization went a few
steps further by adopting a real option-reasoning approach to the tracking of projects:
“For the purpose of maximizing the opportunities for creating successful
campaigns, a range of Key Opportunities have been identified which have
the potential to "go global". These projects will initially be modestly funded,
while a large contingency is held available to provide the required funding
for those that achieve global breakthrough.” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 6)
“ The responsibility for defining the criteria for key opportunities lies with
the national and international executive and the campaigns- the Board's
role is to create the conditions to ensure that great campaigns can happen.
A small amount of initial funding is available to the agreed key
opportunities in order to see how each will develop. If things go well, a
large contingency fund is available to ensure adequate funding thereafter.”
(SGC AGM 2000, p. 11)

The senior leadership could later track down these different projects to allocate
additional resources to the ones that proved to be successful. These developments
came along with “Increased emphasis on developing and funding new ways of
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campaigning and public engagement” and “Developing new ways of working and
allocating our resources” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 6).
Throughout the period, and despite the changes that had taken place, diversity
remained central to what was perceived as central to Greenpeace's ability to identify
and pursue opportunities:
“We need to be able to campaign in different ways in different countries.
While core beliefs remain the same, the characteristics of our campaigning
style may vary. Currently the organisation tends to measure success against
traditional Greenpeace methods, and we therefore have to broaden our
understanding of different cultures and conditions and evaluate effectiveness
within the local context. Diversity is a strength of the organisation. However,
diversification of the Greenpeace presence world-wide must be considered
within a social and political context and not be based on value-judgements.
Kristen explained that what is meant by diversification in Greenpeace terms
is 'the expectation’ of a common set of principles and ethos whilst
acknowledging the different methods of putting these principles into
practice'.” (SGC AGM September 1997, p. 20-21)
“[…] The organisation needs to be more effective globally, requiring more
co-ordinated action and resource allocation. The sentence 'We are not a
federation nor a collection of nationally-based grassroots organisations'
needs to be balanced by a statement that Greenpeace is committed to
safeguard national and regional differences within the organisation and to
reflect those existing in the real world, thereby recognising and reflecting
the social tensions present in society today.” (AGM 1998 p. 15 when
discussing about areas for improvement)

The value given to diversity came along with a desire to implement a culture of
continuous improvements, whereas organizational members were aiming for greater
effectiveness and efficiency in the way the organization was run:
“The only fixed points are the organisation's values and its mission:
anything else can be changed, and everything should be tried. Cornelia said
that the recent experience of attempting to establish the Global Campaign
Budget illustrated the problems of introducing change; in this case to
effectively apply funds to agreed strategic priorities world-wide. The fact
that there is no agreement yet on a Global Campaign Budget is as much due
to structural (governance) problems, as it is a communications problem and
a lack of will.” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 5).
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“Other outcomes so far from the Blue Sky discussions include: the creation
of Global Teams; the creation of Centres of Excellence, whereby global
tasks will be delegated to the location where they can be most effectively
performed; the creation of the Campaign Council and the Executive Council
to improve NRO/GPI communication and decision making.
Peter concluded by saying that it is important that while we talk and
experiment with various approaches to improve our global campaign
performance, we also attempt to become "One Greenpeace", even before the
required changes to the rules and structure have been determined. We must
strive to become globally-minded, rather than nationally-minded and
attempt to the best of our ability to act as One Greenpeace.” (SGC AGM
2000, p. 5)
Overall, the ability of Greenpeace to pursue opportunities could be described as
improved compared to the previous period. This is supported by the results obtained by
the organization despite relatively stable resources available to organizational members.
5.4.3 Shaping ability
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape proved to be greatly improved during this
period. Evidence of this can be found in the support they received from supporters, with
increases in income and membership from 1998 to 2002 (see Graph 4), but also in the
increase in the number of international agreements addressing issues of concerns at
international institutions (15 between 1996 and 2002 for an average of 2.5 a year – see
Graph 15) and in the number of changes in the global practices of MNEs that could
directly be attributed to Greenpeace's actions (6 between 1996 and 2002; and later on,
20 between 2003 and 200637).
Early signs that the organization’s shaping ability was improving were obtained
through surveys conducted on their behalf. Reports from Opinion Leader Research
from 1996 show a net increase from 1994 in the perception influential leaders had of
37

Greenpeace International archives do not cover the years following 2004; furthermore, very little
documentation is available after the year 2002. Thilo Bode resigned in 2001, but many of the current
structures are part of his legacy. This suggests that the philosophy that was in place from 2003 to 2006
remained very similar to the one that carried the organization over following 1995.
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Greenpeace's ability to influence governments and businesses and the effectiveness of
Greenpeace's lobbyist in their communications (internal report from Opinion Leader
Research, 1996). These surveys showed that Greenpeace was increasingly perceived as
a legitimate actor in the landscape and that the people that had been in communication
with organizational members were more receptive to their message.
The successes obtained by Greenpeace were largely attributed to the
implementation of “One Greenpeace”, which permitted greater flexibility but also
greater consistency and integration across the organization. Reflecting on the GMO
campaign to learn from the successes obtained with the issue, the executive director of
Greenpeace provided the following explanation:
“The capacity of [Greenpeace International] to conduct effective
international campaigns has significantly increased under the leadership of
Elaine and Kelly, who have made progress with the problems of joint
campaign funding and extra territorial activities. Examples of campaign
achievements include the GMO campaign, which, despite having the
smallest campaign budget, has had the largest public impact. It was a wellrun campaign, using a global campaign team approach, and helped force
large agro-chemical companies in Europe to rethink their strategies.” (SGC
1999 AGM Minutes, p. 7)

The GMO campaign was one that was highly controversial within Greenpeace
for many years. If it was not for “One Greenpeace”, which favored greater flexibility in
the allocation of resources, the project might have never materialized. Through greater
flexibility in the way tasks were handled internally, resources shifted from one
opportunity to another and opportunities nested into meta-issues were scaled up across
the organization once they proved to be successful, Greenpeace was able to seize new
opportunities as they arose. Based on evidence that the organization had been able to
legitimize new opportunities in a specific location, it could then build on its experience
to replicate its actions to other locations. With that regard, the list of successes obtained
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throughout 1999 provide evidence of the changes that had taken place in the recent
years and that contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability to engage with the future:
“The toxic campaign was particularly successful in Japan in 1999. This
was the result of a concerted effort on behalf of Greenpeace offices
worldwide. The Campaign was also successful in Europe with the
emergency ban on PVC toys in the EU.
The Tokairnora nuclear accident in Japan contributed to raising the issue
of the safety of nuclear power. The Japanese office is to be congratulated
for its excellent work on nuclear issues in recent months and its quick
reaction following the incident.
The GMO campaign made great strides last year. It has been extremely
successful, both in Western Europe and in certain sectors of US society.
One of the measures of this was the drop in the price of Monsanto shares.
However, industry is still committed to further development in this area.
The challenge for Greenpeace is to offer an alternative, organic vision for
the future while not underrating the problems caused by hunger in the
developing world.” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 14-15)

Nevertheless, it was believed that the ability to shape the landscape could still be
improved, as it was perceived that Greenpeace was not having the impact it should:
“One of the areas in which Greenpeace needs considerable improvement is
in media and communication. I feel the outside world exaggerates our
ability to communicate, because it underestimates the reality that the
actions of Greenpeace, (at least the really successful actions which inspire
people,) embody the message itself. Nowadays, we have much more to say.
It is surprising that less than five percent of the German population is
aware that Greenfreeze was developed and pushed onto the market by
Greenpeace. Recognition of Greenpeace's name in the US is widespread,
but knowledge of anything we've done beyond saving whales and seals in
the 70s and 80s is shockingly low. We rely too much on hard news, are not
sufficiently using the potential of new media and images. It is also a
significant shortcoming that Greenpeace does not yet have an international
and organisation-wide media monitoring and analysis system. If one of the
most important campaign goals is to create a public debate, it is hard to
believe that we do not have a good international system of monitoring the
impact of our campaigns in the media and in the wider public.” (Board
Report to Council, AGM 2000, p. 15)

Overall, Greenpeace's shaping ability was ramping up during this period: the
organization had been able to influence important actors in the landscape, to adopt
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practices more in line with the vision of Greenpeace with regards to the future; it had
obtained some successes in influencing the adoption of agreements at international
institutions; it had also been able to increase its profile in the media. These successes
were in large part attributable to the changes initiated in the previous period following
the publication of the Strategic Plan, and the new mindset adopted following the arrival
of Thilo Bolde.
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Table 7: Rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability across periods
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Rationality

Rationality

Rationality

Rationality

The senior leadership builds on
The senior leadership reflects on what Learning from an important victory, the
Greenpeace's notoriety to engage into Greenpeace is about and what made
senior leadership recognizes that they
distant foresight on the most salient
Greenpeace successful in the past. After can identify potential opportunities for
issues threatening the planet. Through discussions, the list of priorities
small wins, but that they can’t identify
this exercise, a list of issues to be
established in the previous period is
which ones will succeed and through
addressed by the organization is
carried over. There is recognition,
which course of actions. They modify
established based on the importance of however, that tackling these issues
their approach by providing guidelines
the issue and the impact the
cannot be achieved through detailed
to NROs, and grant them the mandate
organization can have. Most of these
planning, but requires seizing
to identify opportunities and develop
issues are more complex than the ones opportunities that emerge as a result of solutions falling under these guidelines.
that had been undertaken by the
unforeseen events.
organization until then.
Plasticity
Plasticity
Plasticity
Plasticity
The ability of Greenpeace to act on the The ability of Greenpeace to act on the The ability of Greenpeace to act on
The ability of Greenpeace to act on
identified opportunities required greater identified opportunities was believed to opportunities was believed to be
opportunities was believed to be
be dependent on a greater centralization associated with ‘One Greenpeace’, a
coordination between the different
associated with greater integration and
of activities, with GPI acting as the
NROs under the leadership of GPI,
single organization working towards
flexibility. The role of GPI was to
responsible for unifying the different ‘conductor’, and exercising greater
the same goals. It was also believed that develop a common ground for NROs to
control over the different activities of greater flexibility was required to seize operate, and to give them general
groups, set the plan, and execute the
pre-defined strategy on the issue with the organization. This mode of
opportunities arising from unforeseen guidelines to develop projects that
events. Instability, however, made it
would allow the organization to move
the collaboration of NROs. Because the operations was successful for some
opportunities, but proved to be less
towards its overarching goals.
opportunity was unequivocal, the
difficult to pursue opportunities.
effective for more complex issues
landscape well defined, and the
whereas more flexibility was deemed
organization still at a nascent stage,
simple communication processes were important.
sufficient to engage with the
opportunity.
Shaping Ability
Shaping Ability
Shaping Ability
Shaping Ability
The organization proved to be able to The organization enhanced its ability to The shaping ability of the organization The shaping ability of the organization
shape the landscape for issues
shape the landscape for an issue
is ramping up, as it has been able to
is showing signs of decline as it
contained within a well-defined
contained within a well-defined
influence important actors in the
struggles to impact the landscape for
opportunity space, but encountered
opportunity space with identifiable
what is seen as the role of Greenpeace landscape to adopt practices more in
difficulties for more complex issues.
actors, which contributed to the
line with the vision of Greenpeace with
for the future.
reputation of the organization.
regards to the future.
The senior leadership decides to focus
on a limited number of issues. These
issues are relatively simple and
unambiguous. They are international in
scope and fall, for the most part, under
the regulation of international
institutions. Issue areas are used to
facilitate discussions, and the issues
that reach a consensus are the ones
being prioritized.
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5.5 Rationality, plasticity and shaping ability across periods
The comparison of rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability across the different periods of
Greenpeace is summarized in Table 5. The comparison of these different periods with regards
to the aforementioned abilities highlights the importance of three properties: flexibility,
diversity, and stability. The importance of these three properties was highlighted through the
period of crisis (Period 3), when Greenpeace experienced a decline in income and a
stagnation of its influence. This led to reflexivity on what the organization was about, what
made the organization successful in the past, what explained its difficulties, and how it should
do things in the future to become more effective at shaping the future. The subsequent
successes obtained during the “One Greenpeace” period (Period 4), following the
institutionalization of structures, processes, and practices that permitted to enable greater
flexibility and stability, and to benefit from Greenpeace diversity, provided additional support
for the importance of these properties in engaging with the future.
Flexibility was explicitly mentioned by organizational members at different times
throughout Greenpeace history, and became an explicit aspiration for the organization during
Period 3. The absence of flexibility with regards to the planning process, the processing of
information, and the allocation of resources were identified as reasons for the difficulties
encountered by the organization in identifying, pursuing, and seizing opportunities. Before
the crisis, some organizational members attempted to warn the senior leadership for the need
to develop greater flexibility. The discussions that aimed to identify the challenges faced by
Greenpeace during the period of crisis reiterated this point. The subsequent period, when a
variety of measures had been implemented to become more flexible, provides support for the
importance of flexibility and how it could be achieved.
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Stability was explicitly mentioned by organizational members as a reason for the
difficulties in moving forward with the Strategic Plan during Period 3; it could also be
observed through the changes in structures, processes, and priorities that occurred during that
same period. Instability undermined Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape, especially
when the organization attempted to focus on more complex problems. Complex problems
required deeper knowledge about issues and greater persistence when it came to communicate
them to external audiences: instability in focus created confusion; instability in structures and
processes created distractions. These undermined the ability of Greenpeace to identify and
pursue opportunities. The arrival of Thilo Bolde contributed to implement greater stability
throughout Period 4. Greater stability allowed the organization to keep its focus on a limited
set of issues and to dedicate its attention to the pursuit of opportunities instead of on
organizational issues related to the structuration of the work conducted by organizational
members. It also contributed to improve structures and processes through incremental
changes as opposed to radical change that momentarily worsen the ability of the organization
to engage with the future.
Diversity could also be observed though the data, being identified by organizational
members as both a strength and a weakness. Diversity could first be observed in the portfolio
of action alternatives that was expanded during Period 1, and re-emphasized during Period 2,
3, and 4, as it had become part of the philosophy of the organization to persuade external
audiences to adopt more sustainable behaviors. Diversity was also institutional and structural,
especially following the events surrounding the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior: Greenpeace
became more culturally and professionally diverse and the senior leadership aimed for greater
diversity; they also aimed to build on the different organizational affiliations (e.g. science unit,
media and communications, by region and country) to maximize the organization’s impact.
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Contrary to properties of flexibility and stability, however, diversity represented a challenge
on its own that had to be thought of by organizational members, especially during Period 3.
Diversity can create barriers among individuals which, if not addressed, can undermine the
ability of the organization to pursue a coherent strategy. The period of crisis highlighted this
point and forced organizational members to find ways to benefit from their diversity.
Overall, flexibility, stability, and diversity contributed to enhance the ability of
Greenpeace to engage with the future. Flexibility allowed the organization to identify, pursue,
and seize opportunities arising from unforeseen events, and to test and experiment different
ways to engage with external audiences. Stability allowed organizational members to focus
on issues, as opposed to discussions over structure and processes. Diversity contributed to
approach problems in different ways and to develop creative ways to engage with external
audiences. These properties allowed the organization to enhance its ability to shape the
landscape by facilitating the identification of opportunities that could contribute to enact its
vision for the future, by facilitating the allocation of resources to work on projects that had
the potential to make the pursuit of these opportunities successful, and by enhancing the
ability of the organization to create the residuum of changes necessary to shape the landscape.
In the next section, I elaborate further on the specific dimensions of these properties that
contributed to Greenpeace's successes, why and how they mattered, as well as what
Greenpeace did to enable them in practice.
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Chapter 6
6. Flexibility, stability, and diversity, and their Impact on
engaging with the future
Flexibility, stability, and diversity contributed to making Greenpeace more effective at
engaging with the future. Over the years, they became institutionalized within the
organization structures, processes, and practices. They were also interconnected with one
another. In this section, I provide a description of what these properties are, an explanation as
to why they matter and how they can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the
future, and how they were enabled within the Greenpeace context. I conclude with a brief
discussion on the interrelatedness of these properties.

6.1 Flexibility
The first dimension highlighted by the case of Greenpeace is the importance of flexibility.
While flexibility is not a guarantee of success, the absence of flexibility can undermine an
organization’s ability to think creatively about problems and their ability to pursue and seize
opportunities that are time sensitive. Aligned with this observation, I move forward the
following baseline proposition:
Proposition 1: Flexibility enhances the ability of an organization to identify,
pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

There are three forms of flexibility that can contribute to enhance an organization’s ability to
engage with the future: cognitive flexibility, operational flexibility, and financial flexibility.
The three forms are interrelated, but not mutually exclusive. Below, I detail why these
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dimensions of flexibility matter, how they manifested in the case of Greenpeace, and what
the organization did to enable these properties in practice.
6.1.1 Cognitive flexibility
Cognitive flexibility corresponds to the ability to look at problems from different angles and
to process information without the constraint of rigid frames of reference. It is enabled
primarily within the governance and operational channels of the organization.
The frames of reference I refer to correspond to those used by organizational
members to process information and allocate resources. They take the form of issue areas.
Cognitive frames contributed to guide actions and focused organizational members’ attention
on a specific set of issues. Cognitive frames were adopted in the early years of the
organization to facilitate decision-making across NROs. These cognitive frames were
developed initially around two criterions: the scope of an issue (international or not) and the
type of issue (oceans, nuclear, wildlife, etc.). This categorization was deemed necessary to
facilitate the discussions held within the governance channels of the organization to help
decision-makers reach an agreement over what mattered for the organization and where
resources should be allocated. As illustrated in the previous chapter with regards to periods 1
and 2, these frames contributed to the effective functioning of the organization by providing a
map of the landscape that could be used by organizational members, and by creating
boundaries in terms of what to look for in the environment. Opportunities falling outside
those frames were more difficult to process.
Cognitive frames can be flexible to allow organizational members to look at the
problems from different angles, to find ways to effectively communicate the message with
external audiences. First evidence of this form of flexibility can be found when the
organization started to operate by using both specific problems and ecosystems to describe
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issues within issue areas (see Year 1984 in Figure 7). This move between specific problems
and ecosystems proved particularly useful for issues that were more equivocal and/or less
visible, such as the release of pollutants in the environment by industries and the causes
leading to climate change and depletion of the ozone layer. The issues themselves were not
necessarily visible, but because the ecosystem was, it made it possible for organizational
members to persuade external actors of the importance of an issue. It thus expanded the
portfolio of alternatives available to organizational members. It also allowed organizational
members to test different ways of influencing external actors and to adjust how the landscape
was conceptualized to make it fit with specific objectives. For instance, the protection of an
ecosystem could pass by the protection of a specie (e.g. sea turtles or seals), and the depletion
of the atmosphere could pass by the protection of a rare ecosystem (e.g. Antarctica). This
first form of flexibility in the way to frame problems is related to the ability to identify
opportunities and to pursue them successfully.
Cognitive frames, once institutionalized, can negatively affect the ability of an
organization to pursue new opportunities. At the turn of the 90s, issue areas provided
Greenpeace members a detailed list of specific problems the organization was focusing on.
Within these issue areas, there was some flexibility in terms of the conceptualization of
problems. There was no flexibility, however, in terms of the need for an issue to fall within
an issue area if the opportunity was to be pursued by the organization. This prevented
organizational members from engaging with more ambiguous opportunities or opportunities
that did not fit squarely into the issue areas used to identify opportunities and coordinate
projects associated with these opportunities. This lack of cognitive flexibility translated into
missed opportunities due to the incapacity of organizational members to make these
opportunities fit into the agreed templates, and through the inability of the organization to
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process information related to these opportunities. To overcome this limitation, Greenpeace
had to enhance its cognitive flexibility.
Cognitive flexibility is thus expected to enhance an organization’s ability to engage
with the future through its effect on the ability of an organization to identify and pursue
opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape. Building on the Greenpeace case,
I thus propose the following:
Proposition 1a: Cognitive flexibility will enhance an organization’s ability to
identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

Cognitive flexibility was developed through greater integration across functions and
issue areas with the adoption of simple rules that could be used to guide actions. By favoring
simple rules rather than focusing on specific problems addressed through issue areas, the
organization was able to enhance its effectiveness. Through the use of simple guidelines
about what the organization is about instead of developing detailed plans to be rolled out
across the organization, it provided NROs with sufficient flexibility to identify opportunities
nested into these guidelines and seize windows of opportunities; it also facilitated
coordination between NROs, favoring discussions about opportunities to communicate issues
to the public and to create residuum of changes in the environment instead of discussions
about structures and processes.
6.1.2 Operational flexibility
Operational flexibility corresponds to the ability of an organization to shift resources around,
to refocus the attention of the organization on the most salient opportunities at a specific
point in time. This flexibility can be geared towards projects that are gaining momentum,
towards windows of opportunity that arose from unforeseen events, or to opportunities that
require further organizational commitment in the short term.
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In the context of Greenpeace, operational flexibility was important to move fast and
to be able to pursue opportunities that were time sensitive. It became particularly important
when the organization shifted from a focus on simple, easy-to-grasp problems to more
complex and ambiguous issues. These more complex opportunities were crossing several
issue areas and, sometimes, the opportunities associated with these meta-issues were not even
associated with existing areas of expertise. When competing internally with more traditional
issues for resources, or issues that could more easily be captured (either because they could
be explained through simple images or because there was no causal ambiguity), complex
issues were at a disadvantage because organizational members could not necessarily make
sense of how to frame them or how to position these issues, to seize opportunities that would
bring the organization closer to its objectives with regards to these meta-issues. The lack of
operational flexibility made it close to impossible to shift resources towards these issues to
explore new action alternatives that could permit the enactment of Greenpeace’s vision.
Operational flexibility contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability to engage with the
future by letting NROs decide as to how to allocate their time and efforts within the agreed
templates. This facilitated the development of solutions to problems that were the core of the
organization’s mission and to shift resources around for opportunities that were time
sensitive. Building on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:
Proposition 1b: Operational flexibility will enhance an organization’s ability
to pursue and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

Operational flexibility was enabled by keeping planning to a minimum. While the
initial planning process included defined objectives, scripted strategies, and short, medium
and long-term course of actions, the new planning process was based on a mix of detailed
plans and general guidelines as to how time and resources should be allocated. These
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measures were combined with the development of rapid response teams to deal with
unpredictable events that opened windows of opportunity.
Greater integration across functions and NROs allowed the organization to benefit
from greater operational flexibility. Integration favored information sharing, making it easier
to engage the resources of the organization when the right opportunity came up. Integration
also had a complementary effect: it reduced politics in favor of the development of a more
united voice, and added to the cognitive flexibility of the organization by forcing
organizational members to think outside of their focal point of reference within the
organization (i.e. their functional division, NRO, or issue area). Integration of activities was
obtained through group meetings, direct contact between organizational members of different
functions and units, and the creation of area advisors acting as boundary spanners.
In addition to changes in the planning process and greater integration, the adoption of
an internationalist approach to problems contributed to foster the benefits of operational
flexibility. By ignoring borders between countries, organizational members could more easily
identify with the global goals of the organization and seek opportunities in their home
country that were aligned with the main objectives of the organization.
6.1.3 Financial flexibility
Financial flexibility corresponds to the ability to allocate financial resources to a project on
short notice. It implies maintaining resources for projects that have a high probability of
success when they come along. For example, funding several projects at an early stage, and
increasing or limiting the allocation of further resources to these projects at later stages of the
innovation process, can affect innovation performance by spreading an organization’s bets on
unproven innovative endeavors. This way of approaching financial resource allocation is
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based on the recognition that it is not possible to predict which projects will prove to be
successful when it comes to pursuing opportunities.
Financial flexibility is important because it gives one organization the means to seize
opportunities whenever they emerge, and goes hand-in-hand with operational flexibility.
Having the flexibility to free funds on a quick notice can help seize opportunities that require
fast decision-making and to fund projects that are gaining momentum. Financial flexibility
became an issue for Greenpeace early on as close to all of its resources were allocated to
specific projects. In the first two periods, Greenpeace had a tendency to allocate close to all
of its financial resources to specific projects through the budgeting process, a process that
was utterly hierarchical and controlled by the upper echelons of the organization. Later on,
however, financial flexibility became part of the strategy of the organization, especially when
small wins were necessary to persuade external actors on issues of interest for the
organization.
Building on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:
Proposition 1c: Financial flexibility will enhance an organization’s ability to
pursue and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

In the case of Greenpeace, financial flexibility was enabled through the allocation of a
significant portion of their budget to contingencies and flexible funds. These funds were used
to finance operations associated with unexpected events occurring in the environment and to
provide funding for the diffusion of projects that proved more successful than expected.
Contingencies were not subject to discussions held within the governance channels: these
were funds available on short notice and managed within the operational channels of the
organization.
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6.2 Stability
The second dimension highlighted by the Greenpeace data is the importance of stability.
Stability, in the case under investigation, should be thought in terms of relative stability as
opposed to rigidity, as the organization was always on the move and could not be considered
static at any point in time. Stability can contribute to enhance an organization’s ability to
capture signals in its environment, to develop a set of processes that allow organizational
members to focus on the organization’s goals and objectives, and to understand their role
with regards to these objectives. While stability is not a guarantee of success, instability can
undermine an organization’s ability to engage with the future by altering its capacity to
identify and seize opportunities aligned with its objectives. In line with this observation, I
move forward the following baseline proposition:
Proposition 2: Stability will enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the
future.

Building on the narrative from Chapter 6, I focus on three forms of stability:
attentional stability, structural stability, and stability in processes. When Greenpeace
presented these three forms of stability, it was easier for the organization to focus on the
identification of opportunities and on the development of creative ways to communicate its
vision for the future. I discuss below these three forms of stability in relation with flexibility.
6.2.1 Attentional stability
Attentional stability corresponds to how sustained is the focus of the organization on a set of
key issues and can enhance an organization’s ability to capture cues signaling problems,
threats, and opportunities in its environment. In the case of Greenpeace, the focus of the
organization was conveyed through priorities and issue areas. Evidence for the importance of
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attentional stability in engaging with the future can be observed across the different periods
of Greenpeace history.
Attentional stability favors the identification of opportunities. This is particularly true
when the issues of concern are difficult to communicate to external audiences. Through
attentional stability, it is possible to keep focusing on a given problem, to “see” different
ways to frame an issue. Attentional stability also contributes to foster organizational
engagement through a clear direction for the organization by signaling what is important to
organizational employees and stakeholders. This can increase the odds of attracting
information concerning potential opportunities that might have been otherwise missed. In the
case of Greenpeace, attentional stability was not always necessary or obvious, but it proved
to be more important once the organization started to tackle increasingly complex issues.
When the organization was focusing on relatively simple issues, this was not problematic:
opportunities could still be identified without stability as individuals could grasp the issues
quickly and identify opportunities in a straightforward manner. Complex issues, such as
genetic engineering for instance, on the other hand, had to wait close to a decade before
tangible opportunities leading to success could be identified. Without sustained attention to
the issue and the landscape, however, a solution to the problem might not have been found
out as opportunities might not have been identified, or organizational members would have
been unable to capture cues that could be exploited by the organization.
In addition to its effect on the ability to identify opportunities, attentional stability is
important for the pursuit of opportunities. Engaging with the future is expected to occur over
long periods of time and is also expected to elicit resistance. With that regard, Greenpeace
has always been controversial, experiencing several drawbacks before tangible successes
could be obtained. In the absence of a clear focus that is sustained over time, an organization
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is at risk of losing direction by reducing organizational members’ engagement towards the
direction the organization is aiming for. In some instances, the benefits of attentional stability
could only be observed years later. Complex issues, such as genetic engineering, for instance,
had to wait close to a decade before tangible opportunities leading to success could be
identified. Yet, these successes opened up new possibilities as they contributed to make sense
of how to enact a particular vision of the future. Without sustained attention to the issue and
the landscape, however, a solution to the problem might not have been found out as
opportunities might not have been identified or organizational members might not have been
able to capture cues to be exploited.
Attentional stability is thus expected to enhance an organization’s ability to engage
with the future through its effect on the ability of an organization to identify and pursue
opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape. Building on the case of
Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:
Proposition 2a: Attentional stability will enhance an organization’s ability to
identify opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

In the case of Greenpeace, attentional stability was enabled through the designation of
a set of key issues as central concerns for the organization. By 1988, the senior leadership
had already identified a number of key issues they wanted the organization to focus on in the
long term. As the data shows, the organization reduced the number of key issues it was
tracking in the subsequent years when resources became more scarce, but maintained its
focus across the subsequent periods. By sustaining its focus on a limited set of key issues, it
allowed the organization to capture cues signaling potential opportunities and to identify
ways to simplify problems.
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Attentional stability was also enabled in combination with cognitive flexibility by
using different labels for the key concerns of the organization, discriminating between
“priority” (i.e. issue/campaign prioritized at a given point in time) and “ongoing” (i.e. issues
that are long-term priorities for the organization) issues/campaigns. By labeling issues and
campaigns as “ongoing”, the senior leadership was able to keep the issues alive within the
organization, maintaining them in sight without necessarily putting them at the center of the
organization’s activities all of the time.38 This granted the organization greater flexibility: it
allowed for faster decision-making to avoid discussions about whether or not a given issue
should lead to action by the organization; it also provided NROs some guidance for issues
that are deemed important by the organization but for which there is no immediate solutions
or actions that have the potential to influence external actors. To ensure the key issues of
concern for the organization were well entrenched into organizational members’ and
volunteers’ minds, they made them part of the identity of the organization (i.e. “What we
are”), through the adoption of a clear definition for the organization’s mission. They also
ensured that this mission statement was included in all of Greenpeace's communications.
6.2.2 Structural stability
Structural stability corresponds to the extent to which the formal and informal governance
and operational channels are sustained over time.39 With regards to the ability of an
organization to engage with the future, instability can undermine the ability of the
organization to identify and seize opportunities. In the case of Greenpeace, instability

38

This later move allowed the organization to combine attentional stability with cognitive flexibility, to favor
the identification of opportunities and the development of solutions aligned with the long-term objectives of the
organization.
39
This does not negate the need, in some circumstances, to undertake major restructuration. This is to
emphasize the benefits of stability for the identification and the pursuit of opportunities aligned with the vision
of the organization.
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manifested through the major restructuration efforts that took place to shape current
governance and operational structures of Greenpeace.
Structural stability is important because instability in structures can create distractions,
which in turn can affect attentional stability. Greenpeace experienced such distraction when
important structural changes occurred. These reorganizations ‘distracted’ the organization
from its primary mission, as internal documents demonstrate. As more stable structures
became implemented, organizational members could once again focus on the identification
and pursuit of these opportunities. Organizational members could then build on these stable
structures to improve the functioning of the organization and focus on efficiencies and
effectiveness using the stable elements as an anchoring point for organizational members to
diffuse information and discuss organizational and environmental issues.
In addition to the distractions associated with reorganizations, instability in structures
proved to greatly inhibit Greenpeace's ability to identify and pursue opportunities. It created
“holes” within the organization in terms of roles and responsibilities. These “holes” created
confusion internally and externally. Internally, organizational members did not know to
whom they should pass important information with regards to a specific portfolio. Externally,
stakeholders were confused as to who they should communicate information to that could
lead to the identification of new opportunities to pursue. Building on the case of Greenpeace,
I thus propose the following:
Proposition 2b: Structural stability will enhance an organization’s ability to
identify and pursue opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

In the context of Greenpeace, structural stability was enabled through reflexivity
about Greenpeace's identity, to understand what are the enduring principles behind
Greenpeace's actions. It is thus the period of structural instability that led to greater structural
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stability. Structural stability included the establishment of formal committees to favor greater
collaboration across levels, to clarify the lines of authority, and to facilitate the work
between the NROs. This included the adoption of clear formal and informal principles of
action and the development of a culture of collaboration with internationalism as one of the
core values of the organization. Following the major restructuration, however, it is the
conduct of ongoing discussions about structures that contributed to foster stability. These
ongoing discussions were part of a ‘continuous improvement’ philosophy to make the
structures more stable, to avoid the need of major changes.
6.2.3 Stability in processes
Stability in processes corresponds to the extent to which processes are sustained over time
and can be thought of in terms of two dimensions: whether or not processes are maintained
over time and whether or not the processes are finite in time (e.g. process begins with a
starting point and an outcome), or continuous (e.g. the process is an ongoing process and the
outcome cannot be said to be finite). In the case of Greenpeace, the key processes of concern
were those related to the strategy of the organization, the identification and selection of
opportunities, and the ones that allow an organization to act on opportunities.
Stability in processes can enhance the ability of an organization to identify and seize
opportunities aligned with its vision for the future. This dimension of stability is important
because instability in processes can prevent organizational members from discussing
priorities, as discussions over processes can supersede discussions over opportunities and
means to seize these opportunities. Instability in processes can also create confusion among
organizational members. This can impact the efficiency of the organization in processing
information and making fast decisions, altering its capacity to capture cues in its environment,
and to act based on these cues. In the case of Greenpeace, instability in processes occurred at
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two different instances, but it manifested in different ways. Instability in the early years when
processes were yet to be implemented was one instance. This first phase of instability,
discussed at length in the previous chapter, was caused by the absence of established
processes to identify and discuss opportunities. Instability also occurred during the period of
transition. In this second instance, it was caused by a desire to seek greater effectiveness in
the way Greenpeace was identifying and pursuing opportunities.
Stability in processes affects the ability of an organization to engage with the future.
It contributes to maintaining organizational members engagement with a focus on
effectiveness and efficiency. It also fosters stability in structure by favoring incremental
changes as opposed to major restructuration. Finally, it fosters attentional stability by
reducing the distractions generated by organizational restructuration. All in all, stability in
processes contributes to enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the future by letting
organizational members focus on the identification and the pursuit of opportunities. Building
on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:
Proposition 2c: Stability in processes will enhance an organization’s ability to
identify and pursue opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

In the case of Greenpeace, making the processes of the organization an ongoing
commitment enabled stability in processes. This can be illustrated through three strategic
planning exercises. The first one was conducted by the senior leadership to give direction to
the organization. The publication of the Long-Term Plan meant the end of the strategic
planning exercise. The second exercise involved the whole organization and, once again, the
publication of the report, the Strategic Plan, meant the end of the process. The third exercise,
however, was a continuous process, where vision and implementation were part of this
exercise, effectively making the process an ongoing commitment. By making strategy an
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ongoing process as opposed as to a periodic event, Greenpeace leadership had been able to
make effectiveness and efficiencies an entire part of the process. The same approach was
adopted for the identification of priorities, shifting from a finite process and ending with the
allocation of funds to specific opportunities, to the categorization of opportunities between
ongoing, opportunistic and priority campaigns. In this case, the establishment of procedures
for flexible funds contributed to make the decision-making process an ongoing process as
opposed to a process limited to certain windows within the year, and the ongoing campaigns
were continuous as opposed to periodic, allowing organizational members to keep their
engagement with the issues.

6.3 Diversity
Diversity corresponds to the extent to which a particular dimension of the organization can
be described as heterogeneous or homogeneous. Diversity can enhance an organization’s
ability to engage with the future by allowing one organization to approach problems from
different angles, to gather more information that can be used to understand problems and
make sense of issues, and to enhance its capacity to communicate with external audiences. In
the case of Greenpeace, creativity appeared to become more important as the organization
started to deal with issues that were more complex and difficult to communicate to external
audiences. By leveraging diversity, Greenpeace's organizational members were able to work
on more projects simultaneously and increase their likelihood of developing innovative
solutions to the problems they were encountering. Aligned with these observations, I build on
the following proposition as a basis for this section:
Proposition 3: Diversity will enhance an organization’s ability to engage with
the future.

Diversity can be looked at from a variety of angles. I focus on three different
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dimensions of diversity highlighted by the Greenpeace case: institutional diversity (which
encompasses a range of dimensions, including cultural, political and economic diversity),
structural diversity (which refers to the diversity within Greenpeace's internal structures), and
diversity in the portfolio of action alternatives (which Greenpeace organizational members
refer to as campaign diversity). I also provide details as to what Greenpeace organizational
members did to mitigate the risk of seeing diversity undermine their efforts at shaping the
landscape.
6.3.1 Institutional diversity
Institutional diversity corresponds to diversity in value systems. Sources of institutional
diversity include organizational cultures, national cultures, and professional background. In
the case under investigation, the sources of institutional diversity were coming primarily
from the national cultures from the countries in which Greenpeace was operating, and from
the professional background of Greenpeace members.
Institutional diversity can enhance the possibilities of the organization in terms of
identification of opportunities. The differences in value systems allow for looking at
problems from different angles based on an individual’s cultural and professional background.
Within Greenpeace, institutional diversity led to the adoption of the precautionary principle,
favored by European countries, as an explicit value of the organization. This changed the
approach of the organization in terms of how to look at issues. It also increased the number
of potential opportunities by virtue of what was valued by individuals in different countries.
The expansion in different countries could inform about issues in these countries, some of
them being salient issues that found their ramifications in other countries. This provided
opportunities to connect issues that at first seemed unrelated, but were nevertheless
interconnected. For instance, the description of the Amazon found its roots in the demand for
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wood products by northern countries. The institutional diversity of Greenpeace permitted to
make this link, leading to the identification of an important opportunity for the organization.
Institutional diversity can also enhance the organization’s ability to seize
opportunities by providing additional ways to communicate with external audiences. This
occurs in multiple ways, first because institutional diversity provides greater legitimacy when
it comes to engage with actors in the landscape. This is especially true when the message has
to cross boundaries because the problem to address is universal. Communicating with
someone who shares a similar background can contribute to make the communication more
effective, increasing the odds that the message will be well received. This is something that
has helped Greenpeace in numerous instances, starting with its first major victory, the
moratorium on commercial whaling. Second, institutional diversity can also enhance the
organization’s ability to seize opportunities by providing opportunities to test and experiment
actions in different locations and with different audiences. While successful actions can then
be diffused across the organization, unsuccessful actions can provide information as to how
to improve the organization’s actions with a given type of opportunity. Third, institutional
diversity can enhance the creativity of the organization, which can help innovate when it
comes to diffuse a message in different ways. Hence, institutional diversity increases the
potential to expand the pool of action alternatives available to organizational members.
Overall, institutional diversity can enhance the ability of an organization to engage
with the future through the identification of opportunities and the actions that can be taken to
communicate with external audiences. Building on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the
following:
Proposition 3a: Institutional diversity will enhance an organization’s ability to
identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.
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While institutional diversity can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the
future, it can also lead to conflicts and prevent organizational members from leveraging this
diversity to their benefit. These conflicts can be particularly detrimental when it comes to
pursue opportunities, as organizational members can diverge in their understanding of what
should be prioritized and how. Greenpeace being born as a global organization, institutional
diversity was a de facto characteristic of the organization. Yet, it is only after a few years that
the organization was able to cope with this diversity, to explicitly build on it to enhance its
ability to shape the landscape.
Institutional diversity was first managed by developing common goals, establishing
clear processes, and by providing definitions for what was to be discussed. Then, it was
enabled by seeking more diversity and developing a culture where organizational members
valued diversity. First, the senior leadership aimed for greater diversity by favoring the
organization’s expansion into regions of the world where they were not present (e.g. Latin
America, Asia, Africa). Second, they internalized this diversity by granting voting rights to
all NROs. This sent the signal that all countries mattered in deciding on the main orientations
of the organization. It also signaled that all countries could be a source of solution to the
problems the organization was trying to address. Third, organizational members adopted
“internationalism” as an explicit value of the organization. All in all, these measures
contributed to foster organizational members' engagement toward the organization’s goals
and to make explicit that diversity was important if the organization was to succeed in its
mission.
6.3.2 Structural diversity
Structural diversity corresponds to diversity in organizational affiliations. Organizational
affiliations can include national versus international affiliation, functional unit, or service line.
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A structurally diverse group is one where members differ in their organizational affiliations,
roles, and positions. In the case of Greenpeace, structural diversity was found in the
development of centers of excellence (R&D, science, politics, economy, media, direct actions,
etc.), in the different national and regional affiliations, and in the affiliation of certain
organizational members with specific issues (e.g. marine ecosystems, biodiversity, etc.).
Structural diversity can enhance the ability to identify potential opportunities. This
structural diversity allows the organization to draw from different knowledge sources. By
virtue of their organizational affiliation (service line, geography, etc.), individuals can make
bridges with external actors to obtain new information that can potentially lead to new
opportunities. Within Greenpeace, the development of centers of excellence contributed to
develop specialized knowledge and to build bridges with other organizations. For instance, a
TV panel in the UK invited a representative of Greenpeace with expertise in agriculture and
affiliated with the science unit to speak. This member, because of his affiliation with the
scientific community, was presented with an opportunity to enter into a discussion on GMOs
before GMOs were even commercialized. This discussion later led to an invitation to visit the
facilities of a major player in the field. This opportunity would not have presented itself if
Greenpeace did not have a separation between the developments of specific knowledge with
regards to issues through centers of excellence and the conduct of actions.
Differences in organizational affiliations can also increase the possibilities in terms of
identification of opportunities. A structurally diverse group allows for searches in multiple
landscapes. This allows for the identification of more potential opportunities and to favor the
selection of the ones that have the most potential in terms of shaping the landscape. In the
case of Greenpeace, it permitted the organization to build from both local searches, as well as
global searches, when it came to identify opportunities that had the potential to succeed at
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enacting a particular vision of the future. It also permitted to pursue several opportunities
simultaneously, to track them and build on the ones that proved to be more successful.
The benefits of structural diversity are not limited to the identification and the pursuit
of opportunities through multiple landscapes all at the same time. Structural diversity can
also enhance the ability of the organization to pursue opportunities through the identification
of best practices that improve the efficiency of the organization. If several units within the
same organization experiment in different ways to manage their operations, their practices
can be assessed and compared facilitating the identification and the diffusion of the ones that
are deemed superior. In the case of Greenpeace, the differences in the way NROs were
managed contributed to enrich the set of “best practices” by building on the varied
experiences of the NROs. It is because of the different organizational affiliations that these
practices developed. Without diversity in structures, different sets of practices would not
necessarily have developed, limiting the possibilities in terms of developing internally best
practices.
Finally, structural diversity can contribute to enhance and expand the portfolio of
action alternatives. Through a variety of affiliations within the same organization, it is
possible to make these affiliations in competition to innovate; it is also expected that different
units will approach problems in different ways. This later effect has been well
institutionalized within Greenpeace and has contributed to the successes experienced by the
organization over the years.
Overall, institutional diversity can enhance the ability of an organization to engage
with the future through the identification and the pursuit of opportunities and the
development of actions that have the potential to create residuum of changes. Building on the
case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:
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Proposition 3b: Structural diversity will enhance an organization’s ability to
identify, pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.

Similar to institutional diversity, structural diversity can only enhance an
organization’s ability to engage with the future if mechanisms are in place to benefit from it.
In the case of Greenpeace, the benefits of structural diversity were enabled through greater
integration. It is through the different joint committee meetings that structural diversity
enabled creativity and contributed to enhance the organization’s ability to engage with the
future. The joint committees provided open forums where all groups could expose their
opinions on issues and share their understanding of what was important for the future. This is
also where they could develop knowledge as to who they should pass information to if
knowledge was gained and they thought it could be beneficial to other units within
Greenpeace.
6.3.3 Diversity of action alternatives
Action alternatives include proposals, routines, programs, and procedures. Action alternatives
are used to seize opportunities that can serve the enactment of a vision for the future.
Diversity in action alternatives implies that the organization can build from a variety of
alternatives when it comes to undertake actions that have the potential to enact the
environment. In the case of Greenpeace, diversity in actions meant carrying a portfolio of
alternatives that included direct actions, protests, lobbying, as well as a focus on highlighting
the problems and providing solutions that addressed those problems. These actions targeted a
variety of actors in the environment.
Drawing from a diverse set of action alternatives can enhance the flexibility of the
organization when it comes to identify and seize opportunities. It provides different ways to
shape the landscape by focusing on different opportunity spaces and different constituents of
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the landscape. It also reduces the time to action when it comes to seize opportunities that are
time sensitive, such as the ones generated by unforeseen events or the ones dictated by
windows of opportunity. Building from the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:
Proposition 3c: Diversity in action alternatives will enhance an organization’s
ability to identify, pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the
future.

For Greenpeace, diversity in action alternatives became part of a core tenet of the
organization. This recognition came from reflexivity on what had made the organization
successful in the past. It was nurtured by making the means to end part of the mission
statement of the organization. It was favored through the allocation of a budget dedicated
specifically to innovation, to expand this portfolio of action alternatives. It was planned
within their campaigns by combining different action alternatives to their long-term strategies
to attempt to shape the landscape through different opportunity spaces.

6.4 Flexibility, stability and diversity in review
In this section, I presented flexibility, stability and diversity as three properties that can
enhance an organization's ability to engage with the future. Each of these properties and
associate dimensions play a role in the identification and the pursuit of opportunities, as well
as the conduct of actions that have the potential to enact the environment. Figure 9 provides
an illustration for the overall propositions that have been brought forward in this chapter.
It is important to emphasize that although the properties were presented separately,
they can be considered as complementary. Cognitive flexibility and attentional stability, for
instance, go hand-in-hand when it comes to focus on problems and to think creatively about
them. The same goes for flexibility and diversity, whereas diversity aims to enrich the
different ways the organization approaches problems and whereas flexibility allows for
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redirecting resources quickly on the solutions that will have proved to be more successful.
Hence, although each dimension has an effect in and of itself on either the ability of the
organization to identify, pursue, and/or seize opportunities aligned with its vision of the
future, it is through their joint effect that they are expected to have the most impact on the
ability of the organization to engage with the future.
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Figure 9: Flexibility, Stability, and Diversity in Review
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Chapter 7
7. Discussion and conclusions
My dissertation has aimed to shed light on how an organization can enhance its ability to
engage with the future. It built on the case of Greenpeace – an organization that explicitly
dedicates its actions to the enactment of a particular vision of the future – to develop insights
on the properties that can help an organization identify and seize opportunities aligned with
its vision for the future. This allowed me to reconstruct the intentions, structures, processes,
and practices of Greenpeace, to better understand what contributed to the organization’s
successes and how. What my research showed is that if an organization is to engage with the
future with the goal to enact a particular vision of the future, the organization will benefit
from flexibility, stability and diversity.
In this section, I first discuss flexibility, stability and diversity in relation with the
literature. I then discuss the implications of these findings for theory and practice, focusing
on the implications for organization theory, strategic management, and international
management. I conclude with a discussion on the limitations and boundary conditions, the
transferability of the insights, and the implications for future research directions.

7.1 Flexibility, stability, and diversity in organizations
The properties identified in this dissertation are not new. In fact, they relate to a variety of
literatures concerned with the effectiveness and the efficiency of organizations. Most
research looked at these properties in the perspective of organizations adapting to a changing
environment. I looked at these from the perspective of an organization that aims to shape the
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future by conducting actions that force individuals to change their behavior. Here, I discuss
my findings in relation with previous literature.
7.1.1 Cognitive, financial and operational flexibility
Flexibility is the first property that was discussed in this dissertation. It is also a property that
has been the object of many contributions in the management literature. It has previously
been identified as key to superior performance (e.g. Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Okhuysen &
Eisenhardt, 2002). It has also been identified as a specific feature of firms navigating towards
the future (e.g. Narayanan & Fahey, 2004). Because these organizations need to adjust to
feedback from their actions with regards to the way they are engaged with the future,
strategic, technical, and operational flexibility had previously been identified as central to
their ability to survive in a changing environment (Narayanan & Fahey, 2004). In the case
under investigation, three dimensions of flexibility were identified: cognitive flexibility,
financial flexibility, and operational flexibility.
The first dimension, cognitive flexibility, corresponds to the ability to look at
problems from different angles. It is closely linked with the notion of cognitive frames and
mental maps that help individuals make sense of a complex world (Walsh, 1995). At the
organizational level, cognitive frames are used to create and share understanding (Lyles &
Mitroff, 1980; Morgan, 1980). They articulate what is important and unimportant depending
on underlying values, shared interests, and common understandings (Kiesler & Sproull,
1982). They constitute the frameworks behind organizational belief systems and rationalities,
on which formal analyses, policies, and procedures are based. They are constructed over time
through the shared experiences of organizational members and have long been known to
influence actions and performance in organizations (Huff, 1990; Porac & Thomas, 2002).
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Cognitive flexibility, as discussed here, has been presented as central to Greenpeace's
ability to identify and seize opportunities. Cognitive flexibility was obtained by adopting
simple rules that could be followed by all organizational members in terms of which issues
were deemed important for the organization. This approach contributed to enhance
Greenpeace's shaping ability. These findings are in line with previous literature that found
simple rules do positively affect performance (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt et al.,
2010). This is explained by the fact that it can facilitate coordination and accelerate decisionmaking, allowing the organization to seize windows of opportunities (Bingham & Eisenhardt,
2011); it can also allow for greater structure in unpredictable environments (Davis,
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). In that, my study provides additional insights that are
grounded in an empirical case.
The two other dimensions of flexibility, financial flexibility and operational flexibility,
are closely tied with one another. Financial flexibility was related to the allocation of
resources. Financial resources are typically allocated through the resource allocation process.
Operational flexibility, on the other hand, was related to the possibility to deploy and move
resources around on a quick basis. Both relate to resource allocation processes, which have
long been known to impact organizations (Bower, 1970; Levinthal, 2005). They can explain
the development of strategy in organizations (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985;
Noda & Bower, 1996), and impact organizational performance depending on how this
process is managed (Burgelman, 1991; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014).
Over the years, Greenpeace came to adopt a real option-reasoning approach, keeping
both financial and operational resources on hold with their time, to ensure that when a timesensitive opportunity or a project gaining momentum would appear, the organization would
have the resources to quickly seize these opportunities. This is, in essence, an approach that
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has been proposed in previous literature (Allen & Pantzalis, 1996; Barnett, 2008; Maitland &
Sammartino, 2014). A key distinction, however, was in the aims pursued by the organization.
While flexibility has been identified as crucial for the identification and the pursuit of
opportunities aligned with one’s vision for the future, it also emphasized the important role of
integration in enabling flexibility. Integration was identified as important to ensure that
information and knowledge is shared among organizational members. This provides
additional support for the value of integration in fostering the quality of attention to
opportunities in the environment. Joseph and Ocasio (2012), for instance, emphasized the
importance of integration in the architecture of the firm to favor a greater capacity to adapt to
a changing environment. Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) emphasized the importance of
knowledge integration at the group level to enable flexibility and performance. The case in
point here is that integration was intended to make the organization faster at making
decisions with regards to opportunities arising from unpredictable events. These events
represented opportunities to enact a particular vision of the future, but were relatively short in
time. Similarly, projects that were gaining momentum faced a similar challenge: seizing the
opportunity now before the momentum vanishes. Integration contributed to put aside internal
politics for the sake of greater effectiveness through greater communications between the
different units.
7.1.2 Attentional stability, structural stability, and stability in processes
Stability is the second property that was identified as important when it comes to engaging
with the future. Stability was defined based on its opposite: instability. While instability is
inherent to the future (Prigogine, 1989), stability is said to be the matter of organizing (Weick,
1979). With regards to the phenomenon under investigation, stability can contribute to
enhance an organization’s ability to capture signals in its environment, to develop a set of
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processes that allow organizational members to focus on the organization’s goals and
objectives, and to understand their role with regards to these objectives. While stability is not
a guarantee of success, instability can create confusion, which can undermine an
organization’s ability to identify and seize opportunities.
The first dimension of stability, attentional stability, was associated with a sustained
focus on a set of key issues. It was presented as important to identify and pursue
opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape, especially when issues were
deemed complex. This finding was aligned with previous literature that identified attentional
stability as a feature that enhances the ability of an organization to capture weak cues (Rerup,
2009). While previous literature looked at it from the perspective of high-reliability
organizations, which look retrospectively to their environment focusing on cues that match
known patterns that are likely to emerge, I looked at it from the perspective of organizations
looking prospectively at their environment, attempting to find ways that will allow them to
enact their environment. This highlights additional benefits to the value of attentional
stability, which might be further explored in subsequent research. The means to achieve
attentional stability also appear to be similar: the institutionalization of priorities through the
structures and processes of the organization, and a culture and identity that entails these
priorities.
The second dimension of stability, stability in structures, implies that structures
endure over time through incremental changes as opposed to radical changes. Stability in
structures is important to maintain channels of communications, to facilitate decision-making
and the diffusion of information, and limit the distractions caused by major restructurations.
In the case discussed here, structures concerned mainly the governance and operational
channels of the organization. They were not presented as constraints in actions that can
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restrict flexibility (Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt et al., 2010). Instead, they were seen as way
to allow for improved communications, which could enable flexibility and attentional
stability in practice.
The third dimension of stability, stability in processes, was presented as the extent to
which processes are sustained over time. It includes maintaining processes continuous in time.
In the literature, stability in processes is often perceived as a way to make these processes
improve and evolve (e.g. Felin, Foss, Heimericks, & Madsen, 2012; Nelson & Winter, 1982).
Here, stability in processes stemmed from practical concerns over the distractions and the
confusion instability in processes can generate. This can distract the organization from its
focus on issues and diminish its ability to identify and pursue opportunities that aligned with
its vision for the future. In that regard, my study aligned with evidence (e.g. Rerup, 2009)
that organizational distractions caused by major changes in processes and structure can
escalate into a crisis if its restructuration efforts fill the attention of organizational members
at the expense of the primary mission of the organization.
Overall, it must be said that the type of stability discussed here is not incompatible
with change. In fact, if stability and change are often seen as a paradox, we are talking here
about a duality as opposed to dualism (Farjoun, 2010). As Farjoun (2010, p. 203) emphasizes,
stability and change are interdependent – both contradictory and complementary, and it
certainly relates with what could be observed in the case of Greenpeace. This implies that
stability in structure and processes should not be associated with the absence of change, as
change is conceived here as a normal condition of organizations (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).
Instead, it should be seen as a way to let organizational members focus on finding ways to
engage with external audiences to shape the landscape.
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7.1.3 Institutional diversity, structural diversity, and diversity in action alternatives
Diversity was presented as the extent to which a particular dimension of the organization can
be described as heterogeneous. Diversity is usually looked at from the perspective of
diversity in the workplace. In this dissertation, diversity was presented as a concept that
entailed three dimensions: institutional, structural, and in the action alternatives.
The first dimension of diversity, institutional diversity, was referred to as differences
in value-systems, which can find their source in organizational cultures, national cultures,
and professional background. In the literature, institutional diversity (or its various
declinations) are understood to be an important source of advantages: diversity can contribute
to enhance an organization’s creativity (Fiol, 1994); it can enhance sensemaking, as
institutions impact the interpretation individuals make of issues (Barr & Glynn, 2004;
Schneider & De Meyer, 1991); it can also impact scanning behaviors, providing an
organization with a broader focus when it comes to capture cues in the environment (Elenkov,
1997). Institutional diversity can also help an organization develop creative solutions to
problems (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013) and enhance its portfolio of action
alternatives by applying the value-system that best fits the specific task at hand (Pache &
Santos, 2013).
My research provides additional insights on many of these advantages. It emphasized
the important role diversity played when communicating with different audiences. It also
emphasized the role of diversity in identifying potential opportunities and in developing
creative solutions when it comes to finding ways to persuade external audiences to follow a
path that aligns with a particular vision of the future. With that regard, my research put
additional emphasis on the role played by institutional diversity when it comes to collective
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actions conducted by individuals; it thus reinforces previous findings from the literature, and
brought new insights as to how the advantages of diversity can be enabled in practice.
The second dimension of diversity, structural diversity, corresponds to diversity in
organizational affiliations. In the literature, structural diversity had been to positively impact
the ability of a group to identify and seize opportunities. For instance, Hung (2005) found
that a plurality of institutional embeddedness (which presumes diversity in internal
organizational affiliations) enhances the identification of opportunities in foreign countries.
Cummings (2004) found that a structurally diverse group can contribute to engage with
external actors. These findings align with the proposition of Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p.
1007) that “actors who are positioned at the intersection of multiple temporal-relational
contexts can develop greater capacities for creative and critical intervention.”
All in all, the propositions derived from my research are in line with these findings. In
addition, my study highlighted the role of integration in enabling the benefits of structural
diversity. Integration can facilitate communications between units, allowing for faster
decision-making and a greater understanding of what are the informational needs of different
actors within the organization. It can also, along with institutional diversity, lead to the
development of creative solutions to address issues. This later finding is in line with the
findings of Joseph and Ocasio (2012) discussed earlier with the difference that, in the case
discussed in this dissertation, the focus is in a perspective of shaping the landscape. The
effect, however, remains similar in that integration can favor the capture of cues in the
environment and the development of solutions to problems by virtue of improved
communications between individuals from different groups within the organization.
Finally, the third dimension of diversity, diversity of action alternatives, refers to the
different action alternatives used to enact the environment. In previous literature, Ocasio
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(1997) emphasized the importance of action alternatives in the process of allocating attention
to different issues in the environment. He proposed that attention is partly tied with the
repertoire of action alternatives available to decision-makers at a given point in time.
Looking at the perspective of organizations attempting to engage with the future, my findings
suggest that a diversity of action alternatives can enhance the possibilities of the organization
to address issues; it can also enhance the ability of the organization to shape the landscape by
allowing the organization to engage with individuals occupying varying positions in the
landscape. This can help the organization shape the landscape through different opportunity
spaces and through different audiences.
7.1.4 Remarks on the complementarity of flexibility and stability
A final remark is shared here on the complementarity of the different properties discussed in
this dissertation. Stability and flexibility, in particular, could be perceived as in opposition to
one another. Farjoun (2010), in particular, discussed this point at length, emphasizing that
stability and flexibility mirror one another. Building on previous work, he argues that
stability presupposes flexibility and change (Bateson, 1972), that implementing limits that
take the form of stable elements can be liberating (Dewey, 1922) and are central to
innovation (Dougherty & Takacs, 2004). This complementarity of stability and flexibility is
supported by the analysis of the Greenpeace case. While stability was deemed important,
organizational members also emphasized the importance of flexibility in order to experiment
actions that had the potential to enact the future, exploit the projects that proved to be
successful, and seize windows of opportunities. Hence, the organization needed both stability
and flexibility in order to reach its goals. My study thus provides evidence for the
complementarity of stability and flexibility, and how it can be enabled in practice.
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7.2 Implications for theory and practice
Because of the nature of the phenomenon I investigated in this dissertation (i.e. engaging
with the future) and because of the type of organization (i.e. Greenpeace as a multinational
organization) that was the focus of my investigations, my research has implications for three
theoretical streams: (1) organization theory; (2) strategic management; and (3) international
management.
7.2.1 Implications for organization theory
My research contributes to organization theory by focusing on an organization whose actions
are dedicated to shape the future. It built on notions of foresight and enactment to
conceptualize the process of engaging with the future. The conceptualization of this process
served as an anchor for the analysis of the data, but the insights generated by my study carry
a number of implications for organization theory.
My research answers a call made by a number of researchers to focus on how
organizations deal with the future (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Lord et al., 2014). The future,
from a temporal perspective, corresponds to what has not happened yet. It is in the realm of
imagination, meaning that there is not one future but many possible futures (March, 1995).
The future contains issues to be and issues in the making: problems that will have to be
solved, threats to be avoided or mitigated, and opportunities to be seized. Some of the issues
that are to be encountered in the future can be predicted, but many of them are unknown and
are to remain unforeseen until they occur (Lord et al., 2014).
Previous research concerned with understanding how organizations deal with the
future has been concerned with questions such as how organizations develop foresight on the
future (e.g. Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Sarpong & Maclean, 2014), how individuals within
organizations make sense of the future (e.g. Kaplan, 2008b; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012), or on
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how organizations mitigate the uncertainties associated with the future (Eisenhardt et al.,
2010; Greve, 2013; Kiss & Barr, 2014). Some of this research is looked at it from the
perspective of developing a “fit” with its environment (Gavetti, 2012; Levinthal, 1997;
Siggelkow, 2001, 2002), or in terms of the ability to adapt to a changing environment (Gaba
& Joseph, 2013; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011).
In contrast, my research focused on an organization attempting to shape the future.
Organizations that engage with the future live with the understanding that the future can be
altered based on a specific set of desires (van der Heijden, 2004). Organizations that engage
with the future with the intent to change it are the ones that create the rules for others, making
them at the forefront of the changes within their environment. Adapting to a changing
environment is certainly important, but it reflects a conceptualization of the future as an
unalterable path (van der Heijden, 2004). The future can be changed, and projections of the
future can inform actions (Lord et al., 2014). By focusing on an organization that engages
with the future, I focus on one type of organization that received scant attention in the
literature, but nevertheless occupies an important role in enabling institutional change.
By focusing on an organization engaging with the future, I was able to highlight that
although an organization cannot predict the future or anticipate a course of actions to enact
the future, it can adopt specific features that will enhance its ability to engage with the future.
This focus on organizational properties is in line with the call made by King and colleagues
for “recontextualing organizational decision-making as a function of the organizational actor,
focusing on the organization's unique properties as structuring elements of the decision
process” (King et al., 2010). By making this call, King and colleagues did not argue for a
particular theoretical lens, but emphasized the importance of understanding “how
organizations’ unique constituencies shape their ability to act autonomously and exert
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influence over the environment” (King et al., 2010, p. 299). The specific organizational
properties, discussed at length in this dissertation, were properties that can help an
organization identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.
Finally, and although not discussed at length in this dissertation, my research suggests
that foresight cannot be looked at in isolation from actions: actions also inform foresight
through the feedback received from the environment when the organization conducts actions
that have the potential to change the landscape. This observation is in line with the literature
that looked at the phenomenon from a practice perspective (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014;
Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010), which presented the process as a serendipitous one. It is also in
line with Narayanan (2004) who suggested that navigating is a paradox of pathways to the
future. My research reemphasized this point through the eyes of an organization that
dedicates its actions to the enactment of a particular vision for the future.
7.2.2 Implications for strategic management
My dissertation contributes to the field of strategic management by focusing on how an
organization can develop some form of effectiveness when it comes to engage with the
distant, a topic that has received scant attention from strategy scholars (Gavetti, 2012). One
nascent theory that aims to explain how an organization can succeed at engaging with the
distant is “behavioral strategy” (Gavetti, 2012; Powell et al., 2011). Behavioral strategy is
concerned with addressing a number of questions, such as how to improve the psychological
architecture of firms, how particular forms of behavior arise in and among organizations, and
how individual cognition scale to collective behavior (Powell et al., 2011). It aims to ground
strategic management theories in realistic assumptions about human cognition, emotion, and
social interaction to enrich strategy theory; it also calls for a plurality of approaches to the
study of strategy.
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An important recognition of behavioral strategists is the role of human agency in
influencing organizational life (Gavetti, 2012). This recognition aims to reconcile the field
with the influential assumption of bounded rationality that is at the core of the behavioral
theory of the firm (Cyert & March). With regards to the question of why certain firms might
succeed where others fail at engaging with the distant, Gavetti (2012) proposed that the core
of a firm’s success lies in strategic leaders’ ability to counter the behavioral bounds
surrounding the ability to identify superior opportunities (which, incidentally, are assumed to
be cognitively distant), to convince internal audiences of these opportunities, and to lead their
firm in their attempt to shape the landscape. If the strategic leaders of the organization are
unable to master the mental processes that are involved in identifying, acting on, and
legitimating opportunities that go against the norm, their organization will fail. If this
recognition is a welcome contribution that breaks with the tradition of perpetuating the myth
of bounded rationality (Porac & Tschang, 2013), it also raised skepticism from scholars. It
has left some of them questioning whether the theory was going too far in acknowledging the
role of individuals in a firm’s successes, at the expense of the recognition that not everything
can be controlled by individuals. For instance, serendipity and contextual factors are assumed
to play a central role in opportunity recognition (Felin et al., 2014; Winter, 2012). Hence,
focusing on strategic leaders alone cannot provide full explanations in terms of predicting
how an organization can enhance its ability to engage with the distant.
In contrast, my study adopted a holistic approach (Burgelman, 2011) to the study of
how an organization can enhance its ability to engage with the distant. It empirically focused
on a single organization over many years to develop insights as to what contributed to the
successes (failures) of this organization. The features identified (flexibility, stability, and
diversity) are not new, but by contextualizing my research through an historical case study
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approach, I was able to explain why these properties matter and how they impact an
organization’s ability to engage with the distant. In particular, it highlights that if an
organization cannot predict the future with certainty, it can prepare itself to recognize
opportunities aligned with its vision for the future when they present themselves. In itself,
this contribution is important because it brings back the organization within behavioral
strategy by providing elements of answers with regards to the psychological architecture of
firms and how individual cognition scale to collective behavior. It also provides prescriptions
as to what properties can help an organization succeed in its attempts to shape the landscape.
The insights generated by my study are not incompatible with the role of human
agency in organizations. In fact, it complements previous findings on the topic. Creating the
right context is the task of strategic leaders, or at least the one that has the greatest impact on
a firm’s longevity (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). If they cannot be involved in all spheres of
the organization’s activities, they can favor the implementation of structures, practices, and
processes that can help their organization succeed. By making this distinction, I break with a
recent trend that has unrealistic expectation about agents within an organization (Denrell,
Fang, & Winter, 2003; Mitsuhashi, 2012), while at the same time recognizing the important
role of these individuals in their organization’s successes.
7.2.3 Implications for international management
My dissertation also has implications for international management theory and practice.
International management is concerned with the study of international business phenomenon,
including the study of multinational enterprises (Forsgren, 2013; Ghoshal & Westney, 1993).
In the case I investigated, I used the complexity of Greenpeace as a global organization to
make a contribution to an understudied phenomenon (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Roth &
Kostova, 2003). Nevertheless, the research setting (a global organization), the object of
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investigation (shaping the landscape), and the methodological approach (case study based on
historiography to develop contextualized explanations) have important implications for
international management theory. More specifically, it informs current research on cognition
and attention in the multinational enterprise, a stream of research that has gained interest in
the recent years (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009; Maitland & Sammartino, 2014).
My dissertation changes the current conversation on attention and cognition in the
multinational enterprise by providing additional insights on the mechanisms enabling
attention and action across the organization. Prior studies have been instrumental in
highlighting the antecedents of headquarters’ attention to locations (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, &
Ambos, 2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Plourde et al., 2014) and its consequences on
the influence (Ambos, Andersen, & Birkinshaw, 2010) and performance of subsidiaries
(Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). It also contributed to identify the activities associated with
international attention (i.e. ability to identify issues that are global in scope) in the
multinational enterprise (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2011), and the impact of those activities on
the economic performance of multinational enterprises (Bouquet et al., 2009). Yet, these
studies focused on amounts of attention (measured based on the recognition received by
subsidiaries from headquarters) or on the activities used by firms to capture signals in the
environment. These studies did not seek to isolate the specific concerns of the firms under
investigation; they also focused on economic measures of performance instead of measures
of effectiveness with regards to the ability of firms to identify and seize opportunities. This
lack of contextualization is problematic because cognition and attention in an organizational
context is also part of a broader process at its core issues and answers. Without
contextualization on an organization’s concerns, it is difficult to understand with precision
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what were the effects of the different structures, processes, and practices that have been
associated with international attention.
In contrast, my study focused on an organization where the issues and its actions
could be clearly identified and observed. The contextualization aimed to provide
explanations on how specific properties can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with
the future, with an understanding that engaging with the future implies identifying, pursuing,
and seizing opportunities aligned with one’s vision of the future. This way of contextualizing
the phenomena provides additional explanations as to why we find the effects highlighted in
prior literature. For instance, previous research suggests that the ability to identify changes in
the environment can be enhanced through attention-sustaining and focusing devices (Bouquet
& Birkinshaw, 2011; Bouquet et al., 2009), and through the allocation of individuals who
have ties with the center of decision (Plourde et al., 2014). My study provides precisions with
regards to these findings, clarifying how activities associated with international attention (i.e.
discussions about global issues, communication between units, as well as factors associated
with a “global mindset”) influence the ability of the organization to identify and seize
opportunities that are global in scope. For example, providing simple rules to national
organizations enhanced their ability to understand what type of opportunities was important
for Greenpeace, while providing them with sufficient flexibility to identify opportunities
aligned with these goals, and to test and experiment ways to seize these opportunities.
This contextualization in terms of the focus of attention of Greenpeace also provides
an opportunity to revisit previous findings on the attention market of the MNE (Bouquet &
Birkinshaw, 2009). For instance, the location and the institutional background of a subsidiary
within the MNE network are both factors known for increasing (limiting) the attention certain
units receive from headquarters (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008); they are also known to affect
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the recognition by headquarters of opportunities held within a given country (Plourde et al.,
2014). Within Greenpeace, these factors were also creating biases in terms of which countries
received more attention. That said, strategic leaders recognized the necessity to build on their
diversity to be more effective at identifying and seizing opportunities aligned with their
mission. To foster engagement and to send the signal that all countries mattered if
Greenpeace was to succeed at shaping the landscape, and that all countries could be a source
of solutions to the problems the organization was trying to address, they adopted an
internationalist approach and granted equal voting rights to all NROs. These measures
contributed to foster engagement from organizational members and to break biases with
regards to wealthy countries’ voices.
The contextualization of my research also has implications for practitioners. Over the
years, a number of suggestions have been provided to practitioners in terms of how the
attention of senior executives can be channeled and managed to improve the performance of
their firm (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009; Plourde et al., 2014).
By highlighting how the organizational context impacted the effectiveness of Greenpeace at
enacting its environment, my research provides additional insights as to what practices,
structures, and processes can be implemented to enable the benefits of flexibility, diversity,
and stability on the ability of an organization to identify and seize opportunities aligned with
its vision for the future. Given that change in organizations takes time, and attention and
efforts of senior leaders are scarce resources, it provides ideas in terms of which of these
practices they should prioritize, and how.

7.3 Limitations and boundary conditions
No research can be accurate, simple and generalizable at the same time (Shah & Corley,
2006; Weick, 1979). My research built on an unusual research setting through historiography,
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an approach that led to rich insights on a phenomenon that has received scant attention
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010; Weick, 2007). This approach lends itself for greater accuracy (or
“particular generalization”40), which addresses ongoing concerns from scholars about
traditional approaches that are said to “sacrifice analytical precision at the organizational
level for causal explanations at the environmental level” (King et al., 2010). Nevertheless,
this is done at the expense of the generalizability of the insights generated by the study; it
thus requires a careful look at limitations and boundary conditions created by the context and
the potential transferability of the insights to other settings.
In terms of limitation and boundary conditions, it is important to take a careful look at
the particular context of Greenpeace. Greenpeace undertakes actions that aim to persuade
other actors in the environment to act with regards to the issues it targets. This implies it does
not have ownership or control over what can lead to the future it is aiming for. The
organization is thus reliant on its environment in terms of what can be achieved. A
consequence of that is that opportunities to enact a particular vision of the future are often
aligned with unforeseen events. These events open windows to persuade other actors of the
importance of addressing the issues targeted by the organization. This extreme reliance on
events in the environment as well as on the willingness of other actors to take actions
contrasts with other organizations, where a greater share of the organization’s ability to shape
the landscape is expected to be tied with its ability to generate innovation. A salient example
of this can be found in Apple and Google, which both enact their environment by generating
break-though innovation with regards to the way we use technology and innovation. The
changes they initiate concern the way we use technology, but their primary focus remains on
identifying and releasing products and services that will generate superior returns. This
40

Particular generalization implies that the generalization is specific to the case under investigation (Burgelman,
2011). It thus favors accuracy as opposed to generalizability.
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distinction implies that the nature of Greenpeace activities limits the transferability of the
insights of my study to other research settings.
Nevertheless, a number of authors (e.g. Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Kilduff et al.,
2011; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007) have highlighted the similarities between the
management of technological innovation and social movements, as both are involved in
institutional change. For instance, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) see institutional change
as “a dialectical process in which partisan actors espousing conflicting views confront each
other and engage in political behaviors to create and change institutions”. Kilduff and
colleagues (2011) emphasized different approaches and conflicting views regarding
innovation and science more generally, and how activists and businesses compete for the
same space of persuading actors in the environment to follow one path over the other. Hence,
although Greenpeace activities and actions are extreme and unconventional in nature, they
adopt a similar logic of shaping the future. This implies that the insights generated by my
study can also apply to other settings. These settings are discussed in the following section.

7.4 Transferability of insights to other settings
The most obvious type of organizations to which the insights generated by my study can
apply is other international NGOs. These organizations, which have been overlooked in the
management literature (e.g. Kistruck, Qureshi, & Beamish, 2013; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani,
2004), create value by addressing issues unaddressed by governments and businesses. This is
particularly true for advocacy organizations, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights
Watch, which aim to persuade other actors to take actions to favor progress with regards to a
specific cause. Amnesty International, for instance, aims to ensure human rights are respected
all around the world. To fulfill the organization’s mission, they must scan their environment
for potential issues and take actions that have the potential to solve these issues. Similar to
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Greenpeace, they have an ambitious global mission, manage significant resources, and
operate across national boundaries. Because one reason for these organizations to operate as
global organizations is to develop global scanning and sensing capabilities to identify and
seize opportunities on a worldwide basis, similar challenges for Greenpeace are likely to be
observed.
Another type of international NGO is operational NGOs, such as Red Cross or
Doctors Without Borders. These organizations, which are also operating on a worldwide
basis, dedicate their actions to crisis situations. They create value by such as offering services
to refugees, or providing care after environmental disasters, contributing to fill voids when
institutions collapse (Doh & Teegen, 2002; Teegen et al., 2004). Their focus is on addressing
issues directly on the field, either through their own actions, financed through fundraising
efforts, or by persuading other actors to take actions as we have seen in the recent Ebola
crisis in Africa. They do not engage with the future per se, but by focusing on one crisis at a
time, they contribute to shape the landscape as well. A central challenge for these
organizations is that many of the issues they aim to address are to remain unforeseen until
they occur. This requires them to be able to react quickly, as soon as signals of a crisis
emerge. In the case of these organizations, flexibility, stability, and diversity have the
potential to enhance their ability to act on their environment, but through different forms.
The settings presented above correspond to NGOs, but as mentioned in the limitations
sections, for-profit corporations can also face similar challenges. Global service firms, like
IBM and Accenture, are one type of organization that shares similarities with Greenpeace.
These firms' longevity depends on their ability to see broader changes within their
environment and identify trends before they emerge. In certain circumstances, they will also
attempt to shape their environment with regards to the use of specific technologies or
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practices which, in return, can fundamentally change the way individuals and organizations
behave. A salient concern for these firms is what will be the next practices of their industry
(Anand, Gardner, & Morris, 2007; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003): instead of selecting
environmental issues to be attended internationally by the organization, the challenge is to
decide what services to offer to their clients, when, and how. This is particularly true for
these firms because opportunities for new services and the development of practices and
services that match those opportunities can come from any location. Despite a wider pool of
resources, they still need to identify and make a decision about what practices and services
they should pursue, since developing those practices, pitching them to their clients, and
ensuring the development of those practices worldwide requires time and effort that engage
significant organizational resources. Once commitments have been made, windows of
opportunities are expected to play a similar role. Given this, it is believed that flexibility,
stability, and diversity will be beneficial to these organizations, and the manifestations of
these properties are likely to take a similar form.
Finally, the transferability of the insights generated from the study of Greenpeace is
not expected to be limited to organizations that are operating on a worldwide basis. The
themes approached in this dissertation are universal: many organizations that are more
limited in scope attempt, through their actions, to shape their environment in a way that
aligns with their vision of the future. It is thus expected that properties of flexibility, stability,
and diversity will be beneficial to these organizations as well, although they might take
different forms.

7.5 Implications for future research directions
This dissertation sheds light as to how an organization can enhance its ability to engage with
the future. It also raised a number of additional questions that are worth mentioning. First,
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with regards to flexibility, stability, and diversity, researchers might seek to understand when
these properties matter the most and how they might materialize in different contexts. Within
Greenpeace, flexibility, stability, and diversity were seen as conditions that were key to
success, and the performance of the organization with regards to its ability to shape the
landscape provides compelling evidence of the impact these properties can have on the
ability of an organization to engage with the future. Nevertheless, and as mentioned in the
limitations sections, the importance of these properties might vary depending on the nature of
the opportunities pursued by the organization. The degree to which the pursuit of a specific
future is controversial within a given environment is another dimension that has the potential
to modify the importance of one or the other of the properties identified in this dissertation. A
number of additional conditions have the potential to influence the saliency of each
dimension. Understanding the circumstances under which these properties are more or less
important by exploring the effectiveness of other organizations in engaging with the future
could provide valuable insights as to which property should be prioritized depending on the
particular context an organization is dealing with.
A second research direction is the link between the specificities of a particular vision
of the future and their impact on the process of engaging with the future. As highlighted in
the narrative describing the rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability of Greenpeace over
time, environmental problems that were relatively easy to grasp could be handled internally
without thorough discussions on the problem itself: the main challenge was to coordinate the
actions of different actors within the organization and to develop creative ways to
communicate information about the problems, to capture the attention of external audiences.
More complex problems, however, were more difficult to legitimize to internal and external
audiences. This finding, not thoroughly discussed in this dissertation, highlights a critical
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aspect of engaging with the future, which is the process itself. My analysis of Greenpeace
suggests that when a future is too distant from reality, the aforementioned properties appear
to become more important in order to seek “small wins”. Comparing how this process differs
depending on the specific issues aligned with one’s vision of the future could provide further
insights in terms of the challenges encountered by organizations that attempt to enact a
particular vision of the future.
Finally, not discussed in this dissertation, is the role of other actors in the enactment
of a particular vision of the future. Over the years, Greenpeace built on its external network
to gather information that could be used to identify opportunities and to ally with a number
other actors in the environment to seize these opportunities. This suggests that an
organization attempting to enact its environment cannot work in isolation if it is to succeed at
identifying and seizing opportunities aligned with its vision. Focusing on the interactions
between actors can thus provide additional insights on the process of engaging with the
future, and the factors contributing to an organization’s success at engaging with the future.
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Appendix 1: Greenpeace International income and expenditures, 1988-2011 (as reported)
Greenpeace International
Income
Grant from National Offices
Other Grants and Donations
Interest Income
Other income
Total Income
Fundraising Expenditures
Total income less fundraising
Expenditures
Grants to National Office
Campaigns
Organizational support
Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss
Total expenditures
Surplus for the year
Greenpeace International
Income
Grant from National Offices
Other Grants and Donations
Interest Income
Other income
Total Income
Fundraising Expenditures
Total income less fundraising
Expenditures
Grants to National Office
Campaigns
Organizational support
Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss
Total expenditures
Surplus for the year

1988
USD
(‘000)
22,905
998
33
87
24,023
703
23,32

1989
USD
(‘000)
27,151
2,588
278
28
30,055
2,188
27,867

1990
USD
(‘000)
31,833
1,423
143
160
33,559
1,39
32,169

1991
USD
(‘000)
39,492
730
36
66
40,324
1,421
38,903

1992
USD
(‘000)
37,358
669
39
1,01
39,076
1,172
37,904

1993
USD
(‘000)
32,549
517
1,107
177
34,343
1,483
32,86

1994
USD
(‘000)
31,115
175
632
236
32,156
1,88
30,276

1995
USD
(‘000)
34,798
-496
1,188
36,482
1,846
34,636

1996
USD
(‘000)
30,019
264
333
0
30,616
1,948
28,668

1997
USD
(‘000)
31,64
177
99
0
31,916
1,315
30,601

1998
Euros
(‘000)
28,294
180
328
30
28,832
1,431
27,401

1999
Euros
(‘000)
25,342
4,472
410
459
30,683
1,553
29,13

328
18,105
4,377
-289
22,521
799

4,66
15,939
4,15
698
25,447
2,42

1,715
24,204
7,17
486
33,575
-1,406

2,15
28,204
13,092
-529
42,917
-4,014

1,206
28,47
9,741
-150
39,267
-1,363

6,7
23,56
4,528
-1,1
33,688
-1,53

4,263
26,743
2,566
919
33,572
-2,238

6,927
25,024
5,788
701
37,739
-556

6,602
21,106
5,094
-32,802
-2,186

5,484
18,879
5,952
-30,315
1,601

4,715
17,548
3,779
-26,042
2,79

4,514
20,256
3,72
-28,49
2,193

2000
Euros
(‘000)
30,471
3,398
560
74
34,503
1,371
33,127

2001
Euros
(‘000)
35,259
3,14
664
206
39,269
1,301
37,968

2002
Euros
(‘000)
36,221
572
364
67
37,224
970
36,254

2003
Euros
(‘000)
35,233
404
292
86
36,015
952
35,063

2004
Euros
(‘000)
37,188
2,418
286
41
39,933
952
39,981

2005
Euros
(‘000)
39,071
6,151
375
88
45,685
1,116
44,569

2006
Euros
(‘000)
40,569
1,447
569
23
42,64
1,188
41,452

2007
Euros
(‘000)
47,611
1,506
693
77
49,905
1,517
48,388

2008
Euros
(‘000)
46,13
3,08
884
526
50,66
1,956
48,504

2009
Euros
(‘000)
54,947
743
546
0
56,263
2,831
54,432

2010
Euros
(‘000)
58,982
1,497
515
33
61,027
2,465
58,562

2011
Euros
(‘000)
59,709
1,255
-181
47
60,83
2,16
58,67

4,749
25,476
4,599
-34,824
-1,697

4,692
33,245
4,913
-42,85
-4,892

4,159
26,557
5,02
-35,736
518

4,38
25,782
6,862
-37,024
-1,961

4,2
24,687
6,281
-35,168
3,813

6,782
28,021
5,716
-40,519
4,05

7,36
27,507
5,716
-78
40,505
947

7,125
27,817
6,443
449
41,834
6,554

7,044
30,326
7,036
1,862
46,268
2,236

8,437
35,174
7,843
-153
51,301
3,131

11,204
31,44
7,201
-767
49,078
9,484

15,656
34,33
9,848
374
60,208
-1,538

Source: Greenpeace International annual reports, various editions
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Appendix 2: Greenpeace Worldwide (consolidated) income and expenditures, 1994-2011
Greenpeace Worldwide
Income
Grant and Donations
Interest Income
Merchandising and Licensing
Other income
Total Income
Fundraising Expenditures
Total income less fundraising
Expenditures
Campaigns
Organizational support
Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss
Total non fundraising expenditures
Surplus for the year
Greenpeace Worldwide
Income
Grant and Donations
Interest Income
Merchandising and Licensing
Other income
Total Income
Fundraising Expenditures
Total income less fundraising
Expenditures
Campaigns
Organizational support
Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss
Total non fundraising expenditures
Surplus for the year

1994
USD
(‘000)
128,682
3,452
-5,224
137,358
45,992
91,366

1995
USD
(‘000)
138,318
4,256
-10,231
152,805
59,453
93,352

1996
USD
(‘000)
134,826
3,724
1,345
-139,895
39,011
100,884

1997
USD
(‘000)
120,816
3,206
1,626
-125,648
23,857
101,791

1998
Euros
(‘000)
107,068
2,808
957
-110,833
21,357
89,476

1999
Euros
(‘000)
121,644
2,38
1,999
-126,023
29,659
96,364

2000
Euros
(‘000)
139,184
3,182
1,29
-143,646
40,553
103,093

2001
Euros
(‘000)
153,169
3,27
1,291
-157,73
45,361
112,369

2002
Euros
(‘000)
161,304
2,643
2,643
-165,349
47,887
117,462

56,752
18,978
8,805
84,535
6,831

54,378
26,855
6,554
87,787
5,565

82,553
23,736
-106,289
-5,405

83,049
21,118
-104,167
-2,376

67,488
15,489
-82,977
6,499

72,14
17,075
-89,215
7,149

79,912
20,375
-100,287
2,806

92,267
18,761
-111,028
1,341

90,308
22,024
-112,332
5,13

2003
Euros
(‘000)
159,47
2,297
1,672
-163,439
42,947
120,492

2004
Euros
(‘000)
158,527
2,304
1,212
-162,043
43,005
119,038

2005
Euros
(‘000)
169,555
3,943
-34
0
173,464
44,054
129,41

2006
Euros
(‘000)
171,367
4,863
768
23
177,021
49,205
127,816

2007
Euros
(‘000)
204,982
7,063
194
77
212,316
55,648
156,668

2008
Euros
(‘000)
196,62
4,583
-474
1,834
202,563
60,332
142,231

2009
Euros
(‘000)
195,876
1,744
150
2,087
199,857
63,149
136,708

2010
Euros
(‘000)
226,277
1,472
97
2,711
230,557
68,837
161,72

2011
Euros
(‘000)
236,862
1,999
-167
2,421
241,114
77,267
163,848

86,474
24,77
-111,244
9,41

86,532
24,597
-111,129
7,911

95,57
24,097
-119,667
9,743

97,3
24,097
1,449
122,848
4,968

99
27,997
4,034
131,031
25,637

107,688
30,455
3,355
141,498
734

108,993
31,067
-1,604
138,456
-1,748

113,58
31,883
-5,97
139,493
22,227

123,001
37,257
-391
159,867
3,981

Source: Greenpeace International annual reports, various editions
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Appendix 3: List of Identified Events from 1971 to 2001
Year
1971

N*

1972

N*

1977
1978
1978
1978
1979

G*
N*
N*
G*
N*

1979

G

1979
1979
1980

G
G
G

1980

G

1981

N

1981

G

1981

G

1981

N

1982

G

Events
Greenpeace protests voyage against US nuclear tests in Amchitka, Alaska,
leading to an important public mobilization;
The Don’t Make a Wave committee changes its name to Greenpeace
Foundation;
First Global Reunion held in Vancouver, Canada;
Greenpeace San Francisco registers the Greenpeace USA trademark;
Greenpeace Inc. is registered in the UK;
Second Global Reunion held in Vancouver, Canada;
Greenpeace Foundation files a lawsuit directed at Greenpeace San Francisco
over name ownership and policy control;
Founding of Stitching Greenpeace Council (SGC) to take control over
Greenpeace trademark worldwide. SGC uses the generic name of
‘Greenpeace International’ (GPI). The original Council includes 5 voting
members (Australia, Canada, France, UK, USA) which effectively act as the
Board of Directors;
First Annual General Meeting (AGM), held in Amsterdam, NL;
David McTaggart becomes International Chairman of SGC;
Adoption of principles for the role of the International Greenpeace Council,
which is to act as the international headquarters of Greenpeace. These
principles emphasize Council’s role for communications between regions and
with the trustees. Council’s expenses are to be covered by the revenues
generated by its international fundraising activities apportioned between
member countries in proportion to their gross income (2 percent);
The Council Chairman is authorized to move the central office to a location
that he/she deems appropriate; hire an executive director, three support staff,
and an accountant with the choice of director being subject to approval of the
trustees; undertake international fundraising, subject to the approval of
individual trustees, that no conflict arises with national fundraising and
subject to Trustee control over the revenues received; negotiate and facilitate
the development of new country offices under the general guidance of the
Trustees; develop a restructuring plan to merge the different Greenpeace
groups across the USA;
Founding of Greenpeace Film and Photo following a proposal submitted by
Greenpeace France to manage the portfolio of images of Greenpeace;
Launch of a newsletter from GPI to NROs to improve communications
between the different Greenpeace offices;
Establishment of guidelines for communications with the media. National
organizations will be responsible for adapting the message based on their
knowledge of their national press situation;
Hiring of a professional fundraiser by Greenpeace USA and establishment of
a process between national organizations and Greenpeace International to
liaise about large donations;
A Board of Directors is created to make decisions between Council meetings
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Year

1982

G

1982

G

1982

G

1982

G

1982

G

1982

G

1982
1982

G
G

1983
1984

G
G

1984

G

1985
1985

O
G

1985

G

Events
as geographic and numeric expansion made frequent meetings impossible.
The Board is made up of four members, two representing ‘Europe’ and the
other two elected by ‘ANZUSCA’: Australia, New Zealand, the US, and
Canada. Board members are elected from ranks of Executive Directors,
Trustees, and Campaigners. The Board chair takes active role in management
issues;
Separation of the role of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Managing
Director;
Standardization of the accounting year for all NROs with December 31st used
as the year end;
Standardization of Greenpeace logo across all NROs to develop a unified
image;
Development of an inventory of all assets worldwide. This inventory is used
to develop knowledge on Greenpeace tools and assets, and is falling under
the responsibility of the Marine Division;
Creation of an inventory of the libraries of the European and North American
photography departments with the intent to integrate both departments;
Creation of the role of international coordinator for all international
campaigns. Clear instructions are given to them as well as offices
administering national budgets to spend such approved monies on the issues
for which they are allocated and that any transfer of funds from one campaign
issue to another be carried out only after the unanimous approval of all
council trustee;
Consolidation of advertising and merchandising to seek economies of scale;
Adoption of clear procedures for managing the international campaigns. The
procedures include a Council Campaign Committee for administering the
approved funds for campaigns area and for selecting the international
campaigners in charge of managing the day-to-day activities. The doubleveto principle is also designed at that point, allowing international
campaigners to veto an action that might be detrimental to GPI, and the
national campaigners to veto an action in their country that might be
detrimental to their NOR;
The Marine Division obtains representation during Council meetings;
Implementation of a reporting system for Greenpeace campaigns. The
reporting system is to ensure that campaigns are staying within budget and
spending is done carefully;
Revision of Greenpeace financial system and implementation of the 24
percent rule;
Bombing of the Rainbow Warrior by the French secret services;
Adoption of policies on controversial issues to provide guidance to the
different national organizations and greater coherence in all Greenpeace
activities;
Attribution of the auditing contract to a single international auditing firm as
opposed to several firms in different countries, to solve problems with
regards to the lack of standardization between countries, differences in
terminology, format, and interpretation;
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Year
1985

G

1985

G

1985

G

1985

G

1986

G

1986

G

1986

G

1986

G

1986

G

1986

G

1986

G

1987

G

Events
The photo division, in Paris at the time, is moved to Amsterdam as part of a
long-term plan to incorporate the three service divisions and the
administration in one location;
Creation of an international media coordinator role to coordinate the media
image of the organization with particular reference to planned campaigns and
to educate the media about what Greenpeace is all about and facilitate media
access;
Integration of the lobbying work conducted regionally and internationally
across issues under the Convention project to strengthen, in the long term, the
preservation of the oceans. The Conventions Project is to fall under the
responsibility of the Political Unit, a newly created GPI division;
Creation of organizational divisions based on issue areas. From this point on,
all proposals have to fall under a specific issue area to be considered for
discussions. Also, all issue areas fall under the responsibility of an
international coordinator;
Creation of a working group to clarify Greenpeace organizational structure
and the role of different boards. The Board of Directors is moving out of
daily administration to give a greater place to the executive committee;
Distribution of the first organizational development plan. The focus of the
plan is on Greenpeace geographic expansion. The plan comes with a fund and
the allocation of resources to develop new markets;
Adoption of new rules for voting rights: each NRO has to contribute 24
percent of its income to GPI for two years in a row to have the right to vote in
Council;
Launch of a skill-sharing program, known as the Training Project, to
facilitate the development of campaigning skills across Greenpeace and share
best practices between NROs;
Creation of Greenpeace Communications Ltd. to provide communication
services to GPI and NROs. Greenpeace Communications Ltd. mandate is to
secure maximum media coverage of Greenpeace campaigns and to provide
international news agencies with photos, prints, and video material originated
or acquired by Greenpeace. It is based on a merger of Greenpeace Films and
the Photo department in Paris. Greenpeace Communications Ltd. is to be
based in London, UK;
Creation of Greenpeace Science Unit ad adoption of a principle over the use
of science, which focuses on a qualitative analysis of evidence rather than
providing hard, quantified evidence;
The Council commissions a ‘Long Term Plan’, a plan that is intended to give
strategic direction to the organization. The plan is to be supervised by the
board of directors;
Circulation of the first version of the Long Term Plan for feedback ahead of
Council. The document emphasizes the challenge of managing an
organization for which there is no previous successful model. From this
discussion, several items in the LTP were presented for approval, including
the adoption of guidelines for equipment purchases by NROs and the
adoption of a policy on acceptable damages to property;
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Year
1988

G

1988

G

1988

N

1989
1989

G
G

1990

G

1990

N

1991

G

1991

G

1991

G

1991

G

1991

G

1991

G

Events
Publication of the final version of the Long Term Plan. The plan calls for: the
creation of a ‘Terrestrial Ecology’ campaign; for the expansion of
Greenpeace into Russia, Latin America, and Japan in a ‘first tier’ expansion,
and China, India, and Africa as a second-tier expansion; as well as a new
voting right system. It also includes a list of the most salient issues
Greenpeace should address.
Steve Sawyer becomes Executive Director of GPI in place of David
McTaggart;
Germany raises concerns about NROs not making sufficient progress in terms
of fundraising. Germany is to submit a proposal on the issue at the 1990
AGM which is to include the suspension of voting rights of NORs not
making sufficient progress;
David McTaggart is elected Chairman of the Board of Directors;
Adoption of a motion to review the voting rights structure of Greenpeace.
The Voting Rights Mechanism Review Committee (VRMR) consists of the
Executive Director, one member of the Board of Directors, and one
representative from Canada, Denmark, Germany, USA, and Latin America;
Creation of a Steering Committee to reconsider the role of the
Communications department in light of the recent organizational changes;
Germany and Switzerland raise concerns about the challenges they face in
connecting with their local supporters, identifying the centralization trend that
occurred in the recent years as an impediment to their capacity to engage
volunteers in their causes;
Greenpeace voting rights structure is modified to include votes for regions.
This measure is expected to counter-balance the weight of NROs from
industrialized countries, which are the main contributors to GPI. Under this
new structure, each NRO fulfilling its financial obligations towards GPI has
one vote, and each NRO is associated with a region which has a vote on its
own regardless of its financial contribution to GPI;
Setting-up of a Rapid Response Team Working Group to address a list of
scenarios that might require a rapid action, and how these scenarios could be
handled by Greenpeace;
David McTaggart resigns as Chairman of the Board of Directors and
becomes ‘Honorary Chairman’; Matti Wuori becomes the new Chairman of
the Board;
Publication of Greenpeace's first annual report. The annual report includes a
‘Letter from the Executive Director’, summarizing the key achievements
during the year, a review of each issue area and organizational division, as
well as financial statements for GPI;
Initiation of a second strategic planning exercise labeled as the ‘One
Greenpeace’ plan. Contrary to the previous strategic planning exercise (i.e.
the ‘Long Term Plan’), this exercise is based on an organization-wide
consultation process;
Creation of a Global Issue Working Group (GIWG) as part of the strategic
planning exercise to agree on global issues and to develop a greater degree of
understanding about their complexity as well as the importance that they be
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Year
1992

G

1992

G

1992

G

1992

G

1992

G

1992

G

1992

G

1993
1993

G
G

1993

G

1993

G

Events
resolved for the organization as a whole;
Revision of the Training Project to cope with increased competition for
media attention;
Creation of the International Action Team to facilitate the conduct of direct
actions worldwide;
Communication of McTaggart about the original idea behind Greenpeace as a
response to the organizational crisis;
Publication of Greenpeace Communications Operational Review, a report
from KPMG Management Consulting, in October 1992. The report
emphasized the “lack of a formal, defined mission and strategic objectives
driven from the top”;
The Global Issue Working Group issues its report. The report states that:
“Greenpeace over-riding priority is the defense of the environment. We
achieve that by taking on and winning focused international campaigns on the
most significant threats to the environment, in ways that show leadership,
boldness and which are not open to compromise. As we develop as a global
organization, we recognize that we have a lot to learn from and about all the
cultures and societies in which we work, which will be important in
developing appropriate strategies and tactics for our campaigns.”
The report calls for cross campaigning, although there is no agreed definition
of cross-campaigning. They understand is that there are many links between
campaign issues: they want to develop links so that the arguments in one
campaign can help them win another. They also need to be aware of
contradictions so they can resolve them in advance.
Initiation of a restructuring process that emphasizes greater integration of
fundraising and media within campaign work, to maximize impact, and
greater coordination among the fundraisers of different countries; The
restructuration process also includes layoffs and budget cuts as a way to
reduce expenses;
Steve Sawyer resigns as Executive Director. Discuss the process for hiring a
new Executive Director;
Paul Gilding becomes the new Executive Director of GPI;
Publication of the Greenpeace Strategic Plan as the outcome of the strategic
planning exercise initiated in 1991. The report offers a diagnosis on the
problems faced by the organization in light of changes in the environment
and of its recent growth. It also includes a number of propositions for the
adoption of a mission statement, the allocation of resources, the division of
tasks and responsibilities within the organization, and for the creation of area
advisors. Few of its recommendations will be implemented in the short-term
due to leadership turmoil;
Publication of the Greenpeace Global Resources report, to give an overview
of Greenpeace assets worldwide;
Adoption of new guidelines for resource allocation based on the 50/30/20
system, with 50 percent of resources allocated to priority campaigns (short
term pushes to save a given ecosystem or have a piece of legislation adopted),
30 percent to ongoing campaigns (campaigns that are focusing on issues that
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Year

1993
1994

G
G

1994

G

1995
1995

G
G

1995

G

1995

G

1995

G

1995
1995

G
N

1995

G

1996

G

1996

G

1996
1996

G
G

1996

G

1996

G

Events
require a long-term and ongoing commitment, such as the protection of
whales), and 20 percent allocated to contingencies arising from unpredictable
events;
Adoption of a formal mission statement;
Paul Gilding is forced by the Board of Directors to resign as Executive
Director of GPI; Steve d’Esposito replaces him for the interim;
The Board of Directors of GPI is forced to resign upon the dismissal of Paul
Gilding as Executive Director; Following the resignation of the Board of
Directors, a new Board is elected and a committee is established to revise
Greenpeace's structure and clarify the role of the different boards and
committees;
Thilo Bolde becomes the new Executive Director of GPI;
Introduction of Joint Committee Meetings as part of the strategic planning
process to favor greater integration of Greenpeace actions across campaigns
and countries;
Introduction of Executive Directors Meetings (twice a year) to exchange on
best organizational practices across NROs and to adopt a proactive approach
towards organizational issues;
Initiation of the program of reform to improve international and national
relationships. The program of reform aims to clarify the relationship between
the different governance boards, to maximize the organization’s
effectiveness;
Introduction of regional bureaus to facilitate special events, rapid response,
and foster the identity of Greenpeace.
Launch of Greenpeace website by Greenpeace Communications;
Greenpeace UK and Greenpeace Netherlands launch an action against the
sinking of the Brent Spar oil platform by Shell. The action becomes highly
successful and leads to an important mobilization of the organization and a
significant increase in donations and memberships;
Approval by Council of the new principles of governance, which includes the
renewal of Greenpeace articles of association, rules of procedures, and the
implementation of the Program of Reforms by NROs;
The Communications department, previously based in London, UK, is moved
to Amsterdam, at international headquarters. It is identified as a strategic
decision to ensure the thorough integration of the Communications
department with campaigns and all other international functions, to prevent
performance issues that occurred in the past;
Relocation of international campaign coordinators to Amsterdam, to facilitate
the integration of communications and campaign activities;
Dismantling of the Latin America Regional Structure;
Ratification of new Articles of Association, Rules of Procedures, and NROs
Guidelines;
Brainstorming session on ‘Finding Talent’ to favor the recruitment of the best
employees;
Publication of a report analyzing four cases of successful campaigning that
occurred in the past 10 years (Lead in Europe, etc.) in order to identify
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Year
1996

G

1996

G

1997

G

1998

G

1998

G

1998

G

1998

G

1999

G

1999

G

1999

G

Events
success factors in Greenpeace actions;
Revision of the planning process for campaigns: the planning process
becomes an ongoing activity involving different committees to further
integrate Greenpeace activities across functions. As part of this process,
issues no longer have to fit into a ‘box’ to be approved or supported by the
organization;
Circulation of the document “Thoughts on the Role of Greenpeace in the
World.” The document emphasized that “discussions on Greenpeace’s role in
society should be ongoing at every level of the organization.” (EDD 1996
February: p. 9)
Publication of guidelines for the third strategic planning exercise. The
process had been initiated in 1996 and involved the Board, the Council,
NROs, and Executive Directors to develop a common vision for the
organization. It is emphasized that “strategic planning is a continuous process
that should overlap with implementation.” (EDMM 1997: p. 6). This is a
sharp contrast with the two previous strategic planning exercises where
planning and implementation were considered as two distinct phases. The
Strategic Plan includes several components: Greenpeace 2000, which consists
in a strategic vision for the organization in terms of campaigning, the role of
Greenpeace in the world, offices, finance and fundraising, relations between
GPI and NROs, human resources, and ships.
Design of a policy on ‘Greenpeace working with business’. The documents
explain that ‘business is as much part of the solution as part of the problem.
Greenpeace campaigning involving fixed-term strategic alliances with sectors
of the business community is a necessary and legitimate tactic in achieving
the organization’s aims. Strategic alliances with the business community may
be an integrated part of Greenpeace campaign strategy.’ (EDMM 1998a: p.
27)
Publication of a report on globalization and its impact on Greenpeace
International.
Blue Sky discussions on re-visioning how Greenpeace works and should
work.
Global expansion is now based on experimentation through campaign offices
and fundraising before further commitment is made.
Publication of the Greenpeace Global Presence report to the Executive
Directors. It presents a detailed report on Greenpeace international presence.
Publication of the ‘One Greenpeace’ report as a sequel to the Program of
Reforms and as part of the ongoing strategic planning exercise initiated in
1997. One Greenpeace is “to respond to have been the decline in the
importance of national boundaries socially and politically, the rise of the
Internet and new forms of communication, the networking of economies and
the growth in the power and scope of transnational corporations.” (Board
Meeting Minutes 2000a: p. 6).
Adoption of an innovation budget for “campaigning, which goes beyond
business as usual with the aim to test new ideas and approaches.” The budget
is established at USD 500,000.
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Year
1999

Events
G
Launch of an Internet/Interactive Digital TV global environmental news. The
project is divided into several phases and is partially funded by working
alongside hardware and software companies and forming alliances with large
NGOs such as WWF.
1999 G
Use of Global Teams: Global Teams are considered as an alternative for
smaller offices to develop expertise and improve their local performance.
Global teams have a longer horizon compared to project teams.
1999
G Introduction of Centers of Excellence, although there is not a unanimous
support given the need for campaigns and Greenpeace functions to work
closely with one another. Centers of Excellence would dedicate their time to
a specific function, such as fundraising, actions warehouse, trademarks,
specific policy development, or specific campaign concepts.
1999
G Introduction of ‘Greenpeace 2000’ and the ‘Key Opportunity Projects’
(KOPs) at the JCM, which is a two-stage process which consists in first
identifying ‘key opportunities’, and then run those as campaign projects,
aiming to reinforce any of them that begin to grow into truly global or
regionally significant campaigns that resonate strongly with the public. In
1999, this led to the identification of 20 potential campaigns to follow.
2000
G Various initiatives to improve the performance of GPI with regards to human
resources, communications, the International Marine and Actions
Department, and staffing levels.
2000
G Prelaunch of the “One Greenpeace” project.
2000
G Exploration of possibilities offered by new medias.
2001
G Thilo Bolde retires as International Executive Directors of Greenpeace
International. He is replaced by Gerd Leopold.
2001
G Launch of a program for knowledge management and improvement of IT
infrastructures.
2001
G Relaunch of the Rapid Response project, to redefine how this should be done
to enhance Greenpeace ability to respond quickly to disasters.
a
The letters beginning items indicate their provenance. “G” is Greenpeace International
headquarters; “N” is a National Organization; “O” is an outside event.
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Appendix 4: Chairman's Speech to Council
“I would like to start by quoting from Man and Superman by George Bernard
Shaw: -‘The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists
in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the
unreasonable man.’
In this context, I am an unreasonable man! And GREENPEACE'S success to-date
is based on the same premise of trying to adapt the world to our long-term goals and
objectives! We are a most unreasonable gang of men and women - and, if we are to be
worth our salt, precisely this is expected of us, with dedication.
There can be little doubt in anyone's mind that the problems we have encountered
and faced up to during the past twelve months, have been amongst the most difficult and
complex in the history of our organisation. We have initiated a dramatic restructuring,
following the new priorities that were laid down for us at the Regional Trustees meeting.
As a result, we have now laid the firm foundations of a political control structure that
will allow us to build for the future. We have also got 'to grips with the lack of financial
realism that has been prevalent in many parts of the organisation over the past few years.
This has necessitated the recent round of budget cuts that have impacted on both our
staff and the execution of our campaigns, and this has been a painful process for all of
us. But better financial rigour, coupled with streamlined fiscal management and accurate
and timely reporting, will be crucial as we enter another year of economic recession and
growing political uncertainty in both the OECD and non-OECD world. We must play to
our strengths and reinforce our internationalism at every opportunity. This will
inevitably mean building stronger bonds between the ‘national’ and ‘international’
aspects of our organisation and exploiting this partnership for the greater good of
Greenpeace. Greenpeace IS one Greenpeace, remember? The qualitative steps that we
have already taken in refocusing the organisation would be applauded by Alfred
Chandler, the current Professor of Business History at Harvard University. His major
belief is that the structure of an organisation should follow on from the strategy that is
adopted, and that the distinction between the two is crucial. For him, STRATEGY is the
determination of basic long-term goals and objectives, together with the adoption of
courses of action and the allocation of resources for carrying out these goals.
STRUCTURE is the organisation, which is devised to administer the activities, which
arise from the strategies adopted. As such it involves the existence of leadership, the
distribution of work, as well as lines of authority and communication. Although we have
consciously chosen to proceed in an inverted order, defying established text book
solutions to organisational renewal, and although both are in need of further
development, we now have the basic elements of strategic thinking and of structure there
and on behalf of the Board, I would like to congratulate Steve and his senior staff at
International, for their dedication and commitment to implementing this difficult
process. Intermediary steps are still missing and many of the pieces we have must still
fall in place. Yes, there is still much to be done, but the worst is past. The foundations
have now been laid to enable us to move forward.
We are, in every sense of the word, at the crossroads in our development. There
are only two roads to follow: the one ahead, or the one behind us. Remaining at the
crossroads is not an option. We have already chosen a POSITIVE rather than a
DEFENSIVE STRATEGY. In this sense we have recreated GREENPEACE as a real
force for the 90's. We also have the advantage of being able to see and predict some of
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the obstacles on the road ahead, so that we can either negotiate or overcome them. But
we will only be successful, if we move ahead together. At the risk of sounding cliché, we
should take the slogan UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL as one of the main
themes for this historic AGM […].
For the first time in years, the Pre-Council consultative process has cleared the
decks of a lot of business that would normally take up time on the Council floor. Over
the next few days, we will have time to address some of the vitally important issues that
are now facing us. Previously hidden agenda's have been brought out into the open and
aired many disputes and contentious issues have already been resolved. We have had no
choice in this matter, but the time constraints placed upon us, have freed us up to tackle
the really important problems facing us. You have all been involved in this process […].
We can no longer afford the luxury of divisive or centrifugal disputes and debates about
issues that are secondary or irrelevant to our overriding goals and objectives. We can
still be masters of our own destiny, but we will only succeed if we are united behind our
mission.
We know that one of the reasons that we have so much support is because we are
international (while we could and should be even more so!) because we do maximise our
unique characteristics and resources to unite issues in time and place [emphasis added].
We do this in order to take on our adversaries where ever they are, and where ever the
consequences of their global policies may manifest themselves.
What we need is financial stability, intellectual rigour and the flexibility to adapt
our tactics in an ever more dramatically changing political, social, moral and economic
climate [emphasis added]. Right now we are approaching the fourth great economic
cycle since the birth of modern capitalist economy (or more accurately since 1812). This
cycle coincides with the biological life of my generation, starting after the Second World
War and reaching its peak in 1967. What is at stake now is not just recession and
eventual recovery of ‘business as usual’. The planet will not survive a fifth cycle. It
would be growth into bankruptcy, and this phenomenon is part of the cross roads we
have reached and must face up to, just one of the many challenges that lie ahead.
The political and economic face of the world has changed dramatically since the
beginning of the decade and this change is accelerating at an alarming rate. The
environment is under greater threat than ever before as the transnationals position
themselves to take over the new ‘economic order’. Green washing is becoming part of
our daily lives and poses one of the most significant threats to the survival of the
environmental movement. The global recession, eco-fatigue, a satiated media, and the
moral crisis are further challenges that we will have to face in the future. In the post
UNCED era our 5 million members and countless millions of passive supporters are
looking to us as the best hope for the future. This is an awesome and terrifying
responsibility. Time and time again, we have proved that we can win against great odds.
We still have an overall income in excess of $140m, nearly 1,000 staff, a fleet of ships,
an international media organisation, nearly 5 million members and we are a household
name in many countries.
BUT our most valuable assets are the talent, dedication and commitment of our
staff. Let's face it: Greenpeace is not just about supporters, shoes and ships and sealing
wax. Greenpeace is an IDEA. Offices, ships or (heaven forbid!) satellites are only tools.
What matters 'is the idea and the know-how to make it work. We should not become too
attached to any particular hardware, be it a ship or a personal computer or an instrument
of any kind, as long as we ensure that we have adequate tools to work with. (Come to
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think of it: Where is PHYLLIS CORMACK now?) Our hardware must be in top shape,
but at the end of the day it's the software that counts, the idea. We intend to take care of
both. To optimise them. And with physical and human resources such as these we can
make a real impact, rather than a dent, on the environmental crisis and really change the
world.
Whichever way you look at it, I believe that we are stronger now than ever before.
We have been through a painful learning experience. We are leaner, fitter and more
focussed. Over the past few months there has sometimes been a tendency to play safe, to
hide behind group decisions, and for certain national offices to assume some of the
functions of the International Board. I have heard Greenpeacers say that there was a
sense of paralysis, demoralisation, of working in a vacuum, of lack of direction, as we all
tried to come to terms with the urgent need to restructure, fix new priorities and make
hard financial and budgetary decisions, all up against the clock! I am not therefore
surprised that some of these perceptions should have been prevalent and that there was
real concern throughout the organisation. But we have come through the process and the
ED and International staff should take pride in the professional and humanitarian way in
which they have handled the crisis. However we must not now make the mistake of
being over cautious. That will only lead to stagnation and standstill and status quo,
powerful forces that we are trying to fight wherever they rear their ugly heads. As an
industrialist (Gordon Forward, President of Chaparral Steel) said: - ‘You've got to have
an atmosphere where people can make mistakes. If you're not making mistakes, you're
not going anywhere.’ Or as Sochiro Honda, founder of the Japanese multi-national put
even more dramatically:- ‘Many people dream of success. To me success can only be
achieved through repeated failure and introspection. In fact, success represents the 1% of
your work which results from the 99% that is called failure.’
I am not suggesting this is the case with us or recommending that we adopt that
ratio. What I am suggesting is that mistakes are an unavoidable part of innovative human
endeavour. Caution is for those who are satisfied with things as they are or too timid or
powerless to change them. It is the favourite preoccupation of bureaucrats. ·we are for
dynamic change. Therefore we must accept risks and the possibility of mistakes, but
minimise them through professionalism.
I can certainly assure you that the Board will not be faint of heart as we face the
challenges of 1993. We will not succumb to the temptation to play safe and will continue
to support bold, courageous strategies and tactics. But we will also develop long-term
strategic plans and closely monitor the financial health of the organisation. Moreover, we
will be working to release the tremendous potential Greenpeace has, and-which still has
not been fully utilised.
I do not believe that I have underestimated the problems in the future, but I do
have a real sense of optimism. I believe that 1993 will be a landmark in Greenpeace's
development and that as we move forward together, as a truly united organisation, we
will all look back on this AGM as one of the most positive in the history of Greenpeace.
As I said in my opening quote from George Bernard Shaw, ‘progress is in the hands of
unreasonable people’, Greenpeace is full of unreasonable people and we will triumph
through our unity of purpose.”
- David McTaggart (SGC 1992 AGM, p. 41-45)
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